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Disability is a universally difficult concept to define and assess for social assistance and social 
insurance purposes. The ways in which access to disability welfare rights are defined and 
allocated remain especially neglected in the Global South. This thesis examines the 
administration of the disability grant (DG) in South Africa, where unusually generous disability 
benefits exist alongside very high levels of unemployment and poverty. It focuses on the role of 
doctors, who must confirm that applicants for the DG are disabled, serving as gatekeepers, and 
thus as ‘street level bureaucrats’ within the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA).  
Observations of doctor-claimant interactions in clinics and hospitals showed that disability 
assessments are sites of contestation between doctors, claimants and the state over how social 
security rights should be allocated. Doctors struggled to balance their roles and obligations as 
medical professionals, gatekeepers and moral agents, in a context where issues of employability 
and disability are hard to separate. In the face of heavy workloads and significant pressure from 
claimants to recommend grants, doctors employed coping strategies that distanced and 
objectified patients. Despite efforts by SASSA to curb their discretion, doctors inserted their 
own subjective understandings of disability and deservingness into the assessment process as 
they interpreted and applied DG policy in their interactions with claimants - bending the rules 
for people they thought were ‘deserving’ and rigidly applying the rules in ‘undeserving’ cases.  
Variation in doctors’ decision-making reflects different ways of framing disability cases. The 
interpretive schemas that doctors used to organise and make sense of cases were shaped by 
their social background and dispositions, work environment, professional and personal norms 
and values, and ideas about distributive justice. Framing is also an interactive process and was 
influenced by claimants, who brought their own agency to bear on the assessment. The concept 
of framing contributes to street-level bureaucracy theory by capturing the pluralism of norms 
and ideas that ground street-level actions, whilst allowing us to observe and explain patterns 
emerging in street-level decisions. It is also useful in examining the relationship and potential 
conflicts between professional expertise, social norms and values, and bureaucratic rules. The 
study also shows the need for scholars of street-level bureaucracy to consider the influence of 
citizen agency on policy implementation. The challenges and pressures doctors faced in 
categorising disability, combined with patients’ misunderstanding of and resistance to these 
categories and related demands to be included in the system, demonstrate significant gaps in the 
design and application of social security and poverty alleviation policy in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Doctor Rahman stood at the door, calling out to the huddle of patients waiting outside in the 
passage: “Thobani Dlamini”. Shortly afterwards, a young man entered the consulting room. Dr 
Rahman and I were sitting in a shipping container attached to a small clinic in one of the small 
towns in the wine lands around Cape Town in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. 
Most of the people living in the area rely on unskilled, seasonal work on the surrounding farms 
during fruit-picking season. That day twenty of them, who were applying for a disability grant 
(DG), were waiting to see Dr Rahman. The South African DG is a non-contributory, means-
tested cash transfer of R1420 ($107) per month (as of April 2015), available on a permanent or 
temporary (6-12 months) basis to people deemed unfit to work as a result of functional 
impairment and who do not have sufficient other means of support. As of September 2015, 1.1 
million people - approximately 3.4% of the working age population1 - were receiving disability 
grants (SASSA, 2015).  
Confirmation of disability by a medical doctor is a requirement for all DG applications. Dr 
Rahman was contracted by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to conduct 
medical assessments to determine whether claimants were what the state considers to be 
disabled. He moved daily between clinics in the Western Cape, seeing dozens of patients 
applying for DGs, the care dependency grant (for parents of disabled children) or the grant-in-
aid (a small grant given to elderly or disabled people in need of permanent care)2. He was a 
medical professional, with his own private practice, but in the work he did for SASSA he acted 
as a bureaucrat of the state. Although medical doctors are professionals providing therapeutic 
care to their patients, in their role as disability assessors they become also (or even primarily) 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010); i.e. frontline workers who control access to public 
services through the ‘application’ – and interpretation – of government laws, rules and policies 
during their face-to-face encounters with citizens. These doctors are tasked with a gatekeeping 
rather than (or in addition to) their therapeutic role, as part of a bigger rule-bound bureaucratic 
process.  
During the day I spent with Dr Rahman, he told me several times that he had fantasised a lot 
                                                
1 According to the 2011 Census, 33.2 million people are of working age (between 16 and 35) 
2 As of September 2015, 126,642 people received the Grant-in-Aid and 129,296 received the CDG (SASSA, 2015) 
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about developing a formula or algorithm that would help him standardise his decision-making. 
He described a computer programme that would allow him to put all the variables into a 
system, weigh them and produce a recommendation based on the patient’s specific profile. 
Although removing what he called “the human element” or the discretionary aspect of decision-
making would make his job easier, Dr Rahman knew that his imaginary system would be 
impossible and undesirable to implement because it would override individual experiences or 
circumstances (i.e. the very things that made his job difficult). 
Thobani Dlamini provided an example of why Dr Rahman thought that a formulaic objective 
system like this could never work in practice. Although Mr Dlamini was only 31, his gaunt face 
made him look much older. He had been diagnosed with HIV in 2005 and should have started 
anti-retroviral treatment (ART) in 2008, but it was now 2014 and he had never taken any 
medication. His health was deteriorating, which was demonstrated by his low CD4 count and 
recent tuberculosis (TB) diagnosis3. He was evasive about why he was not taking ART 
treatment, but after some probing, he reluctantly admitted to Dr Rahman that he was receiving 
treatment from a sangoma (traditional healer) instead of taking ART, although he was taking 
his TB medication. Dr Rahman told me afterwards that an algorithm would never be able to 
account for a situation like this. By refusing an available form of treatment for his condition, 
Dlamini would be classified by a computer as ineligible. Dr Rahman thought not taking into 
account the specific context of the case would be unfair and that a human being therefore 
needed to make this decision. Dr Rahman felt that he could not discriminate against someone’s 
belief system and that he needed to be flexible and open-minded in cases where people 
preferred to use alternative therapies.  
Social security legislation and SASSA guidelines lay down specific rules and provide a set of 
eligibility criteria for DGs to ensure that DGs are equitably distributed to people who ‘deserve’ 
them. Although perhaps not as refined as Dr Rahman’s imagined system, SASSA’s guidelines 
actually provide fairly straight-forward directives on how to handle cases such as Mr 
Dlamini’s. Where patients are non-compliant or do not properly adhere to treatment, the 
guidelines clearly advise against recommending a DG. Dr Rahman was familiar with these 
guidelines and it seemed that what he was really looking for in some objective computer system 
is a way for him to overcome his daily moral quandary: whether to err on the side of the patient 
                                                
3 CD4 count refers to the number of CD4 or T-cells per cubic millimetre of blood and is a key indicator of the 
progression of HIV. A normal CD4 count is somewhere between 500 and 1,200. 
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or the state. Although many patients clearly do or do not qualify on a clinical basis alone, many 
others fall into a grey area, especially when socio-economic factors and actual employability 
are taken into account. Although SASSA does allow doctors some discretion in considering 
non-medical factors such as level of education in cases of moderate impairment (which it 
classifies as an abnormality that interferes with function), SASSA defines employability in 
terms of one’s ability to participate in the open labour market, regardless of the availability of 
work (SASSA, n.d: 4). Considering that the DG is not intended to address poverty amongst the 
non-disabled population, this definition makes sense. For doctors, however, it is difficult to 
divorce a claimant’s physical ability to work from the broader economic and social context. 
When considering the employability of individuals like Dlamini, Dr Rahman found it difficult 
not to consider how unlikely they were to find a job, especially given the paucity of skills 
development or re-training programs in surrounding areas. Why should belief-based non-
compliance with treatment preclude an obviously sick man from being deemed disabled when 
compliance would probably not secure him a job? 
The case of Dr Rahman and Mr Dlamini shows that despite rules and regulations that outline 
specific claimants’ eligibility for DGs, decisions on eligibility are seldom clear-cut. This case 
of non-compliance related to cultural beliefs provides an example of one of the many moral and 
intellectual struggles that physicians like Dr Rahman face in making DG decisions in a context 
like South Africa. Dr Rahman was thorough in his work and made considered choices, but he 
struggled to balance his responsibility to individual patients with his responsibility to SASSA. 
All the exceptions he made for individuals based on what he thought was in their best interests 
made him a poor gatekeeper and he had been cautioned by SASSA about his high approval 
rates. Despite being reprimanded, he had really struggled to adapt to their approach. “The best 
approach is probably to be rigid, but then are you really doing justice to people? This is the 
problem I sit with.”  
This research explores these and other tensions in the DG system. Focusing on the use of 
discretion in the medico-bureaucratic work in DG assessments in the Western Cape Province, it 
focuses on how doctors like Dr Rahman interpret and apply DG policy in their interactions with 
claimants and explores the gaps between social policy, medical knowledge and practice. It 
shows how doctors juggle their responsibilities as medical professionals, gatekeepers and moral 
agents within a context of contrasting and unresolved discursive tensions relating to 
development and welfare, as well as regulatory and budgetary challenges brought about by an 
HIV epidemic, high levels of structural unemployment and poverty. This is grounded in 
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observations of the daily encounters between DG applicants and doctors and interviews with 
doctors about these interactions, which both shed light on the underlying factors that shape 
doctors’ decisions. I argue that the pressures and constraints doctors face in working as 
gatekeepers for the state highlights important failures in both social protection and disability 
policy.  
Not all doctors involved in this study approached DGs in the same way as Dr Rahman. As I 
will demonstrate, some were extremely strict and inflexible, some (like Dr Rahman) were 
happy to bend the rules to accommodate greater numbers of poor patients and some bent the 
rules for individual patients who they felt were particularly deserving, while enforcing the rules 
strictly in what they perceived to be undeserving cases. An article in the Mail and Guardian 
(Green, 2015), headlined TB Man’s Shirt Too Nice for a Grant, illustrates the latter case well. It 
tells the story of Bongani Ngcobo from a rural settlement in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 
who lost his job because of his multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, which requires two years of 
intense treatment. Despite MDR TB being a clear case of medical eligibility, the doctor 
assessing him refused to recommend a grant, telling him that he dressed too well to be poor and 
that others needed the grant more than him4. Doctors are employed to conduct medical, not 
financial assessments of claimants’ eligibility (SASSA carries out formal means testing) and by 
making this snap judgement, the doctor concerned was clearly stepping beyond the boundaries 
of his assignment. I argue that this subjective decision-making by doctors should not just be 
treated as arbitrary bias to be eliminated by introducing more rules, reducing discretion and 
increasing bureaucratic oversight. Rather, the patterns that emerge in examining doctors’ 
decision-making reveal important aspects of the institutional, organisational and professional 
logics that structure doctors’ work, as well as the discourses and values that shape social 
development, health and disability policy in South Africa.  
In examining the day-to-day interactions between physicians like Dr Rahman and DG 
claimants like Mr Dlamini, I show how doctors act as intermediaries between claimants and the 
state, working within the constraints of SASSA’s rules and processes, but also using their 
discretion to insert their own ideas and values into this process. Using the concept of framing 
(Goffman, 1974) to understand doctors’ decision-making, I show that as professional, moral 
and social agents, doctors bring different framings of disability to bear on assessments. I 
demonstrate how citizen-state interactions in administrative settings can be sites of negotiation 
                                                
4 As a result of the publication of this story, Ngcobo was eventually awarded a grant  
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and contestation around entitlements to social welfare. The encounters between doctors and 
claimants reveal how ideas and values about distribution and social justice and conceptions of 
the deserving poor are constructed, and can influence social policy implementation. I argue that 
it is important to attend to the disability assessment process and the politics that emerge around 
disability assessment, not only for what it adds theoretically to the study of frontline workers in 
public services, but for its practical implications. Understanding the challenges and pressures 
doctors currently face in assessing disability will provide greater insight into gaps and 
inconsistencies in the current design and application of social security policy in South Africa. 
In the first part of this introductory chapter, I present an overview of the programme and show 
how the universal ambiguity of the disability category and both the general and South African-
specific difficulties in assessing disability make it an interesting case study of welfare policy 
implementation. I then present an overview of the comparative and South African sociological 
literatures on street-level bureaucracy and medical gatekeeping. This is followed by a 
discussion of my methodological approach in relation to other studies of street-level 
bureaucracy and studies of doctor-patient interactions and a brief overview of my research 
design. This chapter concludes with a roadmap of the remainder of this thesis.   
1.2 The ambiguities of disability grants 
The past two decades have seen the massive growth of social protection programs in the Global 
South (ILO, 2014). These have largely emerged in the form of direct cash transfers to the poor, 
which have been demonstrated to reduce poverty and promote development (DFID, 2011; 
UNICEF, SASSA & DSD, 2012; Samson et al., 2010; Hanlon et al., 2010). South Africa has 
featured prominently in this story as a case study of success. South Africa’s social assistance 
system comprises eight cash transfer programmes5. These cash transfers (or social grants) have 
been heralded (although perhaps begrudgingly) by the South African government as its most 
effective anti-poverty initiative.  
The development of social assistance programmes offered in the form of cash transfers 
emerged much earlier (between the late 1920s and mid-1940s) and along a different path to the 
cash transfer programmes that have more recently emerged in other countries in Africa 
                                                
5 South Africa has five social grants in addition to the three disability-oriented ones: Older Person’s Grant (also 
known as the old-age pension, for people over 60); Child Support Grant (children under 18); Foster Child Grant 




(Seekings, 2015). Although social grants are a legacy of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid 
past, the post-apartheid government has overseen a massive expansion of social grants from 2.4 
million beneficiaries in 1994 to over 16 million in 2015. South Africa’s social assistance 
programmes have a very wide reach and two-thirds of households have a member with some 
sort of social grant income (Seekings & Moore, 2013).  
This growth has not come without controversy and there have been extensive debates in the 
media, through which both the public and government have expressed concerns about possible 
perverse incentives associated with grants, as well as concerns about undeserving claimants 
receiving grants, particularly the Child Support Grant (CSG)6 and the DG. Although there is 
little ideological contestation around whether children or disabled people ‘deserve’ state 
assistance, there has been significant anxiety about whether these groups are targeted 
effectively; i.e. whether mothers who receive a CSG for their children spend it on the children 
and whether the people receiving DGs are genuinely disabled.  
The DG has for many years proven extremely difficult to administer and target effectively 
(Graham et al., 2010). The main eligibility criterion for the DG (work disability) is 
considerably ‘fuzzier’ and more flexible than criteria used to identify ‘deserving’ categories of 
people as eligible for other types of grant. In order to apply for an Old Age Pension or CSG, 
claimants must provide SASSA officials with proof of their identity, age and financial means, 
whereas applications for disability-related grants also requires an assessment of disability7. As 
social security legislation requires that assessments be conducted by medical doctors, the South 
African government relies on the expertise, authority, and discretion of these professionals to 
assess whether an applicant is medically eligible for disability assistance and their gatekeeping 
work has been difficult to manage8. There are long-standing concerns amongst policy-makers, 
implementers and civil society that DG assessments are highly subjective and open to bias and 
fraud on the part of both doctors and patients (see Chapter 2)9. Whilst overt incidents of fraud 
(e.g. falsified documents and bribes to doctors) has been easier to address with the 
                                                
6 The CSG, paid to the primary caregivers of children, has the largest coverage of South Africa’s social grant 
programmes, reaching over 11 million children. 
7 The Care Dependency Grant for disabled children and Grant-in-Aid also require a doctor to determine how 
disabled an individual is.   
8 Attempts have been made to de-medicalise assessments by including other healthcare professionals and 
community representatives in the assessment process, but these have been unsuccessful. See Chapter 2.  
9 Doctors also experience difficulties in determining children’s eligibility for the CDG, which is equal in value to 
the DG. However, there is less demand for this grant and with the exception of one highly disputed media report 
about women intentionally disabling their children by drinking during pregnancy (Davis, 2013) there has been 
significantly less concern about this issue.  
 
 8 
establishment of SASSA and introduction of new management procedures aimed at preventing 
fraud, regulating the more regular but often divergent decisions doctors make has been more 
challenging.    
One of the reasons why DG assessments are so difficult to regulate is because disability is a 
complex and multi-dimensional concept. Ambiguities around the definition of disability and 
difficulties in making binary distinctions between disabled and non-disabled people mean it is 
difficult to use disability as an administrative category for allocating social rights. As a result, 
even countries in the Global North with well-established disability assessment systems struggle 
to target disability benefits (Bolderson et al., 2002). The South African context creates a 
number of additional difficulties in accurately targeting intended beneficiaries. These 
contextual problems include: unemployment, poverty, grant generosity (relative to earnings) 
inherited from the apartheid welfare state and the HIV epidemic which has greatly escalated 
demand for the grant.  
Significant and longstanding debates exist in the disability studies, medical and social policy 
literature about how disability and impairment should be conceptualised. Much of this debate 
has been around the extent to which disability should be treated as an embodied, individual and 
medical problem or a fluid and relational concept determined by the interaction between the 
person and their environment and therefore social problem and human rights issue (Swartz & 
Schneider, 2006: 234; Oliver, 1996; Shakespeare, 2006). Although these theoretical debates 
have not been fully resolved10, it is now generally accepted that disability is a complex, 
multidimensional concept and the presence of disability may vary between individuals based on 
socio-economic circumstances, culture, environmental conditions and personal characteristics 
(Altman, 2001).  
Although understandings of disability have become more nuanced and inclusive over time, 
policy makers need to translate abstract ideas about disability and resolve how to define, 
operationalise and measure disability for administrative purposes. As no single definition of 
disability is feasible or desirable that will fit all purposes of assessment or all contexts, 
disability determination subject to ideological, technical and administrative challenges and 
disputes (Gooding & Marriott, 2009: 691; Hicks, 2001). The standards used to measure 
disability are therefore typically more a function of their particular purpose and the political, 
                                                
10 I will not address these debates because this thesis is not concerned with normative ideas of how disability 
should be defined, but with how disability has been and is defined and operationalised as a category of ‘need’ in 
the welfare state and how this shapes the distribution of resources. 
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economic and social context in which they are used than some objective, bio-scientific 
framework or universal truth about what disability ‘is’ (Jette, 2002,  Stone, 1984; Møller & 
Stone, 2013; Anner et al., 2013; Andrews et al., 2006)11. For example, in South Africa there are 
different operational definitions of disability for workmen’s compensation claims, social grants, 
employment equity policy, and education policy. Whilst in education a more inclusive 
definition of disability is appropriate to identify children in need of additional support, when 
disability is used as a categorical targeting mechanism for social benefits and assessments have 
financial implications, the definition of disability has to be more limited in scope (Albrecht, 
1992).  
People with physical, mental, sensory and intellectual impairments face impairment-related as 
well as social, economic and environmental barriers to participation in the mainstream labour 
market. In recognition of these difficulties, many states provide welfare benefits to people with 
disabilities who cannot be suitably employed. Identifying who should qualify for these benefits 
is however difficult, and countries with more developed welfare systems than South Africa, 
with much greater capacity and resources for assessing disability claims, still struggle with 
inclusion and exclusion errors in determining eligibility for disability-targeted welfare 
programmes (OECD, 2010). These difficulties are not new and concerns about how to define 
impairment and disability and the tendency of disability programmes to grow, date back to the 
first implementation of social insurance programmes in Bismarck’s Germany in the 1880s and 
social assistance offered through poor relief systems in England (Priestley, 2010; Stone, 1984).  
There are numerous reasons for this. Firstly, exempting certain groups from participating in the 
work-based system and providing them with social aid requires making normative decisions 
about who can legitimately access support from the state. Given the expectation that people will 
attempt to avoid work, liberal welfare states (Epsing-Anderson, 1990) such as the United 
Kingdom (on which the South African system was modelled), guard the boundaries of 
categories of entitlement to social aid to exclude the ‘undeserving’. This requires that 
operationalising disability with specific eligibility criteria and measurement tools that include 
the population it intends to target and excludes those who are not considering deserving 
(Meershoek et al., 2012). Disability assessment is used to manage the number of people who 
                                                
11 Concerns about growing disability welfare rolls in Europe and North America have driven welfare bureaucracies 
to reform their systems to actively encourage labour market participation (De Boer, 2010; Prinz and Thompson, 
2009). As a result, disability benefits are increasingly tied to work reintegration efforts and assessment tools and 
eligibility criteria have been adjusted to focus on functionality and residual work capability and medical criteria 
and measures of work ability have been tightened (Kalisch et al., 1998; Matheson, 2003). 
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are able to claim benefits and to root out people seeking to misrepresent themselves as disabled 
in order to make illegitimate claims (Stone, 1984). As medical impairment is relatively easy to 
verify, it has remained the predominant underlying factor in disability determination (Robinson, 
2004) and the medical expertise of doctors is highly valued in the assessment process.  
Although it is not easy to make binary distinctions between the disabled and non-disabled 
because of the relational and contextual nature of disability, in the case of welfare programmes 
like the DG a decision has to be made whether a person does or does not qualify (Swartz & 
Schneider, 2006). There therefore needs to be a balance between the measurable attributes that 
make someone disabled (e.g. medical or functional), more relational factors such as the 
environment that affect functioning and participation and more pragmatic concerns such as cost 
(Jette 1999).There is no one set of medical or other standards for assessing disability for social 
protection purposes and there is significant overall variation in how different welfare regimes 
have constructed the disability label and have used it to target disability welfare programmes 
(Anner et al., 2013; De Boer, 2007)12. Tests of disability vary in their specificity and 
restrictiveness and consider medical evidence, functional capacity, and personal and social 
aspects of disability to different degrees. Impairment thresholds, for instance, can shift over 
time based economic and political factors and in the face of financial pressure medical evidence 
can be used a rationing device (Bolderson et al., 2002; Millward, 2014).  
Furthermore, for the purpose of establishing eligibility for disability pensions or social 
assistance programmes, disability is generally operationalised in terms of work or earning 
capacity rather than in terms of other areas of social participation. As the definition of ability to 
work changes over time in response to political and economic circumstances, so does the 
threshold for what we consider to be disabling (Priestly, 2009). The plasticity of employability 
and work capacity further muddles the process of sorting people into or out of the disabled 
category (Garsten and Jacobsson, 2013). Periods of economic downturn can make it more 
difficult for people with mild and moderate impairments to work and can lead to growth in 
disability programmes, as has been seen in Europe and North America (OECD, 2010; Prinz & 
Thompson, 2009; Autor & Duggan, 2001).   
Despite these complexities, disability policy has received relatively little interest from social 
welfare scholars internationally and relatively few scholars (Albrecht, 1992; Skocpol, 1992; 
                                                
12 Although the World Health Organisations’ International Classification of Functioning and Health (ICF) 
guidelines present an attempt to create an international standard of disability measurement, they have not yet been 
widely adopted as a standard for disability testing in social security programming internationally.  
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Stone, 1984; Mashaw, 1983; Kohrman, 2005) have studied bureaucracies that are linked to the 
rubric of disability and that do the work of constructing the disability category. Kohrman 
(2005: 3) calls these organisations “bio-bureaucracies” because they are undergirded by and 
promote a set of biologically oriented “ways of conceiving of and responding to normalcy and 
abnormality, health and pathology.”  
These complexities are multiplied in the South African context. According to the Social 
Assistance Act of 2004, someone is eligible for a DG if “he or she is, owing to a physical or 
mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment or profession the means 
needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance.” Disability itself is not 
defined in the Act and the lack of a proper definition means that it remains open to 
interpretation. Eligibility is also strongly tied to the capacity to earn income from work, which 
means that in DG administration a clear link has to be made between disability and 
employability without conflating the two concepts. This is extremely difficult to do. In his 
analysis of the American disability welfare system, Mashaw (1983: 53) argued that there are no 
clear lines between being unemployed, unemployable and disabled. In a context of high 
unemployment such as prevails in South Africa, where even able-bodied people struggle to find 
work, these distinctions are even more difficult to make.  
Although officially the government policy in the form of the Integrated National Disability 
Strategy (1997) and Draft National Disability Rights Strategy (2014) supports and promotes a 
social understanding of and human rights approach to disability, these models were not 
designed for social protection purposes. The South African government has struggled to 
develop a multi-dimensional model for assessment that is affordable and practical and the DG 
system remains predominantly medically focused.  
The positioning of the DG within the broader social policy environment also complicates its 
administration. South Africa is unusual among developing countries for having such an 
established and relatively generous programme for disabled people (Gooding & Marriot 2009). 
Social assistance targeted specifically at disabled people is more common in developed welfare 
states, where lower levels of unemployment and absolute poverty are present, and which have 
better systems of support for sick and disabled people and more extensive social insurance 
coverage for the unemployed. In South Africa, disability grant policy has shown strong path 
dependency and despite a number of failed attempts at reform, the eligibility criteria and 
assessment process have not changed significantly since the grant was first introduced 
through the Disability Grants Act of 1946 in a very different political and socio-economic 
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context13. The South African system was initially designed to cater to the white population and 
was modelled on the British welfare model that targeted specific categories of the ‘deserving’ 
poor. The deserving poor are typically categorised as those who are not expected to participate 
in the labour market and cannot be blamed for their poverty – such as children (and their 
mothers), disabled people and elderly people (van Oorschot, 2000)14. This system is premised 
on the notion of full-employment and given the realities of the current South African post-
apartheid context where many people other people are jobless and poor, this targeting system 
excludes large numbers of the able-bodied, long-term unemployed (Nattrass, 2006).  
Although South Africa has an extensive social grant system in terms of beneficiary numbers 
and there has been some parametric reform (Seekings & Matisonn, 2010) and extension of the 
social grant system (in the cases of the Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant), the South 
African state has resisted introducing new social grants for either the chronically ill or the able-
bodied unemployed15. Although contributory unemployment insurance exists in the form of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, this is very limited and does not include informal sector 
workers or those who have not been recently employed (Bhorat et al., 2013).  
In this context the DG has been in high demand from people whom the grant is not intended to 
target. The only grant paid to and intended for adults of working age16, it is relatively generous 
compared to the CSG paid to caregivers of children (R330 per month17) and the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion are  unclear. As a result, many poor people in South Africa, including 
those without disabilities, have seen claims of disablement as means to access to financial 
support18. Health and social workers have repeatedly reported that large numbers of people 
apply for the DG because they see it as a form of stable income, considering even minor 
ailments as an opportunity to apply for grants and re-applying repeatedly until successful 
                                                
13 Grants for the blind were introduced earlier (1936) and were administered separately from DGs until the passing 
of the Social Assistance Act of 1992.  
14 These categories are based in the ‘moral economy’ - a set of collective and normative shifting ideas about need, 
distributive justice and ‘deservingness’ – the degree to which a person deserves the assistance of others (Stone, 
1984). 
15 It has also been reticent to provide financial support to the long-term unemployed outside of its Extended Public 
Works Programs, which reaches only a small proportion of the over 26% people who are unemployed (Stats SA, 
Q1 2015). 
16 The CSG is paid to adult caregivers but it is intended for the child  
17 Other social grants are valued as follows: CSG (R330 per child), Old Age Pension (R1420), Care Dependency 
Grant (R1420), Foster Care Grant (R860). 
18 The government also provides support to the disabled in the form of indigent relief for rates and services, access 
to free healthcare, rehabilitation and support services and special education and training services and employment.  
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(Steele, 2006; Kelly, 2012). Although the DG is set below the minimum wage it can pay more 
than informal sector work and is not significantly less than the minimum wage in a number of 
sectors including low paid domestic work (R2,065 per month) and minimum wage work in the 
agricultural sector (R2,520 per month), contract cleaning (R15.66 per hour) or work in the retail 
sector (R15.95 per hour) (DoL, 2015)19.  
The DG was designed to target a specific, particularly vulnerable section of the population. 
However, without adequate social security options for the chronically ill and able-bodied 
unemployed, the grant has become in some measure a de facto chronic illness grant, and even a 
general poverty grant. In some communities, the DG has been called igrant yokuhlupheka, 
translated as “the grant for the poor people” (Delany et al., 2005; Steele, 2006; Hansen & Sait, 
2012).    
The HIV epidemic in South Africa has also introduced particular challenges in targeting the 
DG, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. Although not corroborated in systematic quantitative 
or qualitative studies, several studies report anecdotal evidence of some people intentionally 
infecting themselves with TB or HIV/AIDS and some TB and HI/AIDS infected people being  
reluctant to take medication that will restore their health and make them non-eligible for the 
DG (Delany et al., 2005; Leclerc-Madlala, 2006; Nattrass, 2006; Hardy & Richter, 2006; De 
Paoli et al., 2010; 2012; Woolgar, 2014)20. This has been characterised as a “bizarre sickness-
poverty trap” (Standing, 2008: 22). This also applies to other chronic diseases such as epilepsy 
(Segar, 1992), diabetes and hypertension.  
Disabled people often have special resources dedicated to them to help them find work, to 
cover the additional costs they face or in the case of the DG, to compensate them for not being 
able to work. Disability therefore becomes a desirable category because it has the potential to 
offer some kind of social and economic inclusion. As I have argued elsewhere (Kelly, 2012), 
the disability assessment provides marginalised citizens access to a kind of “biological 
citizenship” (Petryna, 2002). Being disabled becomes a form of social advantage or a resource, 
creating a divisive, triage-based access to economic resources that can create conflict within 
communities.” 21 These dynamics around the grant have provided fuel for the debate around the 
                                                
19 These low wage workers may also spend a significant portion of their income travelling to work.  
20 Woolgar (2014) found that some respondents in her study had stopped taking ARVs to receive the grant but 
became so sick that they resumed taking them. However, this did not appear to be a common strategy.  
21 Kolofanos (2010) terms this “biosociopathy”. This is an adaptation of Paul Rabinow’s (1992) concept of 




limitations of a social security system that excludes the majority of the unemployed and the 
need for a Basic Income Grant or Chronic Illness Grant, which I will also discuss in Chapter 2.  
The state relies heavily on the cooperation of doctors to ensure that only appropriate claimants 
are able to receive DGs. Although SASSA, which is responsible for administering social grants, 
makes the final decision on DG applications based on a person’s income and assets, doctors’ 
medical assessments are the most significant factor in determining eligibility. Despite SASSA’s 
emphasis on a medical model, disability can seldom be determined by medical diagnosis alone. 
Although in principal doctors should consult with other professionals (e.g. occupational 
therapists, vocational specialists or medical social workers) on non-medical aspects of 
assessments, the system is not geared for this. Both the health and SASSA system lack the 
capacity to properly investigate functional capacity and the more relational and contextual 
aspects of disability such as psychological, socio-economic and environmental factors. This 
means that doctors are left making decisions on employability based either entirely on a 
medical model or based on their own assumptions about the non-medical aspects of disability.  
The ambiguity of the disability category, the amount of discretion that doctors have in carrying 
out assessments, and the lack of thorough professional training in disability assessment 
amongst doctors has opened up space for DG assessors to insert their own understandings of 
disability and deservingness into the assessment process. This implies that access to DG 
depends not only on the rules defined in legislation and regulations, but on doctors’ 
interpretation and application of SASSA’s medical guidelines to individual patients, which can 
be influenced by non-Weberian (i.e. subjective) factors and logics that undermine bureaucratic 
ideals (Lipsky, 2010; Keiser, 2010; Dubois, 2010; Prottas, 1979; Hasenfeld, 2000, 2010). These 
discretionary decisions are important because they have implications for how state resources 
are allocated. Although doctors have been criticised for many years by policy makers, social 
security administrators and academics for providing subjective and arbitrary assessments, 
existing studies on DG have not focused sufficiently on the nature of these subjectivities and 
how they influence the distribution of social benefits (Delany et al., 2005; Steele, 2006; 
MacGregor, 2006; Govender & Miji, 2009; Jelsma et al., 2008; Tumbo, 2008; Segar, 1994; 
Baron; 1992; Graham et al., 2010). By observing disability assessments and interviewing 
doctors about their work, this study aims to contribute to understanding the challenges doctors 
                                                                                                                                                     
concept of biosociopathy to the competition for food aid in Mozambique, where HIV positive status becomes a 
resource and means to access material benefits.  
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face in disability assessment and what motivates their decision-making.    
1.3 Street-level bureaucrats  
As the previous section has shown, doctors have played an important role in the DG system 
through their gatekeeping role in disability assessments. This thesis builds on the foundations 
of street-level bureaucracy theory to unpack and explain their decision-making and how their 
actions in the context of DG assessments shape policy implementation. Doctors are positioned 
as street-level bureaucrats to the extent that they work at the interface between citizens and the 
state and have an important role in the allocation of state benefits and are subject to the 
bureaucratic constraints and regulations of social security and health policy.  
Street-level bureaucracy research is grounded in a theory of policy implementation that 
considers frontline state workers and the point of service delivery as key to understanding how 
policy works (Brodkin, 2003). The seminal works of Protass (1979) and Lipsky (201022) first 
introduced the idea that frontline public service workers form a part of the policy-making 
process due to their discretionary ability to apply policy in different ways through their daily 
practices at the ground level. Lipsky first called these workers “street level bureaucrats” and 
included a wide range of professional, semi-professional and white collar public service 
workers in this category. Somewhat confusingly, Lipsky described all street-level bureaucrats 
as “professionals”, which Evans (2010, 2011) argues glosses over the differences between 
white collar workers and those who would typically be considered professionals in a narrower 
sense (e.g. doctors). Although Lipsky’s intention was to focus on the common experiences of 
frontline work, Evans suggests that differences in occupational status are in fact important, 
reasoning that the idea that professionals (in the narrow sense) have discretion is fairly obvious. 
In this thesis I work with the narrower definition of professional, namely, the professional as 
someone belonging to an occupational with recognised professional status (Freidson, 1994).  
Street-level bureaucrats translate policy into practice through their everyday interpretation and 
application of procedures, rules, laws and policies, often in ways that make their difficult work 
easier. The work of street-level bureaucrats draws our attention to how professional knowledge 
and experience is put into action through practical reasoning processes. It also, as Rowe (2012: 
15) notes, “takes us further, to the context-dependent ethics of public service (the phronesis)”. 
Lipsky (2010) argued that street-level bureaucrats effectively create policy through the ways in 
                                                
22 Originally published in 1980. 
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which they exercise agency as they interpret policy and process and categorise clients in their 
daily work. The body of literature that has emerged around this concept focuses primarily on 
the tensions between the norms and goals of street-level organisations, the professional and 
individual values and goals of frontline workers, and broader policy goals and what this means 
for how policy is enacted (see Brodkin, 2012, 2013; Dubois, 2010; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003; 2012; Jewell, 2007; Møller & Stone, 2013; Harrits & Møller, 2013; Soss & 
Keiser, 2006; Soss, 1999; Rice, 2012). 
The theory of bureaucratic action put forward by scholars of street-level bureaucracy directly 
challenges rational-agent models of bureaucracy and theories of the policy-making process 
based on the notion that policy can be controlled from the top. Top-down theories of policy 
implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Hood, 1976; 
Bardach, 1977), which first emerged in the 1970s, looked to the Weberian ideal of rational, 
hierarchically structured bureaucracy as the best way to achieve policy goals. The ideal 
Weberian bureaucracy is one run by neutral, rational technocrats, who carry out their work in a 
detached and uniform manner - “sire ira et studio” – without hatred, passion, love and 
enthusiasm. Their work is managed through codified rules and processes that ensure that policy 
implementation on the ground takes place as policy makers at the top conceived it. Recognising 
that policy is not always implemented as intended, top-down theorists have attributed policy 
goal failures to deviations from the ideal rational model caused by principal-agent problems 
(e.g. shirking or sabotage) that are created by asymmetries between governments (principals) 
and bureaucratic agents. They have offered solutions promoting greater bureaucratic 
compliance and control through managerial procedures and rules (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 
Hood, 1980). 23 
On the other hand, bottom-up theorists, like Lipsky, opposed the notion of the ideal rational 
bureaucrat and the idea that implementation can be controlled from above through hierarchical 
compliance models. Rather than glossing over ambiguities and indeterminate aspects of policy, 
Lipsky and others (Hjern & Hull, 1982) started to explore what happens in the grey spaces 
between policy and practice (Brodkin, 2003). Instead of treating street-level divergence as a 
function of the principal-agent problem, where self-interested bureaucrats take advantage of 
information asymmetries for their own benefit, Lipsky and others have argued that workers 
                                                
23 Principal-agent theory is based on the idea that asymmetries in information held by principals and agents 




(agents) may just be employing “coping mechanisms” in response to environmental conditions, 
for instance, high demand for their time or the complexity of decisions they are faced with 
making.  Although the concept of street-level bureaucracy emerged in and has been most 
commonly applied in Northern countries, its focus on the role of discretion and hence motives 
that underlie the decisional aspects of frontline work, provides an important frame for 
understanding the ‘problems’ that seem to interfere persistently with policy implementation in 
South African bureaucracies. 
In his original exposition of the street-level bureaucrat concept, Lipsky (2010) used teachers, 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, social workers, judges, public lawyers and 
other court officers and health workers (including doctors) as examples of street-level 
bureaucrats. Since then the street-level bureaucracy concept has been elaborated, extended and 
applied in a wide range of disciplines in a wide variety of different government programmes 
and services. Some examples include studies of caseworkers in welfare benefit and work 
activation programmes (Sandfort, 2000; Jewell, 2007; Soss, 1999; Watkins-Hayes, 2009), 
disability and illness benefit determination by welfare case workers (Møller & Stone, 2013; 
Gulland, 2011; Marston, 2013; Keiser, 1999, 2003), the gatekeeping and healthcare policy 
implementation work of nurses and doctors (Allen et al., 2004; Checkland et al., 2004), the 
work of teachers (Maynard-moody & Musheno, 2003), social workers in various social 
programmes (Evans, 2010; 2011; Sherz, 2011; Halliday, 2009), immigration work (Heyman, 
1995, 2001), and legal and criminal justice work (Barnes & Prior, 2009). Despite differences in 
focus, these studies are all grounded in the idea that the agency of frontline workers and their 
interactions with clients are vital to understanding how policy is ‘made’ in practice (Maynard-
Moody & Portillo, 2010; Rowe, 2012). Arguably, the actions of street-level workers are not 
always consistent or coherent enough to build policy– for the most part their actions are 
individualised and context-specific and the patterns that emerge in street-level settings may not 
necessarily ‘add up’ to policy, although it may influence it (Maynard-moody & Musheno, 
2000, 2003).  
 
There is now an extensive literature focused on the frontline public service workers who make 
the daily decisions about “who gets what, when and how” (Laswell, 1936) in European and 
North American welfare states. However, the role of frontline workers, how they interact with 
welfare claimants and make decisions about eligibility is understudied in Africa. In general, 
there have significantly fewer studies of how frontline public service workers contribute to how 
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policy is realised on the ground in developing countries. There is however growing interest in 
developing an emic or ‘insider’ perspective of African bureaucracies and using ethnography to 
explore the gap between official norms and rules and the behaviour of workers within them 
(Hoag, 2010; Bierschenk, 2010; Bierschenk and de Sardan, 2014; de Sardan, 2005, 2015; 
Blundo, 2006). In South Africa this has included studies of officials at the Department of Home 
Affairs (Hoag, 2010, 2014; Segatti et al.  2012), nurses (Le Marcis & Grard, 2015; Harrison, 
2000) and nurses and doctors (Gibson, 2004) and policeman (Steinberg, 2008; Marks, 2004, 
2005; Altbeker, 2005). There are a small number of studies that have applied the street-level 
bureaucracy concept more directly. These include studies of teachers in South Africa 
(Mutereko & Chitakunye, 2015) and nurses in South Africa (Walker & Gilson, 2004), Ghana 
(Ageypong & Nagai, 2011) and Kenya (Kaler & Watkins, 2001). There is also growing interest 
in the more general design and functioning of South African state bureaucracies, institutional 
dynamics and bureaucratic structures (Chipkin, 2011; Chipkin & Lipietz, 2012; Von Holdt, 
2010), including public hospitals (Von Holdt & Maseramule, 2005; Von Holdt & Murphy 
2007; McIntyre & Klugman, 2003) and the social grant system (Vally, 2014; Donovan, 2015).  
As this diversity of studies shows, the ‘street-level’ category is broad and inclusive. However, 
not all state workers can be considered street-level bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucrats are 
characterised by their direct (frontline) interaction with the public and the high degree of 
discretion and autonomy that they have in practically applying the benefits and sanctions of 
institutions to citizens (Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010)24. They are linked by their common 
experience of working in resource-constrained settings where they have to make complex 
decisions quickly, with limited information and time.  
Street-level bureaucrats generally also have significant autonomy in their work because their 
interactions with clients and citizens often take place in spaces where it is difficult to observe 
and monitor their performance: in schools and clinics, on the streets or in private consultations. 
Frontline workers have discretion because the complex, interpretive and situated nature of their 
work means they need some flexibility in how they respond to clients. Policy-makers (in the 
legislature or executive) cannot provide rules for every experience and every interaction 
between frontline staff and clients. At the organisational level, rules and goals are often 
ambiguous and even guidelines and rules that are designed to channel decision-making can be 
                                                
24 Front-office postal service workers (for example) interact with ‘clients’ on a daily basis, but their activities are 
highly routinised and they have little autonomy in their roles. There are of course also bureaucrats who never 
interact with clients. 
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open to interpretation (Sandfort, 2000). Møller & Stone (2013: 601) argue that “rules are 
abstract thinking that must be converted into meaningful actions” and that in this process street-
level bureaucrats must reconcile policy norms with their prior beliefs and moral judgements as 
well as their own interests. Their ability to exercise discretion in their direct interactions with 
clients, whose engagement with bureaucracies is often non-voluntary, gives them significant 
power and the daily decisions they make affect citizens’ lives and their relationships with the 
state (Lipsky, 2010). This does not mean that street-level bureaucrats use their discretion all the 
time. In other words, they “do not do just what they want or just what they are told to want. 
They do what they can.” (Brodkin, 1997: 24)  
The outcomes of discretion are most visible in gatekeeping work that involves classifying 
people in ways that allows or denies people access to certain benefits, such as welfare or 
immigration service work (Heyman, 2001) or in social service case work (Scherz, 2011). 
However, discretion that is exercised in less observable ways can have equally large impacts on 
how resources are allocated or how policy is (or is not) implemented. One particularly relevant 
case put forward by Lipsky is of doctors working in the Veterans Administration (VA) hospital 
system in the United States in the 1970s. At the time VA hospitals did not offer outpatient 
services and feeling that this was an important aspect of care, doctors began to place patients in 
the “pre-bedcare” category. Patients in this category were allowed to receive medical services 
prior to admission. Placing patients in this category, but never actually admitting them, allowed 
doctors to informally offer outpatient care.   
As the exercise of discretion can undermine policy intentions and lead to unequal treatment of 
clients and citizens, street-level bureaucracies typically aim to rationalise and standardise the 
decision-making of frontline worker by promoting accountability and constraining bureaucratic 
discretion. Some writers (most notably Howe, 1991) have argued that rising managerialism in 
the public services (what is referred to as New Public Management) in Europe and the United 
States and the increasingly intense control of frontline worker performance have significantly 
curtailed professional discretion and made Lipsky’s work irrelevant (Evans & Harris, 2004). 
However, Lipsky’s original work is sceptical about managerial control, arguing that reforms 
and complex protocols and rules can create confusion and require the use of more discretion or 
simply re-locate discretion. This has been shown to be the case in recent empirical studies, 
which have demonstrated that despite increased managerialism, discretion continues to be a 
significant factor in public administration and it can be very difficult for managers to change 
the way that street-level bureaucrats carry out their work (Riccucci, 2005). In South Africa, 
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Hoag’s (2013) study of the Department of Home Affairs showed how managerial instructions 
and reporting requirements were treated with suspicion and often ignored by bureaucrats weary 
of the increasing and frequently changing demands on their time. Hoag (2014: 414) also argues 
that “rules can never be enforced enough, nor specific enough to direct action in context with 
precision, meaning that bureaucrats’ interpretations are integral to their work – not a deviation 
from it.” 
Eliminating discretion is also not desirable as the ability of street-level bureaucrats to respond 
to individual circumstances is important and valued by citizens who can become trapped in the 
“iron cage” of inflexible bureaucracy. Dworkin (1978), Mashaw (1983), Evans (2010) and 
Maynard-Moody and Portillo (2010) therefore argue against dichotomising discretion and rule-
based systems and instead focus on how discretion is nested within rule-based systems, treating 
control and autonomy as a “complex dialectic” (Brodkin, 2013: 946). In more recent work 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012, 2015) have called for abandoning the “implementation-
control-discretion narrative” that has been a primary concern in implementation studies in 
favour of focusing on agency and how frontline workers express their agency and make 
meaning in their work through pragmatic improvisation within the structure of laws, roles, 
institutions and practices.  
No single factor or theory can fully explain the exercise of street-level discretion, which is 
rather shaped by a complicated set of overlapping and contradicting factors arising in the 
course of implementation. These factors can be broadly grouped as: 1) the organisational and 
regulatory environment that street-level bureaucrats work in; 2) their individual interests, 
personal norms, values and biases; 3) their professional norms and values; 4) the dynamics of 
their face-to-face interactions with clients; and 5) the socio-economic systems and institutions 
in which both they and clients are embedded (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007). Whilst the first two 
groups have been well studied, the latter three have not been, but are of growing interest in the 
field. Using the concept of framing, this study shows how, in the case of disability grant 
assessments, these factors combine to pattern decision-making.  
Street-level bureaucrats are often responsible for allocating state resources and implicit in their 
decisions are implicit or explicit conceptions about some categories of people ‘deserving’ state 
services whilst others do not. Lipsky (2010) argued that they use their discretion to simplify 
their work in response to environmental conditions. They do so by developing their own rules 
of practice and choosing to ignore or privilege policy directives depending on what makes the 
most practical ‘sense’. When used systematically, their discretion and the unwritten rules they 
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develop in their daily practice become informal policies (Brodkin, 2012).  
In order to manage large numbers of clients and ration access to services and benefits, street-
level bureaucrats need to create patterns of simplification for processing information and 
categorising clients according to administrative categories. These simplifications can be both 
formal (e.g. triage in healthcare) and informal, based on personal biases and decisions on moral 
worthiness. Olivier de Sardan (2015) in his work on bureaucracies on the African continent 
refers to these informal and tacit rules of the game as “practical norms”. These routinised 
simplifications can lead to the institutionalisation of stereotypical tendencies that result in 
street-level bureaucrats treating different categories of people in different ways (Lipsky, 2010).  
A number of South African cases provide useful examples of how organisational context and 
bureaucratic action shapes the way in which public services are delivered. Hoag’s (2010: 18) 
ethnographic study of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) demonstrated that bureaucrats 
developed their own “systems of meaning”, as well as unofficial processes and ‘metacodes’ of 
conduct to stabilise their work environment. This context was characterised by poor 
communication, supervision and training and arbitrary and incoherent policy directives from 
above, where frontline staff needed to manage time constraints and cope with a public whom 
they deemed as untrustworthy and likely to ‘abuse’ the DHA system. He argued that the 
unsanctioned processes they employed made the DHA bureaucracy illegible to the public. 
Walker and Gilson (2004) explored the role of nurses as street-level bureaucrats, finding that 
negative effects of free healthcare on healthcare personnel workloads, attitudes and morale led 
to moralising and blaming of patients. A number of studies on policing work in South Africa 
also show how police officers’ discretionary decision-making is strongly influenced by both 
organisational and environmental factors (Steinberg, 2008; Marks, 2004, 2005; Altbeker, 
2005). 
Although Lipsky focused predominantly on the coping mechanisms used by street-level 
bureaucrats to secure their own survival within organisations, others have since highlighted the 
importance of the personal and professional identity and ethics of street-level bureaucrats in 
shaping their behaviour (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Dubois, 2010; Evans, 2010; 
Eikenaar, 2015). As Walker (1993:151-152) argues, “street-level decisions and actions are 
guided less by rules, training, or procedures and more by beliefs and norms, especially beliefs 
and norms about what is fair.” Based on the stories told by frontline workers, Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno (2003) argue that street-level bureaucrats see themselves as citizen-agents rather 
than a part of state machinery (state-agents) and that they work with other citizens on an 
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individual basis, based on ideas about the ‘right’ thing to do rather than their own self-interest.  
Before concluding this discussion on street-level bureaucracy, I will briefly highlight three gaps 
in the literature to which this thesis contributes. Lipsky included professionals who work within 
rule-bound situations in the street-level bureaucrat category, but paid little attention to the role 
of professional status, in structuring and informing discretionary practices. (Evans, 2010; Hupe, 
2007). Much of the empirical research on street-level bureaucrats has focused largely on non-
professional groups like welfare workers (Evans, 2010) and by focusing on doctors, this thesis 
makes an empirical contribution to our understanding of the work of more professionalised 
groups, who have more discretion and may associate more strongly with a set of professional 
values and norms than bureaucratic rules.  
Although the fact that frontline workers come face-to-face with citizens is a crucial part of the 
street-level bureaucracy concept, the dynamics of how bureaucrats and citizens communicate 
and relate to one another in these encounters have not been well studied (Bartels, 2013). It is 
important to look at the performative, interactive aspects of street-level encounters, both 
because the nature of these interactions shape decision-making, and because it highlights the 
agency of citizens and the role that citizens play in shaping policy implementation. This has 
largely been neglected in international studies of street-level work (see Barnes & Prior (2009) 
and Dubois (2010) for some exceptions.) This is also the case in the South African literature, 
although Steinberg (2008) does show that South African policemen may avoid situations and 
interactions where their authority is likely to be challenged.   
While the concept of street-level bureaucracy has proved useful as a micro-level concept that 
reveals aspects of policy implementation that are hidden by a top-down approach, few efforts 
have been made to link street-level work to wider systemic, organisational, institutional factors 
and other parts of the policy process. For example, there are few studies on how street-level 
bureaucratic action and its divergence from official policy in particular, is interpreted higher-up 
the policy formation and bureaucratic hierarchy, and how this shapes further policy-making 
(Gofen, 2014; Moynihan & Soss, 2014). While the scholarship on policy feedback suggests that 
a dialogical relationship exists between politics, policy and administration (at the street-level) 
and that policy outcomes shape future policy development (Pierson, 1993, 2003; Skocpol, 
1992; Soss et al., 2007), the vagaries of how and to what extent such dialogue indeed occurs, 
likely differs by policy domain and circumstance. 
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1.4 Medical gatekeeping and decision-making 
Whilst the street-level bureaucracy concept is useful in structuring my analysis, its very broad 
focus does not capture some of the particular complexities and moral tensions attached to 
medical decision-making that have been written about in the sociological literature on 
medicine. As high-status professionals with considerable professional power and expert 
knowledge, doctors have more discretion and expect more autonomy than many other types of 
frontline workers. They are also more likely to resist outside control (Freidson, 2001) and their 
work is harder to manage through rules and managerial tactics. Whilst there is a degree of 
uncertainty and interpretation in decision-making in all street-level work, this is particularly 
pronounced in all medical decision-making, including treatment and diagnostic decisions, as 
well as the gatekeeping work that I focus on in this thesis. 
Doctors routinely make decisions on how to allocate health resources to the public, using both 
their professional knowledge and guided by national health policy and organisational policies. 
As intermediaries between the state and its new citizens, health care institutions have 
historically been a crucial yet understudied site in which conceptions about cultural difference 
and ‘deservingness’ of public benefits are elaborated and deployed (Horton, 2004). The 
gatekeeping or rationing work of doctors in medical bureaucracies, both public and private, has 
been studied by medical ethicists and economists, but less by sociologists (Light & Hughes, 
2001), who have focused on social categorisation in healthcare settings but have only recently 
connected this to micro-level rationing (Vassy, 2001).  
Doctors decide when to provide and withhold treatment and to whom, often in life or death 
situations. There are a number of different reasons for gatekeeping in healthcare: ensuring 
patients receive appropriate care (neither too little nor over-treating), budget constraints and 
preventing overuse of the system (moral hazard) and justice in distributing care (need to ration 
care to avoid disadvantaging others) (Willems, 2001). One such gatekeeping mechanism is the 
referral system, which rations access to medical specialists. Patients are generally seen first by 
lower-level or more generalised care providers at what is known as the primary healthcare level 
and only if the health problem requires more specialist input or inpatient care will they be 
referred to a specialist. Admissions criteria to hospitals follow a similar logic. Another well-
known example is triage – the principal of prioritising some patients over others based on the 
severity and urgency of their medical problem. Other forms of medical rationing include organ 
transplant lists (Elster, 1992), patient discharge policy (Dill, 1995) and determining who has 
entry into treatment programmes in settings where resources are limited and where specific 
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eligibility criteria have to be established to ration access, for instance TB treatment in India 
(Harper, 2005) and HIV treatment in South Africa (Human, 2011).  Rationing can be explicit 
(as is the case with a list of treatments covered by a health insurance) or implicitly through 
healthcare workers’ decisions (Schmidt, 2004) and can also take the form of treatment delays, 
less desirable treatment or denial of care (Vassy 2001). 
Whilst the relationship between a doctor and a patient is often thought of as dyadic, it is 
actually mediated by multiple actors and contextual conditions, including organisational, 
regulatory and professional (May, 2007). Studies in the United States and Europe have shown 
that as doctors are co-opted into corporate and state healthcare structures, the role of doctors 
and the space of the clinical encounter have become increasingly regulated, standardised and 
dominated by evidence-based models of practice and protocols and service-oriented and rules 
and guidelines (May, 2007). In the process, doctors’ professional discretion has been eroded 
(Moreira, 2005). This forms part of a general trend towards bureaucratising professional action 
and increasing accountability through rules and procedures (Berg et al., 2000; Freidson, 1994). 
As a result, physicians have become “agents for many masters as they try to meet the demands 
of patients, hospitals, utilisation review committees, insurance companies and government 
agencies” (Zinn & Furutani, 1996: 525). This bureaucratisation of medical practice in Europe, 
has led a number of scholars to position doctors as street-level bureaucrats, using street-level 
bureaucracy theory to explore the tensions between doctors’ professional role and their 
institutional and legal responsibilities (McDonald, 2002; Checkland et al., 2004; Meershoek et 
al., 2007; Eikenaar et al., 2015). These studies showed how doctors mediate between outside 
bureaucratic pressures to adhere to guidelines and their own daily professional practice and 
how they used existing processes and procedures to re-shape how and to whom services were 
provided. They also highlight how important professional expertise and socialisation are in 
shaping how doctors approach the rules and policy structures.  
A crucial problem of medical gatekeeping work is that the logic of clinical judgement and cost-
effectiveness, are radically different from the logic of justice (Willems, 2001: 26). There is a 
high degree of incommensurability in medical decision-making, and how to prioritise certain 
factors over others is not always clear. The practice of medicine therefore requires a degree of 
judgement or wisdom or phronesis (Montgomery, 2006). There is a literature on micro-
rationing and resource allocation in healthcare which bears many similarities to the street-level 
bureaucracy literature (Allen, 2004; Mizrahi, 1985). These studies show that doctors’ decisions 
on how to allocate their time and other resources or social benefits were influenced by similar 
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factors to those found in the street-level bureaucracy literature. They show how doctors often 
become caught in moral dilemmas and are required to juggle the principals of justice, 
economics and their individual obligation to the patient and reach some sort of equilibrium 
(Willems, 2001). More generally, the field of medical sociology has shown that medical 
decisions and resource-allocation in healthcare are not based solely on an objective clinical 
assessment, but are socially complex processes shaped by social and cultural context (Nurock, 
2009: 504). 
Doctors are ethically obliged to treat all patients equally and doctors aspire towards objectivity 
in how they approach patients, trying to ‘separate’ themselves from their biases. However, 
doctors are also human agents who also have the capacity for extreme bias and moral failure – 
clear examples of which include the racism of doctors in apartheid South Africa apartheid 
(most notably Wouter Basson, who developed chemical and biological weapons for the 
apartheid government) and doctors working for the Nazi regime. 
In the South African healthcare system healthcare workers are overburdened and resources are 
limited and in this context clinicians have to make decisions that are not always ideal (Gibson, 
2004). As a result, decisions have to be made as to who is more ‘deserving’ of support, which 
can lead to moralizing about certain categories of people (Le Marcis & Grard, 2015; Walker & 
Gilson, 2004; Fassin, 2008). Le Marcis and Grard’s (2015) work in a public hospital in the 
midst of the AIDS epidemic showed that nurses’ efforts to cope in this environment shaped the 
development of a set of practical norms and ethics that determined how patients were treated 
and the quality of care they received. Another South African study showed that healthcare 
workers also made decisions on the basis of who was most likely to comply with or benefit 
from treatment (Schneider, 2010). Mizrahi (1985) argued that doctors in the US developed a 
Getting Rid of Patients (GROP) mentality and in order to make quick decisions about how 
much energy to spend on patients, doctors placed patients into medical and moral categories. 
Those labelled self-abusers, system-abusers and troublesome or difficult patients received 
minimal attention. Studies of the medicalisation of deviance also illustrate how professionals 
create the ‘problems’ they own and treat, and they make moral judgments both in the technical 
language of the profession and in the language of popular moral meanings (Waitzkin, 1991; 
Schneider, 1985).  
As well as their gatekeeping work within the health system, doctors also play a gatekeeping 
role for welfare and private insurance, deciding who has access to sickness and disability 
benefits. However, theoretical and empirical work on the sociology of doctors’ work, medical 
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knowledge and medical encounters has typically focused on therapeutic medical encounters. 
The role of doctors as third-party assessors and gatekeepers in social security medicine 
(disability and illness benefits) and the doctor-patient relationships that form around non-
therapeutic medical assessments has not been well-studied or theorised (Meershoek et al., 
2007).  
There is a small cross-disciplinary social science literature focused on decision-making in 
social insurance and occupational health medicine that focuses on the application of medical 
knowledge within bureaucratic frameworks internationally (Berg et al., 2000; Dodier, 1994; 
1998; Meershoek et al., 2007; Wilde, 2014; Eikenaar et al., 2015; Meershoek et al., 2012; 
Stone, 1979, 1984; Mashaw, 1983; Wainwright et al., 2015; Cheraghi-Sohi and Calnan, 
2013)25. This research has also shown the conflict that physicians experience in their 
simultaneous roles of patient advocate, physician and medical expert in gatekeeping access to 
these benefits and how they struggle to determine whose interests they should be protecting or 
promoting (Wynne-Jones et al., 2010). There has also been limited exploration of doctors’ 
views on DGs in South Africa by anthropologists (MacGregor, 2006; Segar, 1994) and medical 
doctors themselves (Baron, 1992; Tumbo, 2008). These studies recognised the subjectivity of 
DG assessments and highlighted the difficulties and frustrations that doctors experienced in 
dealing with patients seeking grants and in conducting assessments.  
1.5 Research methodology and design  
As this review of the literature has shown, problems in fairly allocating welfare or health 
resources or targeting social programmes are very often located in the spaces where citizens 
interact directly with state workers. Hypothesising that this also the case with the DG, the 
methodological approach taken to this research is qualitative and interpretive, driven by a 
desire to attend to the situated and interactional nature of the DG application process and the 
relationships between the actors involved in the implementation of DG policy: SASSA, medical 
doctors and those seeking DG benefits.   
This research is divided into two parts: 1) the history and politics of DG policy making; and 2) 
the implementation of DG policy by provincial SASSA staff and local healthcare workers.  The 
                                                
25 Most studies concerned with the gatekeeping and role of doctors in social insurance medicine and sickness 
benefits care found in the health sciences literatures (Wynn-Jones et al., 2010; Overland et al., 2008; Steenbeek, 




first component, largely presented in Chapter 2, traces the development of DG policy in post-
apartheid South Africa and how this was tied to the politics of administration and discourses 
around who ‘deserved’ state benefits. This analysis was based on existing literature and 
primary data sources, which included: reports and documents from the Department of Social 
Development (since 1990) and SASSA (since 2006); DG legislation since 1946, when the grant 
was first introduced; minutes from meetings of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Social Development (previously, Welfare and Population); and the record (Hansard) of debates 
in the National Assembly since 1998 (when they are first available online). Key-informant 
interviews were also conducted with government officials from the Department of Social 
Development, SASSA and the Department of Health, as well as with disability experts working 
in the non-profit sector and academia (list of interviews can be found in Appendix B).  
The second component of this research entailed a study of the everyday work of administering 
DGs. Given that I intended to study the implementation of DG policy from the bottom-up, an 
ethnographic approach seemed most appropriate. As a non-medical person, with limited 
knowledge of inner-workings of the healthcare or SASSA bureaucracies, the only way I could 
possibly imagine understanding the context in which assessments took place was to physically 
observe them myself. This is not uncommon in studies of street-level bureaucracy, which are 
very much focused on the daily realities of organisations and the interactions and relationships 
between bureaucrats and their clients. This complexity is not easily captured through 
quantitative methods and many of these studies are explicitly ethnographic or use a mixture of 
in-depth interviewing and directly observing frontline workers at work on the streets, in cop 
cars and ambulances, medical wards, behind desks in offices or in clients’ homes.26  
Direct observation is useful in understanding the gaps between policy design and practice and 
for unpacking the “black box” of policy implementation by exposing the material effects of 
policies and revealing their unforeseen and unintended consequences (McKee, 2009). “In doing 
so it aims to reveal the messiness and complexity involved in the struggles around subjectivity, 
and offer a more nuanced and finely grained analysis of governing in situ.” (McKee 2009: 
479). There are a number of excellent ethnographies of frontline workers in welfare and 
immigration bureaucracies in Europe and the United States (Dubois, 2010; Hays, 2003; Ticktin, 
                                                
26 There are some scholars (Keiser, 2010; Tummers & Beckers, 2012; Riccucci, 2005; Brodkin & Majmundar, 
2010; May and Winter, 2009) engaged in research on street-level bureaucracy who have used quantitative methods 
to develop and test theories of decision-making and relationships between discretion and street-level behaviour. 
Although arguably there is a need to test more of the tenets of theory and effects of street discretion (Tummers and 
Beckers, 2012), qualitative methods seemed most appropriate in answering my specific set of research questions. 
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2006; Fassin, 2005; Heyman, 1995, 2001) as well as a growing number of ethnographies of 
developing country bureaucracies (Gupta, 2012; Hoag, 2010; Bierschenk, 2008, 2009; Olivier 
de Sardan, 2008; Fuller & Bénei, 2000; Von Holdt & Maseramule, 2005).  
Narrative analysis is an approach that can be usefully combined with direct observation to 
understand the motives that underlie street-level action (Ospina & Dodge, 2005; Borins; 2011, 
Møller & Stone, 2013). An excellent example and detailed account of this approach is 
presented in Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s (2003) book Cops, teachers, counsellors: Stories 
from the front lines of public service. In addition to observational work, researchers in this 
study asked frontline-workers to develop written stories which then became the basis for further 
in-depth interviews. This allowed the authors not only to observe workers in action but to 
understand how they made meaning of their interactions with clients. Although not capturing 
doctors’ stories as formally, I paid attention in my analysis to how doctors constructed meaning 
and framed their interactions with claimants through narrative.  
Although they may act as street-level bureaucrats in the case of DGs, doctors are first and 
foremost medical professionals and the particularities of the medical setting also needed to be 
considered in my approach. Participant observation has also been extensively used by medical 
sociologists and anthropologists to understand social life within clinical settings and studies on 
disability, chronic and terminal illness, and medical ethics and decision-making have relied 
heavily on ethnographic methods (Charmaz & Olesen, 1997; Kohrman, 2012). 
Three ethnographies, Goffman’s Asylums (1961), based on participant observational work in 
mental asylums, Roth’s (1963) ethnography of patients’ negotiations of treatment regimes in 
TB sanatoriums and Strong’s (1979) documentation of the relationships between doctors and 
patients in paediatric consultations have become classic sociological studies.27  
There have been a number of studies of healthcare workers in South Africa that employ an 
ethnographic approach: Fassin (2001, 2008, 2009), Le Marcis (2014), Le Marcis and Grard 
(2015), Gilson (2004) and Human (2011). Macgregor (2006) and Segar (1994) both studied 
doctor-patient relationships in the context of the DG using an ethnographic approach. Although 
there is not a large sociological literature on medical decision-making in social security 
medicine specifically, existing studies have used either interviews with doctors (Waingwright 
                                                
27 Other notable medical ethnographies include Glaser and Strauss’s (1965, 1968, 1975) works on chronic illness 
and palliative care, Atkinson’s (1995) study of medical knowledge construction amongst haematologists and 
Mol’s (2002) study of the multiplicity of medical practice based on observations of the daily work of diagnosing 
and treating atherosclerosis. 
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et al., 2015; Wynne-Jones et al., 2010; Eikenaar, 2015) or a combination of these with direct 
observation of encounters between doctors and claimants (Meershoek et al., 2007; Macgregor, 
2006; Dodier, 1994, 1998). Medical studies of decision-making in social security medicine 
typically have taken a more quantitative approach, using surveys or asked multiple doctors to 
assess the same patient’s case, asking them to explain the reasons for their decision-making and 
quantifying the results (Zinn & Furutani, 1996; Soklaridis, 2011; Baron, 1992). While useful 
for comparative purposes (these studies showed significant variations in doctors’ decision-
making), these studies do not capture a key aspect of decision-making – the interaction between 
claimants and doctors. 
There is also a large medical literature on doctor-patient and nurse-patient interactions (see Ong 
et al., 1995; Waitzkin, 1984; Roter & Hall, 2006; Casey, 2004; Ventres et al., 2005) that uses 
the observation or the recording of doctor-patient interactions as a method to understand the 
formation of (or lack of) inter-personal relationships between doctors and patients, information 
sharing and medical decision-making. Many of these studies focus on process, quantifying 
doctor-patient interactions through coding, operationalising and measuring and predicting 
behaviour and communication in relation to socio-demographic, psychosocial, appearance and 
health factors (Ong, 1995; Clark et al., 1991). This overlooks not only the content of the 
interaction, but the complexities of the broader context in which doctor-patient interactions 
occur. Conversation analysis, which pulls apart and analyses the structure of ‘talk’ between 
doctors and patients has also become a popular method of examining doctor-patient 
communication (Heritage and Maynard, 2006). It seeks to bridge the problems of quantifying 
the doctor-patient interaction and the problems with ethnographic approaches. Although this 
approach is valuable, it requires videotaping or audio-recording doctor-patient interactions 
which was not feasible in this study28. Besides, my main intention was to understand the 
decision-making of doctors. Analysing the conversation between doctors and patients would 
not shed more light on this than talking to doctors about their decisions as they made them, and 
was determined to be a more useful approach for this study.   
                                                
28 The feasibility of recording or videotaping interactions was discussed during my PhD proposal presentation to 
the Sociology Department, both as a way to reduce the influence that my presence as a researcher might have on 
the interaction and to more fully-capture the nuances of interactions. However, given the legal aspects of disability 
grant assessment, I suspected that both patients and doctors would be warier of having very sensitive conversations 
recorded than of having me in the room taking notes.  
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1.5.1 Data Collection 
Data collection was carried in out over a period of eleven months in the Western Cape Province 
of South Africa. The first phase of data collection was focused on understanding the structure 
and operations of the DG system in the Western Cape Province. Information on SASSA’s 
operational structures and processes was provided by the Disability Management Unit at 
SASSA’s regional office who helpfully shared documents, medical guidelines and management 
statistics, and answered my detailed questions over on SASSA’s management processes and 
allowed me to observe two medical assessment training sessions run by SASSA staff. I also 
interviewed staff from the Disability Management Unit at SASSA’s regional office and the 
medical doctor who worked as SASSA’s quality assurance officer in the Western Cape, 
conducting audits on the forms completed by other doctors.  
The Western Cape SASSA branch utilises the Department of Health’s facilities to conduct DG 
assessments. These facilities therefore became the site of the observations, interviews and focus 
groups conducted for this study. The Western Cape Department of Health provides services to 
the 78% of the population who are uninsured and likely to use public health services, in six 
districts – Cape Town Metro, Cape Winelands, West Coast, Overberg, Eden and 32 sub-
districts in the province (DoH, 2015). Healthcare services in the City of Cape Town are 
managed by both the City of Cape Town and the Metro District Health Services (MDHS) of the 
Western Cape Department of Health. The metro district is divided into the eight districts: the 
Northern, Tygerberg, Western, Southern, Mitchell’s Plain, Klipfontein, Khayelitsha and 
Eastern districts, which are managed by four sub-structure offices. Primary healthcare (PHC) is 
provided at community health centres and clinics, more specialised and in-patient care is 
provided by secondary and district-level hospitals, and quaternary and tertiary care is provided 
at three large teaching hospitals29.  
The state of the health services in the Western Cape is considerably better than in many other 
provinces in terms of staff to patient ratios, the number of facilities available and the conditions 
of these facilities, but the system still faces considerable pressure from the high burden of 
infectious diseases, non-communicable disease, traumatic and violent injuries and maternal, 
perinatal and nutritional problems (DoH, 2014). HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis are the two 
leading causes of death in the province (Groenewald et al., 2013) and the Western Cape has the 
                                                
29 In 2014, there were 280 PHC facilities across the Province. At the secondary level, there were 34 district 
hospitals, five regional hospitals, four psychiatric hospitals and two sub-acute psychiatric centres as well as six 
specialised TB hospitals and one specialised rehabilitation services centre. 
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third highest rate of TB infection in country with 746 cases annually reported per 100 000 
people (DoH, 2014). 
At the time of fieldwork, DG assessments in the Western Cape were conducted at all levels of 
the healthcare system by both treating doctors (in hospitals) and dedicated SASSA assessors (in 
community clinics). At the PHC level I worked in twelve different community clinics: eight 
from the Cape Town Metro district and four clinics in two rural health districts in the 
Winelands (3) and West Coast (1) regions of the province. In Cape Town, I selected clinics 
from each of four Cape Town Metro health district substructures, covering seven of the eight 
sub-districts. There remain large socio-economic and racial divisions in the Cape Town 
population and attempting to maximise geographic variation when selecting clinics allowed me 
to observe doctors working with patients from different racial and class groups. In order to 
preserve the anonymity of the doctors and claimants I worked with, I have used pseudonyms 
throughout this study (including for the names of health facilities).  
I also conducted fieldwork at three different hospitals: a tertiary hospital (Whitney Hospital), a 
district hospital (Welgemoed Hospital) and a psychiatric hospital (De Waal Hospital). I have 
also used pseudonyms to refer to these facilities. Within hospitals I attempted to work across a 
range of medical disciplines and worked with the departments of cardiology, neurology, 
neurosurgery, orthopaedics, psychiatry and infectious diseases, which generally received larger 
numbers of DG requests. Data on healthcare worker’s role in the assessment process was 
collected through observational work in clinics and hospitals; in-depth interviews with doctors, 
occupational therapists and social workers; and focus groups composed of nurses and social 
workers. Interview questions for doctors were not standardised and were based on my 
observations and evolved as I learnt more about the DG system and the work of doctors, social 
workers and nurses within it, however I made sure to cover the following topics: how the DG 
system worked in the facility, their professional background, their individual approach to DG 
assessment, factors they considered in making decisions, contextual factors influencing their 
work, their familiarity with and views on the guidelines and SASSA, challenges faced in 
making decisions – both medical and non-medical, their personal views on social grants and 
their experiences interacting with patients.  
Ethical approval to work in healthcare facilities was received from the University of Cape 
Town Human Research Ethics Committee and permission to work in these facilities was 
granted by the Department of Health, the City of Cape Town and managers of individual 
facilities (see Appendix A). 
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Observing doctors while they conducted DG assessments was central to my research design and 
formed the largest component of data collection. Twenty-four doctors were involved in the 
study, who conducted DG assessments during the course of their work as treating doctors (12) 
or as dedicated SASSA assessors (12). I directly observed the work of seventeen doctors over 
one or two days, where I would sit in for the entire duration of the clinic opening hours (four to 
eight hours). In cases where direct observation was not appropriate or not possible, I conducted 
in-depth interviews with doctors. In total, I observed 216 consultations, of which 196 were 
disability assessments. A total of twelve social workers, nurses and occupational therapists 
participated in interviews or focus groups about their involvement in and perspectives on the 
DG system. Data was also collected in less formal ways, when doctors were casually talking 
amongst themselves or consulting with one another on cases and in the corridors when I was 
talking to patients, who were often eager to share their experiences with me. 
Although I made notes on each patient’s age, race, gender and presenting complaints, my 
observational work was otherwise unstructured and I focused on capturing the interaction 
between doctor and patient in as much detail as possible. On meeting a doctor for the first time, 
I would begin by discussing the study with them before the clinic started. This generally led to 
a discussion about their views on the social grant system, during which time I would take notes. 
During the course of the day, the doctor and I would discuss patient cases and the rationale for 
their decision-making, usually between patient consultations. At the end of the day I would 
conduct a more formal interview to reflect on the cases seen and address any remaining 
questions I had about their decision-making and general approach. Combining interviewing 
with observation allowed me to probe doctors’ reasoning and understand how they understood 
eligibility and deservingness.  
Watching doctors perform the work of disability assessment and interacting with patients was 
useful for learning how organisational, medical, social and cultural factors shape doctors’ 
decision-making and how the process of patient classification was “enacted” (Heyman, 2001). 
Observing the doctor-patient interaction created opportunities to learn how the assessment 
process was structured, how assessment tools were utilised and forms were completed, how 
doctors engaged with and examined patients, what questions they asked and what information 
was available in patients’ medical records. It is important to look at these material aspects of 
bureaucratic worlds because it “helps us to attend to bureaucratic practice without fetishizing 
the bureaucratic decision and without dissolving the rule in a ‘bath of context.’” (Hoag, 2010: 
85, quoting Mull, 2008: 504) The “material organisation” (Dubois, 2010: 42) of the assessment 
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also sets claimants’ expectations, thus framing the encounter between doctor and patient. I was 
also able to see how patients presented both their medical and social cases to doctors and how 
doctors responded to patient behaviour and characteristics. Direct observation also allowed for 
non-verbal forms of communication and interaction to be taken into account.  
Direct observation was also useful in stimulating discussions with doctors that were grounded 
in the concrete particularities of real cases and provided opportunities for me to probe their 
understanding and experiences in a different way than if I just heard second-hand accounts of 
their work. This decreased the likelihood that doctors would just present the official version of 
their work or simply describe the professional ideology of medicine. Le Marcis and Grard 
(2015) note that this can be a difficult part of interviewing healthcare professionals. It is 
however, important to note that my presence in the room may have influenced how doctors 
made decisions and treated patients because doctors may not have wanted to be seen as making 
decisions that were not objective and may have been ‘harder’ or ‘softer’ on patients than they 
otherwise might have been. The depth and nuance of data that emerged during my 
observational work also allowed me to get “below and behind the surface of official accounts” 
(Bevir & Rhodes, 2006: 101) and combining interviews and observation enabled me to 
compare what doctors said they were doing with what they actually did. Brodkin (2003: 159), 
for instance, found that street-level bureaucrats often described themselves as taking a hard-line 
(being ‘tough’) or being ‘soft’ in their application of the rules, but their actual practices were 
very different.  Observing and participating in the collegial and casual encounters between 
doctors, nurses, administrative staff and SASSA staff who visited the clinics, deepened my 
understanding of the system. By speaking with claimants while they waited for the doctor to 
arrive, I gained more perspective on how claimants understand and navigate their way through 
the assessment process.  
Although I did not take on participant observer status for an extended period of time, 
combining the rich material and thick description allowed by direct observation with 
interviews, and documentary analysis, allowed me to understand the material reality of the DG 
system. It also helped me to develop an account of the pressures, opportunities and constraints 
of the health and welfare systems that doctors work in.  
Further details on the process of selecting research sites, data analysis, ethical considerations 
and reflections how my chosen research design and positioning as a researcher in the field 
shaped the quality of research is provided in Appendix A. Additional quotations not included in 
the main body of the text, but which support my argument, are referenced throughout and 
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included in Appendix C.  
1.6 Outline of thesis 
 The next chapter provides a historical overview of the development of a legal and regulatory 
framework around DGs since the end of apartheid. Using government documents, legislation 
and parliamentary records, I document the government’s struggle to develop a coherent strategy 
on how to manage DGs the post-apartheid policy space. The new government elected in 1994 
perceived that doctors had been one of many impediments to fair access to DGs by black South 
Africans. The chapter documents the state’s subsequent attempts to break down barriers to 
access and reduce its reliance on medical doctors in determining DG eligibility, which quickly 
created a perceived (and unintended) ‘leniency’ in the system.  In the context of the HIV 
epidemic and high poverty-driven demand for the grant, doctors and newly introduced 
‘multidisciplinary assessment panels’ responded to the poor socio-economic conditions of 
claimants. Recognising the mismatch between social protection policy and the experiences of 
the patients they encountered, doctors responded by recommending the grant in cases which 
previously might not have been considered eligible on medical grounds. This resulted in 
“policy drift” (Hacker, 2004) as the grant become a de facto poverty and HIV grant rather 
than one targeted at people whose disabilities were caused by physical impairments. As the 
number of grants paid escalated in the early 2000s, the state became concerned with the fiscal 
sustainability of the system and moved towards a more medical model.  
Examining policy discussions around how to address the growth in DG numbers, I show how 
doctors’ supposed failure as gatekeepers and alleged fraud by claimants were highlighted as 
major contributors to DG growth. Seeing the extension of the social grant system as an 
undesirable way of addressing poverty among working-age adults, but unable to solve the high 
levels of unemployment driving demand for the grant, policy makers focused on the more 
tractable problem of targeting. They did this by developing assessments tools and guidelines, 
attempting to tighten the definition of disability and eligibility criteria and introducing a waiting 
period between re-applications. Although government ultimately failed to achieve consensus 
around a definition of disability and tools to assess it, SASSA developed its own systems and 
processes to “rationalise” the DG system. These new limits on access led to a significant 
decline in the number of social grant recipients. However, ignoring the systemic issues that 
doctors were responding to with their over-generosity has not made them disappear. Although 
their discretion has been constrained by the introduction of new management systems, 
 
 35 
disability remains poorly defined within legislation and SASSA guidelines. As a result, 
contestations around the meaning of disability continue to play out in the disability assessment 
process through the micro-level interactions between doctors and patients, which I focus on in 
the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
Continuing from the previous chapter, Chapter 3 describes the regulation and assessment of 
disability grant within the framework of SASSA’s Disability Management Model (DMM), the 
bureaucratic system put in place by SASSSA to reduce beneficiary numbers, eliminate fraud 
and manage the medical assessment process. The chapter provides a detailed description of the 
structure of this system in the Western Cape Province as it existed in 2014. I provide the details 
of the relationships between doctors, the Department of Health and SASSA and explain how 
this differs at different levels of the healthcare setting (primary, secondary and tertiary). I 
consider the role of SASSA’s Disability Management Unit and explain how the DMM process 
works from claimants’ first visits to a SASSA office through to the medical assessment process, 
and finally to the administrative processing and award or rejection of the grant. I also describe 
the management and oversight systems and training, and guidelines, which SASSA has 
implemented to standardise the assessment process and reduce doctors’ discretion within the 
assessment process.  
In the fourth chapter, I consider the position of South African doctors as medical experts in the 
DG system and their role in legitimating access to the disability category. Drawing on the 
extensive sociological literature on the medical profession, the nature and practical application 
of medical knowledge and the doctor-patient interaction, I highlight the particular challenges 
that DG assessment presented to doctors. I discuss the nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
in South Africa and show how the role of the doctor in the DG assessment - that of “fraud 
detective” - differs from the work that doctors typically do in treating settings. Given that 
treating doctors are able to conduct assessments within the context of their outpatient clinics, I 
also reflect on the dilemma this created for doctors and what this meant for the doctor patient 
relationship. My fieldwork showed that there was a marked absence of trust in patients’ 
intentions, which left many doctors (especially those in a treating role) feeling unsatisfied and 
discouraged in their work. SASSA’s medical impairment guidelines were inadequate for 
conducting assessments in cases of moderate impairment where employability could be 
exclusively medically determined. As much of medical practice is based on tacit, experiential 
knowledge - what doctors described as “gut feel” - SASSA’s attempts to codify disability 
assessment did not fit with the logic of medical judgement and many doctors therefore found 
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them limiting, and ignored them. Without proper training or guidelines that they found useful, 
doctors were left with an undesirable combination of discretion and uncertainty when 
considering whether and how to consider factors such age, education or work history in their 
assessments. As a result, doctors frequently made subjective and often normative decisions on 
claimants’ employability based on their own experiences and ideas about disablement and 
deservingness.  
In Chapter 5, I show how doctors navigate between their role as medical doctors and their 
bureaucratic role as assessors for the state within the DMM system described in Chapter 3. I 
demonstrate how the organisational arrangements, tools, standards and guidelines put in place 
by SASSA, in combination with the organisation of the Western Cape healthcare system, 
structured doctors’ work. Doctors improvised ways to cope with the demands, constraints 
and frustrations of both these systems in the clinics and hospitals where they worked. 
Despite organisational and regulatory impingements, doctors were able to find spaces of 
discretion in their work. The informal rules and practices they developed to simplify their 
decision-making undermined and impeded SASSA’s attempts to standardise assessments. 
Doctors’ attitudes towards and use of assessment guidelines and processes were based on their 
level of engagement with SASSA and their previous experiences of DG policy and processes. 
Unlike doctors contracted specifically to do assessment work, treating doctors were unwillingly 
drawn into the system and felt alienated from SASSA and DG policy. Their participation in the 
system was largely undirected, often leading to refusals to fill out assessment forms for patients 
or decisions made in the interest of the patient rather than the state. 
Chapter 6 continues the discussion of personal and professional conceptions of disability raised 
in Chapter 4. Focusing on social categorization, I show how personal and professional norms, 
values and notions of justice shaped decision-making. Drawing on Goffman’s theory of 
framing (1974) and Giddens’ (1984) notion of schemas and structuration, I argue that doctors 
make sense of a claimant’s situation and justify their choices in categorising claimants through 
the interactional and intersubjective process of framing. Doctors used the active process of 
framing to arrange medical knowledge, SASSA’s rules and standards and professional and 
personal norms and values, as well as their own experiences and those of their colleagues, to 
answer the question of eligibility in individual cases. I propose that four frames patterned 
doctor’s decision-making behaviour: the bureaucratic frame, the clinical frame, the moral 
frame and the social frame. Although shifting and flexible, the sets of practical rules that 
doctors created for themselves within the framework of existing rules created an orienting 
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structure from which to operate. They managed their bureaucratic ‘thought-work’ (Heyman, 
1995) in ways that allowed them to exercise professional, social and moral agency. Doctors’ 
adoption of certain frames depended on their medical specialty and training, institutional 
environment, social and cultural background, gender, approach to patient care, previous 
experiences with patients requesting the grant and their political views. I show how these 
frames either aligned with and reinforced, or undermined formal DG policy and shaped 
doctors’ attitudes towards formal eligibility criteria, inclining them to be either “harder” or 
“softer” on particular types of patient.   
Chapter 7 focuses on the disability assessment and the interaction between doctor and claimant 
as a site of negotiation and contestation over social security rights. I discuss the power relations 
that developed in the interactions between doctors and claimants and how these interactions 
shaped doctors’ decision-making. Drawing on Foucault (1977) and the work of Scott (1985, 
1990), de Certeau (1984) and Barnes & Prior (2009) on subaltern agency and defiance, this 
chapter discusses the micro-politics of resistance and subversion that emerge during face-to-
face encounters between doctors and DG claimants. I show that far from being passive 
participants in the assessment process, patients exercise agency to resist the objectifying 
process of disability categorisation and express their own subjective understandings of 
disability. Although doctors tended to dominate the assessment because of their professional 
and social status and decision-making power, some patients resisted this dominance and 
attempted to assert their personhood and demands for inclusion in the social security system 
during the assessment process. Some claimants used narratives and physical performances of 
disability and suffering or verbal and physical threats to coerce doctors. Although seldom 
effective, these small acts of resistance disrupted the assessment process. This points to the 
important, but often neglected, role citizens can play in shaping policy through their 
interactions with frontline workers and how they are also shaped by their experiences within 
welfare organisations. I also show how doctors coped with what they perceived to be attempts 
to pressure and manipulate them and what these strategies mean for policy implementation. The 
coping strategies they employed to protect themselves emotionally (and sometimes physically) 
from the demands of patients created distance and hostility between doctors and patients. These 
experiences and attempts to protect themselves made doctors more likely to take a hard-line 
bureaucratic approach to assessments.  
The concluding chapter summarises the evidence presented in other chapters on the difficulties 
of allocating DGs in South Africa. It shows how doctors’ decisions were driven by their 
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interpretations and pragmatic application of formal rules and processes in response to the 
pressures and constraints of their work, the macro economic and social context, their personal 
and professional values and norms and their social interactions with claimants. Their work, and 
attempts by the state to regulate it, shows how important the actions of policy implementers can 
be in shaping policy outcomes and further policy development. Claimants’ strategies to gain 
access to the DG shows that the agency and motivations of the people targeted by policy (in 
this case, DG claimants) also shaped policy outcomes. This is an important contribution to the 
street-level bureaucracy literature that (until recently) has primarily focused on the agency of 
frontline workers. I also argue that my findings illustrate the importance of considering 
professional values and ideas about the ‘right’ way of implementing policy in studies of street-
level bureaucracy. More practically, it shows that professional values and sense of purpose may 
not be easily ceded in the face of bureaucratic rules and public management initiatives, and that 
other more collegial forms of engagement are necessary to manage professionals’ work. I argue 
that the disjuncture between policy design and its implementation by doctors reveals the 
limitations of the DG system and fault-lines in social welfare and disability policy. I conclude 




CHAPTER 2: Regulating access to the disability grant in South Africa, 1990-2013 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past 15 years, the South African disability grant (DG) has received significant 
attention in academic, civil society, media and government circles, largely because it has 
raised major questions about social development and poverty alleviation strategies that 
extend well beyond concerns about disability. This chapter sets out to examine the 
development of DG policy and regulations in post-apartheid South Africa and in doing so, 
explore understandings of disability, as well as how the rights of the sick and disabled to social 
security have been negotiated and decided by policymakers and legislators in government. 
Hansen and Sait (2012) argue that the process of conceptualising disability in South Africa can 
be divided into two distinct phases. The first of these was a period of reconciliation (1994 - 
2001) when discrimination and subjective experiences of disabled people came into play and 
the focus was ‘extending grants to those in need rather than to ask the question of who was in 
need’ (2012: 96). The second phase (2001 onwards) represents a period of controlling access to 
the grant when the discourse of dependency was invoked along with a narrower biomedical 
conception of disability and a focus on who is disabled. However, this analysis overlooks the 
fact that in 2001 disability assessment was in fact adapted to incorporate a more social 
understanding of disability. This led to an unprecedented growth in DG beneficiaries until 
2007, where a narrower, strictly biomedical model of disability was reintroduced. 
This chapter offers a different periodization to Hansen & Sait (2012). I argue that there have 
been three phases in DG management by the post-Apartheid state, which have coincided with 
two major shocks to the social welfare system. The first came because of the seismic political, 
economic and social shifts that occurred at the end of apartheid. The new African National 
Congress (ANC) government recognised the urgent need to address massive poverty and social 
inequality that existed in South Africa. This led to a period of extending and deracialising 
access and overcoming administrative barriers, supported by a ‘rights’ and administrative 
justice discourse. This was followed by a period of growth and generous access (2001 – 2007), 
which, in the wake of what emerged to be one of the fiercest HIV epidemics in the world, led 
to a rapid increase in the number of people applying for and receiving the DG. The way in 
which DG assessors interpreted and applied DG policy in the context of the HIV epidemic 
created what Hacker (2004: 246) calls policy drift - the “changes in the operation or effect of 
policies that occur without significant changes in those policies’ structure”.  The DG became, 
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in effect, an HIV grant and a general poverty alleviation grant, serving a purpose beyond the 
one for which is was designed. The massive increase in beneficiaries over this period resulted 
in growing concern about over-generosity and fiscal sustainability of the DG system. This 
culminated in a set of actions by the state that placed new limits on frontline worker discretion 
and access to the DG and a period of decline in the number of social grant recipients from 2007 
onwards. 
 
Source: Department of Welfare, DSD and SASSA Reports 1997-2015, SA Statistics, 2001 
Figure Changes in DG beneficiary numbers 1993-2015 
Crucial to policy changes over all three periods was the way in which ‘higher-ups’ interpreted 
and responded to street-level action and how this shaped further policy development. The 
relationship between the design of DG policy and its implementation provides an excellent case 
for thinking about the policy-making process as a feedback loop rather than a top-down process 
(Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1993; Hacker, 2002). In particular, it highlights the importance of 
administrators in not only shaping policy outcomes, which the literature on policy 
implementation tends to focus on, but also future policymaking.  
2.2 Disability grant policy at the end of apartheid 
Cash transfers specifically targeted at people with disabilities have a long history in South 
Africa. Social assistance for disabled people was first introduced through the Blind Persons 







































































white South Africans from 1937 onwards. The Disability Grants Act of 1946 formalised 
this scheme in the form of a means-tested disability grant made available to all South 
Africans, but with the value of the grant and the details of the means-test differing by 
race (and urban/rural location), as was the case with old age pension.  
From the 1970s, racial discrimination in the value of benefits was reduced. The real value of 
pensions for black people rose whilst they fell for the white population. By 1990, white 
people accounted for only 23% of welfare spending, whilst coloured and Indian people 
received 24% and black people 52%  (Kruger, 1992; Terreblanche, 2003; Van der Walt, 
2000 in Visser, 2004: 5). Discrimination in benefit levels based on race was finally 
eliminated and equal benefits were extended to all DG beneficiaries in 1993 (Ardington & 
Lund, 1995). 
At the end of apartheid, the system of grants and pensions was in a state of ‘organisational 
chaos’ (Matisonn and Seekings, 2003: 58). The system was racially segregated and 
administered by seventeen different departments, serving different racial groups including 
Africans in the ten bantustans30; four provincial administrations that served Africans outside of 
the bantustans; and three different administrations for whites, ‘coloureds’ and Indians under the 
tri-cameral parliament system (Department of Welfare, 1997a; Van Der Berg, 2002). Eligibility 
and means testing criteria, and grant payment amounts were racially discriminatory and payment 
periods varied significantly across these administrations (Lund, 1992). Data on beneficiaries 
were held by these various administrations, rather than centrally, and some were not 
computerised. The result was that there were few consolidated statistics on beneficiary numbers 
or expenditures by programme (Lund, 1992). Lund (1992) analysed estimates of expenditure, 
auditor general reports, parliamentary debates and policy speeches and interviewed members 
of various government departments, finding significant discrepancies in the information on 
social grants provided by these sources, estimating a total expenditure of R828 million in 1990 
based on the best available data. No accurate data on the number of DG beneficiaries over this 
period appears to exist. 
Between 1991 and 1995, the welfare budget grew faster than any other government 
department (23% per annum) as a result of equalising benefits (Ardington & Lund, 1995). 
                                                
30 Territories set aside for the African population. Four of these territories - Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 




As a result, there was concern about the growing welfare ‘burden’ and social security reform 
was informed by a need to manage costs leading to a push to ‘rationalise’ the social grant 
system (Department of Welfare, 1994) and increase administrative efficiency. 
In January 1992, the New Social Welfare Dispensation for the Republic of South Africa 
document outlined the development of a new welfare policy that would incorporate welfare 
policy under a number of umbrella Acts, increase the allocation of social welfare services from 
1.6% to 3.2% of GDP and achieve full parity of social grants by 1 April 1996. This led to the 
promulgation of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992.  
The Social Assistance of 1992 repealed existing social welfare legislation, including the Social 
Pensions Act of 1973, the Disability Grants Act of 1968, and various welfare acts promulgated 
by the formerly independent homeland states. The 1992 Act used the same definition of 
disability as was used in the Disability Grants Act of 1968 and read as follows:   
“Disabled person” means any person who has attained the prescribed age and is, 
owing to his or her physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, 
employment or profession the means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or 
her maintenance. (Social Assistance Act 1992, Section 1)  
Other than eliminating racial disparities and increasing the age of eligibility from 16 to 18, the 
1992 Act changed little in the way that DGs were managed. As in previous legislation, a 
disabled person was defined as someone with a physical or mental disability. However, as I will 
discuss in Section 2.3.3, the concept of ‘disability’ or how to assess it was never properly 
defined in the Act or its regulations.  
2.3 Attempts by the post-apartheid government to extend access and overcome 
administrative barriers: 1994-2001 
When the ANC government took power in 1994, poverty and inequality were significant 
problems. The poorest 52% of the population accounted for less than 10% of total income, 
whilst the r ichest  6% captured 40% of income (Taylor Committee, 2002). Grants were 
awarded to only 2.4 million out of a total population of 40 million people (Seekings & 
Matisonn, 2010). 
On coming to power, the new ANC government committed itself to building a social welfare 
system that promised “the attainment of basic social welfare rights for all South Africans, 
irrespective of race, colour, religion, gender and physical disability, through the establishment 
of a democratically-determined, just and effective social delivery system” (Republic of South 
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Africa, 1994: 2.13). Although the ANC was committed to achieving racial equality in the social 
grant system, which at the time reached few Africans relative to other racial groups, it was also 
concerned about developing a welfare state that promoted dependency rather than development. 
The Reconstruction and Development Plan White Paper (1994) presents an early example of 
this discourse:  
Co-ordination of programmes alleviating the needs of people living in poverty and 
marginalised circumstances will be essential to maximise individual potential and 
minimise the extent of dependency on the State… It is unfortunately true that many 
communities and families depend almost entirely on the cash from social grants. (RSA, 
1994a: 3.12) 
2.3.1 Difficulties in managing a messy system  
The administrative complexities of the previous system, and poor capacity for delivering social 
security services, especially in more rural areas, made extending access to social grants an 
extremely challenging task. The social security system it inherited was fragmented, inequitable 
and administratively inefficient, and was designed to serve a minority of the population. In the 
case of the DG, existing administrative difficulties were compounded by the complicated nature 
of identifying and targeting beneficiaries who were particularly marginalised and were 
doubly discriminated against by the apartheid system in terms of both race and their 
disabilities (Nkeli, 1998). The new government therefore faced the daunting task of both 
consolidating and extending the complex and discriminatory administrative structures 
inherited from the previous regime.  
Given low levels of unemployment in the white population, the apartheid social security system 
was focused on providing unemployment insurance to white people working in the formal 
labour market, with social assistance only forming a residual ‘safety net’ function for 
specifically targeted categories of people considered vulnerable to poverty, namely disabled 
people, children and the elderly (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005; 2015). This design did not take 
into account the large numbers of previously excluded poor and unemployed black people 
(Woolard et al., 2010). Service delivery structures of the social welfare system were based on 
the British and American models, which were inappropriate to the South African political, 
economic and socio-cultural context (Patel, 1992: 46). However, budget constraints made re-
imagining a new system fairly challenging for the ANC government. In the six years after 
apartheid a series of commissions were assembled to examine how to re-structure the existing 
system: the Chikane Committee for Restructuring Social Security (1996), the Lund  
Committee  on  Child  and  Family  Support (1996), the Public Service Commission 
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Investigation into Social Security Services (1998) and the Taylor Committee on 
Comprehensive Social Security for South Africa (2000). 
The draft White Paper for Social Welfare, published in 1995 and adopted by cabinet in 
1997, outlines the creation of a developmental social welfare system in-line with the goals 
and strategies of the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). 
The White Paper was aimed at guiding the consolidation of welfare policy. Apartheid 
legislation was largely developed in an ad hoc fashion, reflecting reactions to particular 
issues and the White Paper for Social Welfare attempts to set the tone for more 
comprehensive and consultative welfare policy: “A comprehensive and integrated social 
security policy is needed to give effect to the Constitutional right to social security.’’ 
(Department of Welfare, 1997a: 55) 
The White Paper acknowledged that welfare services were underfunded and sought to 
increase welfare spending and the number of social grant beneficiaries over time, reintroducing 
promises of a universal social security system. 
There will be universal access to an integrated and sustainable social security system. 
Every South African should have a minimum income, sufficient to meet basic 
subsistence needs, and should not have to live below minimum acceptable standards. 
The social security system will also work intersectorally to alleviate poverty 
(Department of Welfare, 1997a: Section 7.27). 
However, at the same time, like the RDP White Paper, it expresses a reticence around building 
a paternalistic welfare state, promoting the idea of developmental social welfare instead. It 
suggests a number of strategies that would promote the ‘sustainability’ of the social security 
system by increasing the self-reliance of the poor and the vulnerable, effectively reducing their 
dependence on the state. These strategies included public works programmes, active 
employment policy, more stringent eligibility testing and employment and training programmes 
that would “divert people from the welfare system” (Department of Welfare, 1997a, 6.22). 
There was also concern about the growing costs of the social grant system and the need to 
address the wasteful expenditure caused by the inefficiencies, confusion and fraud within the 
highly disjointed existing system. To this end, in 1995 the Department of Welfare began a 
project to amalgamate and clean up social grant records of the 17 different systems into one 
national database.  
In 1997, the Cabinet instructed the Department of Welfare to undertake a national re-
registration drive intended to reduce fraud and discrepancies in the system and a national 
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social security system was phased in from 1 April 1998. The clean-up process included 
removing deceased beneficiaries (ghost beneficiaries) and duplicates from the system as 
well as Temporary Disability Grants (TDGs) that had not been cancelled. Prior to 1998, 
disability pensions could only be terminated after an annual medical review and if the 
person concerned was less than 100%  disabled. In 1998, amendments to the Regulations of 
the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 provided for the automatic lapsing of temporary DG 
granted before 1998. 
As a result of these efforts, the number of DG recipients dropped 14.6% from 711,629 to 607, 
537 between the end of March 1997 and the end of March 2000 (see Figure 1). Although the 
clean-up process resulted in significant savings for the Department of Welfare, 
administrative problems in carrying out the re-registration – poor communication about the 
process as well as the lack of identity documents of many beneficiaries – caused financial 
stress for those whose grants were suspended or cancelled, especially in rural areas. The 
blanket cancellations of temporary DGs and the grants of ‘suspect’ beneficiaries without 
notice over this period also resulted in litigation by beneficiaries in which judgment was 
given in favour of the applicants (Olivier & Mpedi, 2009). 
2.3.2 Poor coverage of the population eligible for the disability grant 
Although the efforts to improve administration were effective in reducing the number of 
illegitimate beneficiaries in the system, in 2001 the Director of Social Grants in the 
Department of Social Welfare, Fezile Makiwane, acknowledged that the number of social 
grant beneficiaries was only a small fraction of the total number of eligible individuals (PMG, 
2001a). There were also additional barriers to access specific to the administration of the DG 
that needed to be addressed, such the difficulty disabled people had accessing medical 
facilities and a shortage of medical doctors to conduct assessments. This is recognised in the 
post-apartheid government’s initial proposals for social security and disability issues in South 
Africa – the White Paper on Social Welfare (1997) and the Integrated Disability Strategy White 
Paper (1997), which the quote below is drawn from: 
 People who receive social security benefits in South Africa tend to be totally dependent on 
them for their survival. The majority of people with disabilities, however, receive no grant at 
all. … The present social security legislative framework, its administration and allocation 
systems, tend to be discriminatory, punitive, insensitive to the specific needs of people with 
disabilities, uncoordinated, inadequate and riddled with high levels of fraud (Office of the 
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Deputy President, 1997). 
As shown in Figure 1, in 1994 less than 600,000 people received the DG. This represented 
1.6% of the total population (38.38 million) and around 30% of the people with disabilities 
based on survey estimates that disability prevalence at the time was around 5% (CSS, 1995). 
Although not all disabled people would necessarily be eligible for the grant, it is likely that 
uptake of the grant was low relative to the number of disabled persons living in poverty, 
largely because of punitive means testing and medical assessment processes (Department of 
Welfare, 1997a). 
Coverage of black South Africans with disabilities was low compared to coloured and Indian 
people, despite a higher prevalence of disability and high likelihood of unemployment within 
this group (see Table 2 below). This is likely because of discriminatory practices during 
apartheid as well as spatial discrimination because of lower literacy levels and poor access 
to welfare services within rural areas. 
Table 1 DG Coverage by population group 
Population group Number of DG recipients per 
1000 people in population 
(1997) 
% Disability in 
population 
(1999) 
% of disabled 





8 5.7% 19% 
Indian 23 4.7% 9% 
Coloured 31 4.5% 4% 
Black 12 6.1% 6% 
Source: Van Der Berg, 1997 and Schneider et al., 1999 in Bredenkamp, 2001. 
2.3.3 Problems of accessibility 
The social grant system in the early 1990s was both difficult to access and “ironically over-
administered” (Lund, 1997: 9). In 1997, the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) 
was commissioned by the Department of Welfare to research social security policy options 
for people with disabilities. CASE convened a task team that included representatives 
from the disability sector and the Department of Welfare. The report, based on data 
collection in five provinces,  found that administrative inefficiencies presented a serious 
barrier to accessing the grant (Schneider & Marshall, 1998). Beneficiaries reported that the 
application process was frustrating and complex and that the success of an application 
frequently depended on being lucky enough to find a sympathetic official (Schneider & 
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Marshall, 1998). Healthcare workers pointed out the challenges disabled people faced in 
navigating the DG application process: 
“We’ve joked in the past at our hospital that if you can actually get through the 
whole system, get to all the places and see all the people, you probably aren’t 
disabled enough to qualify.” (Medical assessor quoted in Schneider & Marshall, 
1998: 50) 
The Black Sash, which provided paralegal advice on social security issues, reported that DG 
enquiries constituted 60% of the advice given by their paralegals (Black Sash, 2000a). This 
was likely a result of high demand for the grant, challenges faced by those seeking access to 
the grant and the suspension of DGs without notice. 
At the time, all DG forms were filled out by Medical Officers (MOs) and assessed by Pension 
Medical Officers (PMOs) employed by the state to oversee the administration of DGs 
from a medical perspective. This practice was criticised for creating significant backlogs 
(Baron, 1992) and for allowing PMOs to make important decisions affecting patient 
welfare without actually examining patients (Simchowitz, 2004). The shortage of medical 
doctors available to perform assessments in rural areas also lead to significant assessment 
backlogs in some provinces. The Department of Welfare estimated that in 2000 there was a 
backlog of 86,951 grant applications across the country (see Table 3 below). The Eastern Cape 





Table 2 Backlogs per province as of May 2000 
KwaZulu-Natal 10000 





Northern Cape 400 
Western Cape 500 
North West 7000 
Northern Province 30000 
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Free State 100 
Total 86951 
Source: Department of Welfare, 2000a  
Based on the policy that no one should wait longer than three months for a grant application to 
be processed, payment of arrears was restricted to three months regardless of how long 
an applicant i n  f a c t  waited to receive their grant (South African Federation for 
Mental Health, 1999; Black Sash, 2000a). Although this policy was meant to incentivise 
administrators to speed up the application process, long delays in administering grants were 
common. Another study by CASE found that only 27% of DG applicants received their grants 
within the stipulated three months (Schneider et al., 1999). 
Physical access and transport to welfare offices for applications and collection of payments 
was often challenging and expensive for disabled or very ill people who had mobility issues 
and for whom the costs of transport or the time spent in long queues proved physically 
difficult. People who had moved from their hometowns had to travel back to these towns to 
collect their grant money (Schneider & Marshall, 1998). 
Temporary DG applicants were often not told that their grants were temporary and their 
records were often deleted completely from the system without notice, forcing recipients 
to apply and wait without support for several months whilst their new applications were 
processed from scratch. The right to appeal grant refusals or cancellations was poorly 
understood by many applicants and beneficiaries. The appeals system itself was also deeply 
faulty and inconsistent and significant backlogs existed in the appeals process (de Villiers, 
2006). 
Inefficiencies and inequities in grant administration such as those discussed above 
undermined the constitutional requirement of lawful and reasonable administrative action 
outlined in Section 33 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996 and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 that 
expanded on this right. This lead to litigation by the Legal Resource Centre and the Black 
Sash against the Department of Social Development on behalf of applicants and 
beneficiaries facing delays and cancellations (Black Sash, 2000b; PMG, 2000a;  Department  
of  Welfare, 2000a)31. One of the most prominent cases over this time was the class action 
                                                




brought forward by the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of Ngxuza and two other 
defendants as well as 37,000 other temporary grant beneficiaries in the Eastern Cape, who 
had their DGs suspended or cancelled without proper procedure or notice (Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza and others 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA)). 
2.3.4 Problems in DG Assessment 
The DG assessment process has been the most problematic and contentious aspect of 
regulating access to the DG. In the 1990s difficulties in the assessment process included: the 
lack of a proper definition of disability for social assistance purposes; a lack of 
standardised assessment tools; inconsistent and subjective application of assessment tools; 
the medical focus of the assessment process, which did not take social or environmental 
factors into account; and a shortage of medical doctors to perform assessments, especially in 
rural areas. 
Although Section 9 of the Social Assistance Act of 1992 outlined the criteria for eligibility for 
DGs, there was no clear definition of what classified as “physical or mental disability.” 
In fact, since the introduction of DGs in 1946, the concept of disability had never actually 
been formally defined in any of the social assistance legislation and related regulations. 
Although the definition of disability was vague, the Act required that an applicant’s disability 
be confirmed by a medical report, meaning that the assessment of disability was heavily 
biased towards medical diagnosis and the medical model of disability. 
In the 1990s, a person was eligible for a grant if the degree of their disability was certified as 
greater than 50% on an open labour market and was expected to last longer than one year 
(Brown, 1990: 31; Guthrie & Sait, 2001). The assumption that there is a norm of 
physiological and mental function and that deviations from this norm can be measured in 
terms of a percentage of disability does not take into account social and economic factors 
that may act as barriers to people’s ability to participate in productive work (Schneider & 
Marshall, 1998; Kimani, 1999).   Whilst   the   Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 and 
the Compensation for Industrial Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 that later replaced 
it provided impairment tables (sometimes referred to as ‘meat charts’)32 to categorise the 
                                                                                                                                                     
a class action of approximately 30 000 cases in the Eastern Cape (Ngxuza) and another 150 cases in the 
Gauteng. 
32 A meat chart assigns a value to each body part and assists in categorising the severity of an injury. The current 
DG system uses impairment tables.  
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degree of anatomic loss in workplace injuries, no such guidelines existed in the case of the 
DG (Lund, 1997). This meant that the judgment of what constituted 50%  disablement was 
left to the discretion of medical officers. A general assessment of ‘fitness to work’ also did 
not take into account whether an applicant was able to carry out the type of work they were 
specifically trained for (Bredenkamp, 2001: 198) and it was not clear to what extent 
medical officers could or should take highly variable economic factors into account in 
assessing disability (de Villiers, 2002). This very one-dimensional assessment also left no 
room for self-representation by people with disabilities in the application process (Guthrie & 
Sait, 2001). 
In addition, the 1992 Act referred only to physical or mental disability, excluding people 
with intellectual and sensory impairments, often causing administrative problems for deaf or 
sight-impaired applicants (Guthrie & Sait, 2001). There was also no clear definition of and 
delineation between temporary and permanent disability, meaning that these decisions were 
often made arbitrarily. Attempts to address this were made in 1998 through amendments to 
Social Assistance Act regulations which distinguished between permanent disability grants and 
temporary disability that lasted no more than six months or no more than a year. The temporary 
classification was frequently misapplied by officials and doctors and used as a “convenient 
half-grant” (de Villiers, 2006: 3) where they felt a permanent classification was not justified 
or where insufficient supporting evidence was supplied. There were also cases where 
people with temporary disabilities received permanent grants for conditions such as epilepsy, 
which are in theory manageable but remain stigmatised (Dr Jacobs, interview, 2013 October 
24). 
In the 1990s, given the spectre of a growing HIV epidemic and the lack of widely 
available anti-retroviral therapy, the White Paper on Social Welfare (1997) predicted an 
increased demand for disability benefits and there was growing concern in government about 
the possible burden that AIDS-sick people would have on the DG system (Department of 
Welfare, 1997a). Although DGs were not technically available to people with chronic illness, 
people who were functionally disabled by illness were eligible, making it difficult to establish 
at which point someone with a chronic illness such as HIV should receive a grant. Given 
inadequate definitions and vague and unclear guidelines, state doctors struggled with 
conducting DG assessments and were recommending the grant to people of varying levels of 
health and disability, creating confusion amongst applicants about who was eligible for 
grants (Baron, 1992; Segar, 1994; Schneider & Marshall, 1998).  
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Although not well documented, it appears that clinic and the hospitals had, during apartheid, 
been sites where rights to social benefits were negotiated and settled in ways that were often 
very different to official state policy (Jehoma, interview, 2014 August 11). Qualitative 
research conducted into the DG application process in the 1990s (Baron, 1992; Segar, 1994) as 
well as government documents and parliamentary discussions in the 1990s all reveal concern 
about the pressure placed on doctors by the growing numbers of people seeking DGs.  
Although a national grants system was created in 1998, the nine provincial governments 
remained responsible for administering grants and implementing grant policy. Without 
national guidelines, provinces operated their own systems very differently and used 
different application and medical forms and guidelines for the DG application process 
(Black Sash, 2000a; de Villiers, 2002). In most of the provincial for assessing disability were 
inadequate or did not exist at all (Lund, 1997)33. Without proper training, a clear definition 
of disability or clear universal guidelines for disability assessment, the system was 
subjective and arbitrary, resulting in confusion and inconsistency (Schneider & Marshall, 
1998: 49; Swartz & Schneider, 2006; PMG, 1999; Department of Welfare, 2000b; 2000c).  
As already overworked medical officers were conducting assessments in addition to their 
regular workload, medical officers generally did not have time to properly consider each case 
and thus made rapid assessments (Schneider & Marshall, 1998; Kimani, 1999). This meant 
that those with more obvious disabilities were more likely to receive grants. Schneider et al. 
(1999) found that people using assistive devices were significantly more likely to receive 
a DG than to not receive one. Given that the doctor had such influence over access to the 
grant, the process was further undermined by bribery, fraud and threats to doctors by people 
demanding the grant (PMG, 2000a). 
In a context of high poverty levels, it is difficult to distinguish between disability-related 
poverty and other generalised poverty and there was often confusion as to whether 
someone was receiving a grant because they were disabled or unemployable (Schneider & 
Marshall, 1998). This was often the case amongst applicants over the age of 55 who were not 
yet eligible for the Old Age Pension and were awarded temporary DGs because t h e y  
were no longer able to carry out manual labour but lacked the education or skills to do other 
work (Schneider & Marshall, 1998). 
                                                
33 This came under criticism in Msiza v Director of Social Security, North West Province 
Bophuthastswana HC 702/2001 
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There were also emerging concerns that in a context of high unemployment people were 
using temporary DGs as a ‘ticket’ to an income (Segar, 1994). Segar’s (1994) ethnography 
of patient compliance to epilepsy medication in the epilepsy clinic of an Eastern Cape day 
hospital, indicates that patients were strategically using the illness to access the DG. In the 
case of her study, patients and doctors became “locked into a kind of negotiation where the 
issues of disease and therapy may themselves become of secondary importance.” (Segar, 
1994: 295) In a letter to the South African Medical Journal, a tuberculosis researcher focusing 
on patient compliance raised concerns that it was “financially advantageous for the indigent 
TB patient to remain in the ‘sick role’ for as long as possible” (Dick, 1995), affecting 
adherence to treatment. In recommendations to the Department of Welfare, Schneider & 
Marshall (1998) recommended the elimination of the temporary DG for this reason. This 
strategic use of the DG placed healthcare workers in a position of acting as both detectives 
and judges (Baron, 1992: 428), roles that were beyond the scope and training of their medical 
role. 
2.4. A new strategy on disability 
Although the Integrated National Disability White Paper (1007) and the White Paper on 
Social Welfare (1997) recommend changes to improve and extend access to DGs, 
government took little action to change policy, legislation or regulations around the DG 
until 1999/2000 when Zola Skweyiya became minister of the Department of Welfare in 1999 
(which soon changed to the the Department of Social Development). In response to the 
obvious need to improve DG administration, the Department of Welfare convened a 
Disability Task Team including legal experts, academics, civil society and government 
representatives from the nine provinces to look at the existing legislation, regulations and 
implementation challenges (Department of Welfare, 2000c; Black Sash, 2000a). In June 
2000 the Department of Welfare presented a new strategy on DGs to the Welfare and 
Population Development Portfolio Committee in Parliament (Department of Welfare, 2000b). 
The strategy attempts to address the concerns and difficulties with administration 
of social grants in respect of disability and attempts to involve the disability sector in 
the assessment panels, to assess applications for a social grant. The strategy proposes 
a clear definition, clear assessment criteria and uses a combination of the medical 
and social model in the assessment process. Applicants will no longer be forced to 
go to a medical officer of health for a medical report but can obtain a report from any 
doctor who is familiar with his/her medical history (Department of Welfare, 2000a). 
This strategy proposed amendments to the DG system which included: creating a new 
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definition for disability, reducing reliance on medical officers who were often not present 
in rural areas, creating a timeframe for temporary disability and specifying an appeals 
process for those claimants opposing suspensions and rejections. The medical assessment 
process was considered time consuming, expensive and duplicative34 and the document 
recommended that this process be relaxed to allow any physician, psychiatrist, psychologist 
or optometrist of the applicant’s choice to make recommendations on grant applications. This 
report would however only form part of the process and multi-disciplinary adjudicating 
panels would perform the actual assessment. The multi-disciplinary nature of assessment 
panels (APs) were expected to move disability assessment away from a biomedical 
understanding of disability by incorporating more social considerations into assessment of 
applicants’ ability to work. This would bring the DG process in-line with the INDS White 
Paper (1997), which advocated a social model of disability. Including community members 
and the disability sector in the panels was expected to break the bias towards physical 
disability inherent in the medical examination. 
Practitioners other than medical practitioners, and community members who have 
had the opportunity to observe applicants over a long period of time, may, it was 
hoped, be better placed to detect ‘invisible’ disabilities’ than would a medical 
practitioner forced to undertake a quick assessment, with limited resources 
(Swartz & Schneider, 2006: 239). 
Given the shortage of medical doctors, especially in more rural areas, the DSD hoped that 
APs would help to reduce the large backlog of DG applications and reduce the growing 
threat of litigation against backlogs and unclear or improper processes for DG 
cancellations or classifications or permanent and temporary disability. Based on these 
proposals, amendments to the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 were introduced in 
September 2000, with the main purpose of the amendments explained by the Department of 
Social Development (DSD)35 as follows: 
To remove constraining factors towards administrative justice. Remove incentives for 
unscrupulous individuals to enrich themselves. Regulation to be aligned with a more 
developmental approach to empowering people with disabilities to become self-
sustaining (DSD, 2000). 
                                                
34 The grant had to be approved by both a medical officer and a pension medical officer 
35 In July 2000 the Department of Welfare was re-named the Department of Social Development. At the 
beginning of 2001 the Welfare and Population Development Portfolio Committee in the National Assembly 




The DSD also hoped that introducing APs would decrease the individual discretion of 
doctors, whose decision-making was seen as subjective, bias and open to corruption. As the 
DSD Chief Director of Social Security, Fezile Makiwane, explained, “panels were mooted to 
shift the process of decision making from one individual to a group of persons” 
(Makiwane, 2001b). 
Mr Makiwane did, however, agree with the Chair that the problem of fraudulent claims is a 
critical one and calls for a multisectoral approach. Capacity building by the government is 
needed to stamp it out. He hoped that with the setting up of the panel system the problem 
would abate to a considerable level (PMG, 2001c). 
The multi-disciplinary nature of APs was expected to increase the reliability and validity of 
assessments. According to the 2000 proposal APs consist of a senior social security official, 
a rehabilitation therapist (nurse, social workers, psychologist, occupational therapist or 
audio-visual therapist) and either a representative from the disability sector or other reputable 
community member. 
The idea, she underscored, was to incorporate people with the locus standi to testify to the 
applicant's disability status. The panels, she said further, are poised to inject some efficiency 
and reliability in the disability assessment process. The current set up is inadequate since it 
involves a single medical officer of health (PMG, 2001c). 
Discussions around amendments of regulations to the Social Assistance Act highlighted 
the need to create a clear definition of disability for social grant purposes: 
The MP pointed out that the definition of disability needs to be made clear. Because of 
high unemployment, people are using this avenue to obtain money, especially by 
claiming temporary disability benefits. In terms of the definition of temporary 
disability, how would one differentiate gout from arthritis? (PMG, 2000a). 
Amendments made to the Regulations of the Social Assistance Act (Act 59 of 1992) in 
July 2001 removed the role and regulatory function of the Pension Medical Officer, 
allowing assessors to function independently of their oversight. This amendment also 
introduced Assessment Panels (APs) as possible substitutes for Medical Officers (MOs) in 
areas where there were no medical officers. Further amendments were made in November 
2001, which allowed APs to be used in all areas and for Care Dependency Grant 
assessments. According to the Regulations as amended in November 2001 an assessment 
panel was defined as “a group of individuals appointed by the Director-General in 
accordance with regulation 2(4), who have the relevant experience and expertise to assess 
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disability and care dependency.” 
However, despite an obvious need to clearly define disability, no definition of disability was 
included in the amendments to the regulations. 
2.5 A period of unbridled growth in DG beneficiaries: 2001 – 2007 
In a 1997 paper, Van der Berg commented that given the extent of unemployment in 
SA, the take-up of benefits such as the DG are likely to be as great as administrative leniency 
allows (Van der Berg, 1997: 494). This proved to be the case when 2001 amendments to the 
Social Assistance Act increased the leniency of DG administration, contributing significantly to 
the massive increase in DG beneficiaries from 655 822 in 2001 until 2007, when this number 
peaked at 1,442,808 (see Figure 1).  
As a result of the amendments, which came into effect in December 2001, provinces 
had two available routes for assessing disability for social grant purposes. Provinces could 
either continue to use medical officers without PMO oversight, or assessment panels could 
be used to make a final recommendation to social security officials. Although new 
regulations were aimed at improving DG administration, the removal of the PMO oversight 
function and the lack of training or guidelines for APs in fact further reduced the control 
the DSD had over the assessment process and created what one provincial official described 
as a “free for all” (Delany et al., 2005). Although panels were meant to include medical 
professionals such as occupational therapists, physiotherapists, doctors and nurses, two APs 
in the North West Province observed in a study conducted by Goldblatt (2009) did not 
always include these professionals and panellists often did not understand medical reports 
(Goldblatt, 2009: 376). Based on legal casework, de Villiers (2002) also reported that APs 
worked off scantily detailed, poorly explained and often illegible medical reports. Without 
the presence of MOs to explain their reasoning, the assessment panels were not able to 
establish the severity of medical impairment. APs also struggled to weigh medical factors in 
relation to the psychosocial and economic circumstances of applicants (de Villiers, 2002). 
Goldblatt’s (2009) research found and the Director of Disability and Retirement Benefits, 
Dimakatso Pooe reported that the panels they observed in the North-West province were 
‘unprofessional’, lacked confidentiality and panellists were unclear on their roles or what model 
of disability to apply (Pooe, interview, 2014 September 10).   
As the administration of grants was neither centralised nor standardised across provinces, 
different provinces introduced APs at different times and used them to varying degrees and 
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in various combinations with MOs and PMOs. For instance, Mpumalanga introduced three 
APs to work with MOs and retained an oversight role through a senior social security official. 
The Free State and KwaZulu-Natal eliminated the PMO role and ran dual systems that 
allowed either MOs or APs to make assessments. The North West and Limpopo provinces 
were most organised in implementing APs but also implemented quite different systems. The 
North West province introduced 26 APs linked to social security offices that worked 
alongside MOs in the assessment process and were the only province to provide trainings for 
panel members. Limpopo situated APs within hospitals where they worked alongside the 
Medical Officer to recommend the grant, with the MO conducting the medical assessment 
component. On the other hand, the Western Cape and Gauteng never introduced APs. Gauteng 
abandoned the PMO function while the Western Cape retained it, although they could no 
longer override an MO recommendation. The Eastern Cape and Northern Cape briefly 
piloted APs but abandoned them for logistical reasons (Simchowitz, 2004), with the Northern 
Cape retaining its original system (with the PMO) and the Eastern Cape using MOs 
exclusively (Delany et al., 2005). 
Medical assessment forms and the criteria used to define AIDS-related disability also differed 
widely across provinces, with some provinces offering the DG very generously and others 
having no HIV/AIDS guidelines available until 2004 or later (Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 
2005; Nattrass, 2007).36 
The unexpectedly large increase in the number of DGs from 2002 onwards has been largely 
attributed to the 2001 regulatory changes (Simchowitz, 2004; Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 
2005; Nattrass, 2007). Delany et al. (2005) reported that between October 2001 and September 
2004 the number of permanent DGs increased by 143% and temporary DGs increased by 
61% , whilst the CDG uptake increased by 119%. By 2007 over 1.4 million people accessed 
the DG, up from 600,000 in 2001. SOCPEN data demonstrate that the percentage of 
rejected/not recommended applications dropped significantly from 8% in 1997 to less than 
1% in March 2005 (Steele, 2006). In addition, of those who registered as rejected in March 
1999 and who reapplied later, 60% were successful in claiming a DG (either a PDG 5% or 
TDG 55%) by March 2001 (Steele, 2006). 
                                                
36 Northern Cape and Mpumalanga did not develop any guidelines and left assessment of HIV positive patients to 




In 2004, driven by anxiety about the budgetary implications of the growth in DG numbers, the 
DSD commissioned the Community Agency of Social Enquiry (CASE) to carry out new 
research into the increase in DG uptake (see Delany et al., 2005). This and other studies have 
attributed this growth to relaxation of grant assessment criteria, the reduction in oversight 
brought about by the elimination of PMOs and introduction of APs, the lack of a framework 
for assessments, the increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and TB and high levels of 
unemployment (Delany et al., 2005; Simchowitz, 2004; Steele, 2006; Nattrass, 2007). 
According to these studies, the social aspects of disability applications became the strongest 
factor in applications and the DG was often awarded more out of sympathy on the basis of 
poverty than actual physical capability (Simchowitz, 2004; Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 2005; 
Nattrass, 2007). The confusion between medical diagnosis and actual functional capacity 
also meant that disability grants were often awarded to people who may have been able to 
work. HIV positive patients were particularly likely to be given the grant on the basis of their 
positive status rather than their actual ability to work and the popular perception emerged that 
people with HIV/AIDS would automatically qualify for the DG (Schneider & Goudge, 2007; 
De Koker et al., 2006), in some cases even promoted by politicians to encourage people to test 
(Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2007: 185). The willingness of doctors to recommend DGs for HIV 
positive patients may also have been driven by a sense of hopelessness and nihilism created by 
the lack of available treatment for the disease (Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2006). As HAART was 
rolled-out from late 2003 and people with HIV/AIDS were able to recover their health, 
awarding the grant to PLWHA became increasingly complicated and created further 
confusion around eligibility criteria. Based on an analysis of assessment forms, Delany et al. 
(2005) found that in 2003, 41% of new permanent DG beneficiaries received the grant because 
of their HIV status, up from 27% in December 2001. 
It should also be noted that temporary DG numbers increased as a result of the 
reinstatement of 35,529 temporary DGs, mainly in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, 
following the Mashishi37 class action in May 2003 as a result o f  inappropriate lapsing 
procedures for TDGs (Steele, 2006; Delany et al., 2005). The Mashishi ruling also halted 
further lapses of TDGs until correct review procedures were instituted. Given that most 
provinces only instituted these procedures between late 2004 and 2005, many TDG 
beneficiaries received their grants longer than initially intended. 
                                                
37  Mashishi and others v the Minister of Social Development and others, unreported Transvaal Provincial 
Division case number (4239/03) 2003. 
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2.6 Tightening the assessment process 
As the result of such massive increases in the number of DG beneficiaries, all provinces 
except the North West Province abandoned the experiment with APs by 2004. Assessment 
Panels were formally removed from the regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 1992 
when the social security system was centralised through the new Social Assistance Act of 
2004 and South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. Regulations to the Act in 
2005 and subsequent amendments in 2008 required that disability be exclusively determined 
by the medical assessment of medical officers and confirmed by a medical report. However, 
the oversight role of the PMO was never reintroduced. 
The purpose of the Social Assistance Bill [B57-2003] and the South African Social 
Security Agency Bill [B51-2003] was to consolidate the administration of social grants under 
one national agency (SASSA) and undo the assignment of social assistance functions to 
provinces, which had struggled to administer social grants. Both bills were introduced at a 
time when the report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa (known as the Taylor Committee) was still being considered by 
cabinet. This committee had been commissioned in 2000 to evaluate and propose a 
new design for the social security system in South Africa. As no clear policy framework for 
social security reform (including reform of the DG) had yet been developed, civil society 
organisations suggested in submissions to the Social Development Portfolio Committee that 
the introduction of the bill was premature and would do little to reform the existing system.  
Although the 2002 Taylor Report is best known for the controversy raised by its 
recommendation to introduce a Basic Income Grant, it also raised some major issues related to 
the administration of the DG and the definition and assessment of disability. It  made a 
number of recommendations on radically reforming the DG system, none of which were 
included in the Bill and few of which have informed actual policy change. Selwyn Jehoma, 
former Deputy Director General of DSD, attributes the “lopsided levels of success” in 
implementing recommendations to: controversy around the Basic Income Grant proposed in the 
report distracted policymakers and civil society away from many of the other valuable 
recommendations in the report; a lack of support for some recommendations; DSD’s focus on 
creating the South African Social Security Agency; and in the case of the DG, the lack of a 
‘champion’ within DSD to take the disability recommendations forward (Jehoma, interview, 
2014 August 11). Many of its recommendations, such as the implementation of a multi-
disciplinary assessment panels, extending the grants to people with HIV/AIDS and other 
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chronic illnesses and taking a less medical approach may have also seemed unpalatable in the 
context of growing DG numbers and the perceived failure of attempts to move the system 
towards a more social model.  
Although the new (2004) Social Assistance Act did not address problems in DG 
administration, the DSD quickly began to investigate ways to contain the growth of the grant. 
In order to contain the use of the DG as a poverty alleviation tool, the CASE report 
discussed earlier (Delany et al., 2005) recommended the introduction of standardised 
assessment tools, clear eligibility criteria and educating frontline staff about the rules of 
disability management. These recommendations were focused on ensuring that the DG was 
given exclusively to the people with functional impairments that limit their ability to 
participate in the labour market. However, by focusing on what Nattrass (2007: 184) describes 
as a “narrow set of managerial solutions” and not the underlying social reasons for the growth 
in DG applications and the overgenerous awarding of grants by assessors, the state ignored an 
important message about the gaps in the social security system made obvious by demand for 
this grant. 
The spike in DG recipients as well as concurrent rumours that people were intentionally 
defaulting on their anti-retroviral medication to avoid recovering their health and losing their 
grants, led to significant discussion of the DG in parliament and the media. This was used by 
academics as an illustration of the limitations of existing the social protection system (Leclerc-
Madlala 2006; Hardy & Richter, 2006; Nattrass, 2006; Venkataramani et al., 2010; Sogaula et 
al., 2005). It also raised serious questions about who should be considered disabled and the 
purpose of social security in the context of chronic illness (MacGregor, 2010). In parliament, 
however, the focus of discussions was on the role of doctors, whose actions were framed as 
fraudulent, as was the behaviour of those who malingered or defaulted on their medication. 
The issue of subjectivity in the medical assessment process raised in 2000 in the proposals for 
DG reform had not been solved by APs and the DSD therefore remained concerned that the 
process allowed personal views on who ‘deserves’ social assistance to influence decision-
making around DGs. Although the DSD put out a tender for the development of a tool for DG 
assessment in 2003, piloting showed that the tool was too complex and theoretical for 
practical use (Margie Schneider Interview, 2013). Although APs were removed no useful 
tools, standardised guidelines or proper oversight yet existed for medical assessment by 
MOs and reports presented to parliament by the Special Investigating Unit in 2006 indicated 
that sympathy felt by doctors for their patients lead to overgenerous, even fraudulent 
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behaviour on the part of the doctor. 
Referring to the disability fraud cases, he said that one of the main concerns were doctors 
who certified people as disabled even though they were not. Many of them get paid to do 
this. This was organised crime and was one of the focus areas at present. There were cases 
as well where doctors classified people as disabled because the case was not very clear and 
they felt sorry for them. People with AIDS were a problem as classification depended on their 
CD4 count and these counts could fluctuate (PMG, 2006).  
The Report on Incentive Structures of Social Assistance Grants in South Africa, produced for 
the Department of Social Development in 2006 to investigate the possible unintended effects 
of grants, also noted that the increase in grants was not only driven by applicants but those 
referring or assessing them for DG applications: 
It is sometimes not the potential recipients themselves that respond in unanticipated ways to 
incentive structures. It may, for example, be gatekeepers such as doctors or social workers, 
or even social security staff, acting in the perceived best interests of their client (Steele, 
2006: iii). 
2.6.1 The Harmonised Assessment Tool and Chronic Illness Grant Proposal  
In 2003, the Department of Health (DoH) introduced a Policy of Free Health Care at 
Hospitals for People with Disabilities, which offered free services to those with moderate 
to severe disabilities of a permanent nature. The need for doctors to assess patients’ 
eligibility for these free services led to growing irritation amongst healthcare professionals 
who were already struggling under the pressure of DG assessments. To simplify this 
process and overcome the ongoing lack of tools and guidelines for disability assessment, 
the DSD and DoH jointly developed a Harmonised Assessment Tool (HAT), which was 
piloted in 2006. The HAT was based on a definition of disability specifically created for 
determining eligibility for the DG and FHC, which was approved by Cabinet in May 2005. 
This definition described disability in terms of the limitations in daily functioning and 
activities that a person is able to perform and reads as follows: 
Disability means a moderate to severe limitation in a person’s ability to function or 
ability to perform daily activities as a result of physical, sensory, 
communication, intellectual or mental impairment. The definition clarified that 
disability is neither a medical condition, nor the symptoms or impairments arising 
from a medical condition (DoH and DSD, 2009).  
The HAT was designed to assess what activity or participation restrictions exist for each 
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individual. The tool has two components, a medical assessment and an Activity Limitation 
( A L )  assessment. The medical assessment component would act to confirm the existence 
o f  a particular health condition, whilst the AL component assesses disability by measuring 
activity limitations in terms of specific categories of impairment through observation, 
information gathering through interviews and testing (DSD, 2010)38. The AL assessment 
would be undertaken by a registered health professional who had received specific training in 
use of the tool and related assessment guides (DoH and DSD, 2009)39.  
This focus on activity limitations over medical diagnoses promised to shift the 
responsibility for assessment from doctors to other healthcare professionals better trained 
in assessing functionality than doctors. This focus was expected to ensure that only 
genuinely disabled people received the grant and also make the assessment process more 
sensitive to hidden disabilities than had not been possible through medical assessment alone. 
The introduction of HAT would also bring the assessment process more in line with 
international guidelines such as the World Health Organisation’s International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). 
The DSD hoped that the introduction of the tool would “ensure uniformity in the assessment of 
disability, thereby contributing to more efficient management of disability benefits” 
(Parliament. National Assembly, 2007). As well as reducing access to DGs by the chronically 
ill, which was seen by the DSD as a ‘major error of inclusion’ (DSD, 2010: 10), it was hoped 
that a more standardised process would also reduce the number of appeals against decisions 
and reduce the threat of litigation by applicants. The HAT was to be implemented in 
conjunction with SASSA’s plans for a Disability Management Model, which was also 
aimed at standardising provincial procedures for disability assessment. 
The disability rights movement, which promotes a multi-disciplinary approach to disability 
assessment and which had long opposed the use of medical doctors who are trained to focus 
on medical conditions rather than functionality, favoured the introduction of the HAT. 
Disability activists argued that DGs should be specifically targeted at the permanently 
disabled rather than those with chronic diseases. ANC MP Henrietta Bogopane-Zulu,40 a 
                                                
38 It uses Global Assessment of Function tool to assess social, psychological and occupational functioning. 
39 Audiologists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists or speech therapists would perform most AL 
assessments, but clinical psychologists, optometrists, orthotists and prosthetists or registered nurses would 
also be able to perform assessments if necessary. 
40 Bogopane-Zulu was appointed  Deputy Minister of Social Development in 2015. 
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vocal disability rights activist, made this argument in a number of debates in parliament and 
the parliamentary Portfolio Committee: 
Ms Bogopane-Zulu said that they had told the DSD many times that doctors should 
not be used to certify disabled people. A doctor could be used for a chronic illness, 
which was not a disability. She requested SASSA to address this. A disability was 
permanent normally and a panel should be used to certify disabled people. Those 
with AIDS should be classified as chronic and not as disabled (PMG, 2006b). 
With its strong emphasis on functionality, implementation of the HAT would imply that a 
significant number of people who had been accessing the grant based on their chronic 
illness would lose their grants when they were restored to health, for example in the case of 
HIV patients who received ARV treatment. HIV positive people technically did not qualify 
unless serious complications were present, or the patient was classified as Stage 3 or Stage 4 
(AIDS-sick) according to World Health Organisation HIV guidelines, but many relatively 
healthy people still continued to receive disability grants. These and many of the other people 
with chronic illnesses who were not in fact functionally disabled would be excluded by the 
new definition of disability and the HAT. Given that so many people were likely to lose their 
grants, the Department of Social Development acknowledged that some provision needed to 
be made for the chronically ill living in poverty. This was based on the argument that 
although with treatment many chronic illnesses such as HIV may live very healthy lives, 
without an income to support adequate nutrition and transport to healthcare facilities for 
ongoing care, some might struggle to maintain their health. In 2007 the DSD commissioned 
the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) to investigate policy options to provide 
social security benefits to people with chronic illnesses. Research was based on a 
desktop review of national and international literature on the provision of social security for 
chronic conditions as well as a review of existing data sets on the prevalence of chronic 
conditions in South Africa. 
The HSRC report recommended two policy options: 1) the introduction of the HAT 
alongside a Chronic Illness Grant (CIG) for people with chronic illnesses not eligible for 
the DG; and 2) the roll-out of the HAT and provision of a coordinated set of general 
poverty alleviation programmes (Schneider & Goudge, 2007). The introduction of a Chronic 
Illness Grant (CIG) had already been recommended in the National Strategic Plan on 
HIV/AIDS drafted by the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) and then 
approved by cabinet in 2007. The CIG was a popular option amongst AIDS activist 
organisations such as the Treatment Action Campaign and National Association of People 
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Living with AIDS. 
The DSD initially appeared supportive of the CIG option and according to 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group minutes, “it was felt that perhaps there was a need for a 
special chronic illness grant, or, as another option, the provision of food vouchers by the 
Department of Health” (PMG, 2009). The DSD presented the CIG as a policy option to 
the Social Transformation Committee at the 2007 ANC Policy Conference, but this proposal 
was rejected. Although the committee acknowledged “the need to provide some form of 
safety net for those people, who do not have any income and are not eligible for any form 
of social grant under the existing policy framework”, the discussion was “characterised by 
a realisation by both commissions that the ANC in government should discourage dependence 
on social grants and therefore should seek to develop comprehensive measures to fight 
poverty” (ANC Social Transformation Committee Minutes, 30 June 2007). As a result, the 
committee decided that the chronically ill should continue to be excluded from the 
definition and that no social grant would be issued to the chronically ill. Instead 
responsibility for the chronically ill was seen as the mandate the Department of Health (DoH) 
and the Integrated Food and Nutrition Task Team (PMG, 2009). A decision was made that 
food vouchers rather than grants would be provided to the chronically ill to ensure that 
they had adequate nutrition to ensure they would be able to adhere to their medication. The 
Department of Health was unsupportive of the idea of a CIG, arguing that the need for a CIG 
was related to poverty rather than health issue and that a CIG would not be an appropriate tool. 
As Dr Yogan Pillay and Deputy Director General of the Department of Health noted, both in 
parliament and in an interview: “poverty cannot be treated with a health intervention” (Pillay, 
interview, 2014 September 9). The proposal was also unsuccessful at the Social Cluster level41. 
Selwyn Jehoma, argued that this lack of support for the CIG was based on territorialism and 
concern about the possible diversion of resources from the DoH to DSD (Jehoma, interview, 
2014 August 11)42.  
The lack of support for the CIG outside of its advocates in the DSD also shows up some of the 
conflicts within government around social grants. While Zola Skweyiya (DSD minister 1999-
2009) understood social grants to have developmental as well as poverty alleviation capacities 
and advocated for social grant expansion and reform, other sectors of government, especially 
                                                
41 Clusters are formed through inter-ministerial committees that focus on specific policy areas and involve multiple 
departments.  
42 He shared similar sentiments in a 2010 interview with Goldblatt and Rosa (Goldblatt & Rosa, 2014).  
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the treasury had been less enthusiastic. Skweyiya reflected on ideological contestations within 
government in a lecture he gave in 2011 after the end of his term as Minister.  
As is expected in a world of contestation of ideas, especially in South Africa, there are 
concerns that the numbers of South Africans on social grants are too high and have 
been increasing exponentially. The issue of grants causing dependency on the state has 
gained currency…Our conviction is that far from creating fiscal wastage and creating 
dependency, we are actually making an investment on children in South Africa, an 
investment on the future of our country. That is a responsibility we cannot turn our 
backs on. (Zola Skweyiya, Oxford, 17 May 2011). Also see Quote 2.1 in Appendix C. 
However, in the case of the CIG, the DSD could not present a strong enough case to 
confidently push forward with the proposal and therefore decided not to pursue it further. The 
weakness in the policy proposal lay in the lack of accurate estimates of the number of people 
with chronic illnesses potentially eligible for the CIG. The large number and high prevalence of 
illnesses categorised as chronic, the complication of comorbidities (and related problem of 
double-counting) and the absence of health data that could be cross-tabulated with income 
created the appearance that very high numbers of people would qualify (Jehoma, interview, 
2014 August 11). This raised concerns about the likelihood that the Treasury would take such a 
proposal seriously, especially in the context of existing concerns about the large numbers of 
DG beneficiaries. The government had also only recently (2009) agreed to extend eligibility for 
the Child Support Grant to age 18 (this came after a long campaign by civil society 
organisations). Dimakatso Pooe, the Director for Disability and Old Age at DSD argued that 
the expected increase in the number of CSGs concerned fanned fears that grants were 
promoting dependency and laziness, which made acceptance of a CIG proposal unlikely (Pooe, 
interview, 2014 September 10).  
2.6.2 The Social Assistance Act Amendment Bill of 2010 
In order to make the implementation of a Harmonised Assessment Tool legally possible, it 
was necessary to insert a definition of disability into the Social Assistance Act 13 of 
2004. In 2010, the Social Assistance Amendment Bill (B5-2010) was introduced to 
parliament to “disability”, insert the following definition of disability into the Act to support 
the implementation of the HAT. 
in respect of an applicant, means a moderate to severe limitation to his or her 
ability to function as a result of a physical, sensory, communication, intellectual or 
mental disability rendering him or her unable to— 




(b)  be gainfully employed; [emphasis added] 
This definition emphasised functional limitation and clarified that these must be moderate to 
severe, excluding minor impairments. It also included sensory, communication and intellectual 
disabilities which had been previously excluded. According to the Minister of Social 
Development, Bathabile Dlamini, the amendments were intended to create “a more rational and 
less arbitrary means of assessing disability through limiting the discretion of individual doctors 
and our officials.” (Parliament. National Assembly, 2010).  
Although chronically ill people who were not functionally disabled had never technically met 
the criteria for eligibility, it was never clear how disability should be measured and doctors 
were left with significant discretion. It was hoped that introducing a new definition and 
assessment tool would reduce this discretion and thus the number of with manageable chronic 
illnesses who doctors were classifying as disabled.  Again, the discussions in parliament 
centred on the role of doctors in driving the increase in DG numbers.  
We are further well aware that many of these people are poor and unemployed, and as 
a result are manipulating the system by collaborating with the doctors in their area, 
because of lack of income support to these unemployed people....Let us take a Dr Van 
Wyk who knows a Mr Khumalo very well, and this Mr Khumalo has a condition called 
asthma. His asthma can be managed through appropriate medication and he can still 
enter the labour market. Now, in medical terms asthma is regarded as a chronic illness 
and not a disability. A chronic illness can be defined as an illness that is prolonged, and 
would not be resolved spontaneously, but can be cured completely. A person with a 
purely chronic illness alone cannot be deemed to have a disability. Yet Dr Van Wyk 
would classify Mr Khumalo as disabled for the purpose of the opportunity to receive the 
disability grant, because he is sympathetic to him, as Mr Khumalo is unemployed and 
lives in poverty. (Parliament. National Assembly, 2010) 
See Quote 2.2 in Appendix C 
The DSD hoped that this would reduce inclusion errors and that fewer inconsistencies in 
DG assessment would reduce the backlog of appeal cases against the rejection of grant 
applications or lapsing of DGs, which had remained an ongoing problem for the department 
in the absence of harmonised regulations. The Bill also sought to add physical and mental 
disability to the definition of disability for the CDG and GIA, enable applicants and 
beneficiaries to apply to the SASSA to reconsider its decision and amend the process of 
appeals against SASSA’s decisions (Portfolio Committee on Social Development, 2010). 
Civil society organisations were invited to consult on the 2010 Bill through oral and written 
submissions in April 2010. Their submissions suggest that these organisations were as 
concerned as the DSD about the administration of DGs and, specifically, how doctors’ 
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discretion lead to unequal applications of the law (AIDS Law Project, 2010; Black 
Sash, 2010; SPII, 2010; Treatment Action Campaign, 2010; SACC, 2010). These 
submissions agreed that chronic diseases were presenting a challenge to social security 
programmes. However, those that submitted argued that the wording of the amendments 
not only did little to address the lack of clarity around the definition of disability, but that the 
definition and the application of HAT would be regressive in its exclusion of persons with 
chronic illnesses if no separate grant was provided for this group.  Organisations that 
presented at the hearings argued that intentionally excluding groups of people already 
receiving DGs from accessing social security was counter to the state’s obligation to take 
reasonable legislative measures to achieve the progressive realisation of social security 
rights as outlined in Article 27(2) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). 
Disability organisations, the Disability Action Research Team and Disabled People South 
Africa, made no comment on the issue of chronic illness and only recommended that 
‘impairment’ be used to replaced disability in the definition of disability. The argument 
against the proposed amendments was led by a coalition of NGOs43 who reintroduced the idea 
of the CIG, arguing that the Act should make provision for a CIG in recognition of the daily 
struggle against illness and poverty that chronically ill people face. 
Civil society organisations argued that although incorporating the chronically ill into the 
labour market was an important goal, given high levels of unemployment and the inability 
of the chronically ill to compete in it, the majority of the people concerned were not 
employed anyway and that excluding them from social assistance would only increase poverty 
and hunger rather than push them into the labour market. The discourse employed by civil 
society in the debates around the bill recognised that chronically ill people face dual 
disadvantages of illness and poverty and are therefore deserving of grants. Underpinning this 
discourse is the belief that social grants have ‘transformative’ potential and as well as the 
ability to promote inclusion and social justice (Devereux, 2010). The Chronic Illness Grant 
was seen as a way to create independence by supporting people with chronic conditions to lead 
healthy lifestyles, which would allow them to participate in society as active citizens and 
potentially find work. 
                                                
43 This group included the Treatment Action Campaign, the AIDS Law Project, Black Sash, DART, DPSA, 
NAPWA, SPII and the South African Council of Churches.   
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Members of Parliament (MPs) on the Social Development Portfolio Committee employed a 
conflicting, conservative discourse that saw grants as creating dependency and work 
disincentives rather than development. Whilst civil society saw the rumours around non-
compliance with medication and the over-generous awarding of grants by doctors as indicative 
of limitations of the current social security system and the general lack of jobs, DSD and 
parliamentarians instead problematised this behaviour as fraudulent. Despite the fact that 
adherence is considered to be a complex health issue, especially for infectious diseases such as 
TB and HIV/AIDS that are most prevalent amongst disadvantage populations (Munro et al., 
2007) those who defaulted or neglected their health and became disabled were blamed for 
being irresponsible with their health. This “victim-blaming ideology” (Bauer et al., 1998) 
neglected the socio-economic origins of ill health such as income, access to healthcare, levels 
of education, food security and housing.  
These MPs argued that failures of the labour market and the burden of chronic illness should 
not be addressed through social grants and therefore a Chronic Illness Grant would not be 
appropriate. In their view, unemployment and poverty were not the exclusive problems of the 
DSD; thus an intersectoral approach was necessary and in keeping with this, discussions about 
these issues were not relevant to the amendments at hand. Issues around exclusion of the 
chronically ill, especially those with HIV/AIDS, were seen as part of a bigger labour market 
issue which should be addressed by employer education programmes and job creation strategies 
rather than social grants. Given efforts to ‘normalise’ HIV as a chronic disease and reduce the 
stigma around HIV, some parliamentarians also felt that a chronic disease grant would be 
counter-productive to these efforts (PMG, 2010a).  
There was also concern amongst parliamentarians that people gambled and bought liquor with 
their grants and came to the same conclusion that ANC members at the 2007 policy conference 
had reached – that providing food vouchers rather than a new category of social grants was the 
best solution for dealing with the chronically ill. It was therefore generally agreed by 
parliamentarians from all parties that the best solution to the difficulties that chronic illness 
posed to targeting DGs was tightening definitions of disability to exclude chronic illness, 
except in cases where people were measurably impaired by their illness.  
Whilst the Portfolio Committee on Social Development accepted the recommendation that 
impairment rather than disability be used within the definition of disability, it ultimately 
rejected the civil society’s chronic illness grant proposal and aimed to proceed with the Bill as 
planned (PMG, 2010b). However, all six sections of the bill relating to disability were 
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ultimately scrapped. This was because in May Dr Yogan Pillay, then Acting Director General 
of the Department of Health, made a presentation to the committee stating that the DoH was not 
ready to implement the assessment tool. The DoH had insufficient healthcare professionals 
such as medical doctors, occupational therapists and physiotherapists to conduct these 
assessments and had not trained professionals outside of the sites where the HAT was initially 
piloted. This came as a complete surprise and disappointment to the DSD, who had 
collaborated with the DoH throughout the process of developing the tool. Although this was not 
articulated in the parliamentary debate, because 250,000 people with chronic illnesses would be 
excluded from the DG (Jehoma, 2010), technocrats from the DoH and DSD argued that ANC 
politicians were concerned about implementing the tool ahead of upcoming municipal elections 
(Pooe, interview August 2014; Pillay, interview, 2014 September 9). It was therefore concluded 
HAT should be deferred until the DoH had better capacity to deal with chronic illnesses.  
The DSD was tasked with re-developing the HAT to address the issue of chronic illness in DG 
assessment more adequately. However, although Dimakatso Pooe, from the Directorate for 
Disability and Old Age Grants in the DSD remains a strong proponent for the HAT, the 
department has not made any further moves to implement HAT. An important reason for this 
lack of action has been disagreement between the DSD and SASSA, about how disability 
assessment should be conducted. Until August 2014, SASSA’s disability programs were 
managed nationally by Dr John Marite, a medical doctor, who had opposed the introduction of 
HAT and resisted a move from a medical model that relies primarily on the input of medical 
doctors (Jehoma, interview, 2014 August 11; Marite, interview, 2014 June 27). The capacity 
and willingness of the DoH to implement HAT also remains in question. A doctor contracted to 
SASSA indicated that the problem with the HAT tool “starts and ends with the Department of 
Health” and that “while the theory is nice, the practicality is not so straightforward” (Dr 
Jacobs44, interview, 2013 October 24) because the healthcare system is unlikely to have the 
capacity to carry out Activity Limitations assessments for some time. As a result, the DG 
assessment process remains purely based on medical assessment by medical doctors.  
Marston (2013) argued that governments can use the incentive structures, rules and guidelines 
of bureaucracies to pursue policy objectives that they may otherwise struggle to through 
legislative processes.  Although legislative efforts in 2010 to implement a new multi-
disciplinary assessment tool and introduce a new definition of disability into the Social 




Assistance Act were ultimately unsuccessful because of implementation capacity and political 
concerns, through bureaucratic incentive structures, rules and guidelines, the government has 
successfully pursued its policy objectives of reducing DG numbers that were not possible 
legislative processes. Through the implementation of a Disability Management Model (DMM), 
SASSA was able to significantly reduce beneficiary numbers outside of legislative channels by 
22% from 1.44 million in 2007 to 1.1 million in 2015. The decline in the number of AIDS-sick 
people as ARVs became widely available is also likely to have contributed significantly to this 
decrease 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the post-apartheid state initially sought to extend access to 
disability grants through dismantling administrative barriers, supported by a socio-economic 
and disability rights discourse set against the perceived discrimination and exclusion under 
apartheid. This lead to a drive to de-medicalise the disability assessment process and increase 
the number of people able to conduct assessments. These changes were not intended to make 
the DG system more lenient. Rather, the goal was to improve access to rightful beneficiaries 
through improved assessment mechanisms and reduced inefficiencies in the system.  
However, through this process the amount of discretion available to disability assessors was 
inadvertently increased and the system effectively became more lenient. Given large amount of 
poverty in many communities, combined with the HIV epidemic for which there was no widely 
available treatment at the time, assessors used their discretion to recommend grants on 
humanitarian grounds for many more people than had ever been planned for. Through their 
decision-making, assessors shifted the DG, aimed at a very specific population, towards a 
bigger intervention that recognised labour market problems and the social and economic 
impacts of the HIV epidemic. What emerged was a “moral underground” (Dodson, 2009) of 
well-intended, rebellious bureaucratic action and the DG became, in effect, an HIV grant and a 
general poverty alleviation grant, serving a purpose beyond the one for which is was designed. 
As the number of grants paid escalated in the early 2000s, the state became concerned with 
what came to be seen as over-generosity and fiscal unsustainability. Efforts to incorporate 
social understandings of disability into DG assessment were quickly halted as beneficiary 
numbers increased.  
Hacker (2004: 246) argues that when policy drift occurs, policymakers face a decision about 
whether and how to respond to the growing gap between the original aims of a policy and the 
 
 70 
new realities that have emerged with shifting social conditions. In the South African case, the 
government did not respond to this emerging need. Although the viability of a Chronic Illness 
Grant and a Basic Income Grant to close the gap in what was clearly an incomplete social 
safety net, were investigated, they were ultimately abandoned on budgetary and ideological 
grounds. Instead, policy makers focused on fixing the principal-agent and targeting problem in 
DG administration. In an effort to re-take control, the government embarked on a process of 
retrenchment and rationalisation, largely focused on reducing assessors’ discretion and 
subjectivity. This narrow problem definition ignored the underlying and much less tractable 
issues driving demand for the grant and reasons for why the actions of street-level bureaucrats 
like doctors diverged from official policy directives. 
Through a feedback-loop, policy implementation created the politics that then very directly 
informed policy decision-making. In this case, doctors’ actions (and for a brief period, APs) 
shaped policy in a way that extended access to the grant, but ultimately reduced their 
parameters for action. The story of overgenerous assessors and abuse of the grant by non-
disabled people was used to frame the policy debate around the growth in DG numbers and 
drove reform of the social grant system towards strictness. Since then, regulation of the DG has 
been focused on defining and guarding the boundaries of the disabled category. SASSA, have 
also embarked on a series of efforts to better regulate the DG application and assessment 
process and constrain opportunities for differentiated interpretations of disability and the level 
of discretion in the system overall. However, underlying drivers of DG demand, such as 
structural unemployment and the lack of adequate social security for the chronically ill and 
general unemployed, have not been addressed. Efforts to tighten DG access within this context 
have distracted policy makers from developing a DG system that promotes the inclusion and 
development of disabled people in society.  
Two additional points can be made about the history of the DG, and of disability assessment in 
particular. Firstly, although many of the efforts to reform the DG system have been driven by 
an administrative and fiscal management agenda and legal action by disgruntled applicants and 
beneficiaries, broader welfare discourses have also influenced the government’s approach to 
providing social security to the disabled. Changes to DG policy over time reflects tensions 
between the ANC government’s early social justice rhetoric and constitutional commitments to 
socio-economic rights and anxieties about financial sustainability and the development of a 
‘culture of hand-outs’ and ‘dependency’ The government has struggled to present a coherent 
strategy for how to incorporate social grants into the post-apartheid and despite significant 
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growth in the number of social grants since 1997, government discourse has increasingly 
emphasised the dangers of growing welfare dependency (Surender et al., 2010; Meth, 2004; 
Barchiesi, 2011; Seekings & Matisonn, 2010).  
“We have a governing party that boasts about the generosity of the social assistance 
system, but in reality despises it. That filters into how we construct the social security 
system, including the disability one. We had our glory years up to the end of Dr Zola 
Skweyiya’s political leadership. I think post him we have had leadership that just think 
social grants create dependency. The current political leadership doesn’t believe in 
social security, neither at the cabinet level nor within the department, but at the 
technical there is still a real understanding of the importance of it.” (Jehoma, interview, 
2014 August 11). 
Seekings (2015: 135-136) argues that concerns about decommodification come from two fronts 
– a progressive developmental position that prefers social development to welfare provisioning 
and conservative fears about the affects of decommodification on social order and values. 
However, despite its reticence about grants, the ANC recognises how important they are to the 
electorate. The inter-governmental tensions about the value and purpose of social security 
interventions are visible in debates around the definition of disability, how to measure it and 
what resources should be dedicated to this process. While the likes of Zola Skweyiya in the 
DSD have for the most part seen social grants as developmental interventions, this view has not 
been shared in other parts of government. These disagreements have meant that despite 
achieving increased administrative efficiencies, the state has remained stuck with largely the 
same system that that was in place in the Apartheid era.  
Secondly, the difficulties in accurately targeting the grant at disabled people reflect a set of 
deeper systemic issues such as structural unemployment that cannot be addressed by 
management techniques. Instead of focusing on systemic issues, regulation of the DG has 
been focused on defining and guarding the boundaries of disability to ensure that the grant is 
properly targeted at those who are functionally disabled. Although the DSD has made several 
attempts to move away from pure medical assessment of grants, the complexities and 
costs of assessing activity limitations and their relation to social, economic context and 
the physical environment, are too high for the current healthcare or social security system to 
manage effectively. This has meant that the state has remained stuck with largely the same 
system that has been in place since apartheid. Although the DSD and SASSA now have greater 
oversight and control of the assessment process, uneven application of assessment criteria 
continues due to ‘grey areas’ within the assessment process.  
While accurately targeting the grant is important, in the process of trying to define disability 
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more narrowly, the political and public debate has lost sight of the objectives of the DG, 
which is to “provide individuals with the means to disrupt forces which maintain their 
predicament of chronic impoverishment” (Andrews et al., 2006). The focus on cutting out 
people who do not deserve the grant has distracted policymakers and legislators from 





CHAPTER 3: The Disability Management Model in the Western Cape 
3.1 Introduction 
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the administrative criteria for administering social grants have been 
contested in post-apartheid South Africa and remain poorly defined. SASSA, the street-level 
organisation charged with implementing DG policy, has inherited the unresolved political 
conflicts and ambiguities around DG policy and has had to develop its own criteria and 
organisational structures to control DG policy implementation and outcomes. The DG has also 
been highly problematic in terms of delays, backlogs and litigation brought forward by 
claimants and there have been significant differences in how the grant has been administered 
across provinces and between service delivery points. The Disability Management Model 
(DMM) was designed to attend to all of these problems and is a set of rules and bureaucratic 
processes which aims to ensure that DG assessments are conducted in an objective, rational, 
systematic and procedurally fair way. The DMM and its associated National Standardised 
Assessment Tool (NSAT) were designed in the 2007/2008 financial year by SASSA’s 
Disability Management Department. Piloted in the 2008/2009 year and gradually implemented 
from 2009, it was intended as a broad management framework, which would lay the 
groundwork for the eventual rollout of the Harmonised Assessment Tool, which had been 
designed and piloted in 2006. As the HAT has not yet been implemented, the NSAT tool has 
remained in place.  
As shown in the last chapter, the South African government’s response to the increase in DG 
recipients in the last decade has focused on disability assessors and their ‘overgenerous’ 
awarding of grants based on social and material conditions. The DMM aims to control policy 
implementation by constraining doctors’ discretion and increasing both their and SASSA 
officials’ accountability through increased oversight. This reaction is similar to those of policy-
makers in OECD countries that have responded to problems in disability benefit administration 
(including increases in beneficiary numbers and expenditure) by developing bureaucratic 
systems, protocols and refining assessment processes and administration procedures to limit the 
discretion of gatekeepers (Schram et al., 2010; Marston, 2013).  
The DMM also forms part of other efforts made by the South African government to hold 
employees more accountable both to citizens and clients and the departments that they work 
for. This work has mainly been carried out by the Public Services Commission (PSC) and more 
recently the Department of Performance Management and Evaluation (DPME). The PSC has 
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developed procedure manuals, codes of conduct and monitoring frameworks whilst the DPME 
has a more explicit focus on improving monitoring and evaluation and planning capacity within 
government, including a specific focus on frontline service monitoring and client satisfaction 
surveys. The most prominent effort to improve frontline service delivery has been the 
introduction of the Batho Pele (“people first”) principles of public service delivery as a 
requirement for planning and service delivery in all government departments (Batho Pele White 
Paper, 1997)45. 
This chapter is largely contextual and intended to describe doctors’ situational context for the 
remainder of this thesis. It is vital to consider policy design, organisational capacity and 
implementation context when assessing street-level bureaucrats’ exercise of discretion and their 
contribution to policy outcomes (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007). This is shaped by external and 
internal policy frameworks, institutional and organisational cultures and hierarchies, 
organisational or bureaucratic procedures, hiring policies, formal and informal incentive 
structures, performance standards, classification guidelines and service strategies (Barnes & 
Prior, 2011; Rice, 2012; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007).  
This chapter begins by describing the legal structures that govern SASSA and DG 
administration and the operations of the DMM, focusing specifically on its implementation in 
the Western Cape. It then provides a description of the DG application process from start to 
finish and the organisational structures and administrative procedures that structure this 
process. It outlines the service agreements with the Department of Health and medical doctors 
that govern how doctors are included and participate in the DG system. Finally, I describe the 
oversight systems, training and protocols designed to standardise doctors’ work. Although 
sometimes mundane, these details of the disability grant bureaucracy set the rules and goals for 
practice and are foundational in understanding how organisational factors shape the interaction 
between doctors and patients and therefore who is ultimately given access to the grant.  
3.2 The SASSA Bureaucracy 
SASSA is a Schedule 3A public entity, reporting to the Department of Social Development and 
mandated by the South African Social Security Agency Act of 2004 to manage, administer and 
pay social grants in accordance with the Social Assistance Act of 2004 (as subsequently 
                                                
45 These principals emphasise developing mechanisms for customer consultation and choice, developing precise 
measurable service standards, increasing access to clients, courtesy to clients, providing information to clients, 
openness and transparency, value for money and opportunities for redress (Batho Pele White Paper, 1997). 
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amended) and Regulations gazetted in terms of the Act, as well as the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). SASSA’s slogan points to its main goals: 
“Paying the right social grant, to the right person, at the right time and place. Njalo46” As a 
frontline service provider, the way that SASSA manages its staff, systems and processes shapes 
the way in which the millions of people who receive social grants in South Africa interact with 
the state. As Marston (2013) points out, this distributive role makes the work of agencies such 
as SASSA fundamentally political.  
The SASSA Act (2004) requires SASSA to provide “honest, impartial, fair and equitable 
service delivery” and promote and protect the human dignity of applicants for and beneficiaries 
of social security. SASSA’s organisational values are transparency, equity, integrity, 
confidentiality and a customer-care centred approach (SASSA, 2014). Its priorities, as outlined 
in its original Strategic Vision document are: reducing delays throughout the grant process, 
improving conditions at pay points, improving customer service and communication, reducing 
litigation against the government and standardising service delivery nation-wide. The DMM 
provides an example of SASSA’s efforts to address these issues and improve service delivery.  
SASSA is subject to Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights in section 27(1c), which states that 
everyone has the right to have access to social security, including social assistance if they are 
unable to support themselves. Section 27(2) also commits the state to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the “progressive 
realisation” of each of these rights. This means that SASSA cannot unreasonably limit the 
rights of any individual or group of individuals to access social grants. It is therefore important 
for SASSA to balance providing social protection for the needy (providing opportunities for 
access) with protecting the boundaries of the disability category (reducing inclusion errors). As 
2008 Regulations to the Social Assistance Act of 2004 stipulate that an applicant’s disability 
must be confirmed by a medical officer, SASSA relies on the cooperation of these medical 
officers in achieving this balance. A medical officer is “any medical practitioner in the service 
of the State, or a person appointed under a contract to perform the functions or render services 
of a medical officer in terms of the Act.” Medical officers are medical doctors registered as 
healthcare professionals under the Health Professions Act of 1974 and are subject to the codes 
of ethical and professional practice laid down in this act.  
SASSA was careful to communicate with both doctors and the public that doctors did not have 
                                                
46 “Njalo” means always in isiZulu 
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the legal authority to award or reject applications for DGs (Observations of SASSA Training, 
February 2014; SASSA, 2011). Doctors make a recommendation on a client’s eligibility based 
on their clinical assessment, but the final decision is made by SASSA who also administer the 
means test and perform other administrative checks (e.g. age, citizenship or permanence 
residence). This is typical practice internationally, where a caseworker or administrator 
generally makes the final decision regarding eligibility (De Boer, 2007).  However, as a 
claimant could not receive the grant without a recommendation from a doctor47 and SASSA 
administrators were not trained to interrogate the medical information or assess it in relation to 
other information from clients (e.g. age, education), applicants would typically receive the 
grant if they passed the means test. This meant that in most cases a doctor’s decision on 
whether to recommend a DG determined whether a patient received a grant, making them very 
important gatekeepers to the system. Therefore, in order for SASSA to achieve its objectives, 
fulfil its legislative mandate and avoid litigation from claimants, it was important to ensure that 
the medical officers responsible for conducting assessments did so in-line with the Social 
Assistance Act and in ways that promoted its values.  
An important part of SASSA’s role in managing doctors’ work was ensuring that doctors 
adhered to legal eligibility criteria. According the Social Assistance Act of 2004 this meant that 
the person has a mental or physical disability that makes them unable to support themselves 
through work. Section 3(c) of the 2008 Regulations to the Social Assistance Act further defines 
eligibility in relation to employability and an applicant is eligible if “he or she is unable to enter 
the open labour market or support himself or herself in light of his or her skills and ability to 
work” and does not unreasonably refuse to any income generating employment within his or 
her capabilities. The DMM is designed to clarify how disability should be determined and make 
doctors more accountable for upholding these definitions in carrying out their assessments.  
3.3 Structure of the DMM and organisational arrangements  
The DMM focuses on rationalising and standardising the application and medical assessment 
process for disability-related grants (DG, Care Dependency Grant and Grant-in-Aid) in all 
regions in South Africa (SASSA, 2011). The DMM also aims to curb fraud and improve 
administrative efficiency throughout the system. This is achieved through standardised 
                                                
47 Although doctors can consult with other professionals, they make the final recommendation on the assessment. 
In Europe and North America, there is significantly more input from other professionals such as social 
caseworkers, labour market experts or rehabilitation experts as well as the client who provides reports their work 
history, activities and limitations (De Boer, 2007; Anner et al., 2013).  
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management procedures, a standardised assessment tool, a set of medical guidelines, training 
for doctors and quality assurance and auditing and oversight practices.  
 De Boer argues that it is difficult for society and claimants to accept that the final outcome of 
an assessment does not only depend on the claimant’s physical or mental condition, but the 
discretion of the person who performs the assessment (De Boer, 2009: 168). The DMM 
therefore intends to shape bureaucratic action by reducing the discretion available to doctors 
and controlling doctors as bureaucratic “thinkers” (Heyman, 1995: 263) to ensure that they 
adhere to its norms and standards. Decision-making procedures and tools like the DMM create 
‘mechanical objectivity’ (Daston & Galison, 1992), which Sherz (2011: 46) argues are an 
attempt to turn “the political problem of balancing citizens’ rights and state responsibility into a 
technical problem”. Standardised procedures and protocols also create a barrier to unwanted 
criticism (Busch, 2011), which in the case of the DG, was necessary to reduce the large number 
of court cases brought against the state on the basis of contested DG assessment processes 
(Marite, interview, 2014 June 27; Pooe, interview, 2014 September 10; Jehoma, interview, 
2014 August 11) 
Until August 2014, there was a Disability Management Department dedicated to the 
administration and management of disability-related grants, headed by Dr John Marite, a 
medical doctor. This has since been subsumed under the Benefits Administration and Support 
programme, managed by the Grants Administration Branch at the National Office as part of a 
general restructuring process. At the time of writing, each of the nine regional (provincial) 
SASSA offices had their own Disability Management Unit (DMU), tasked with overseeing the 
DG process from initial screening through to quality assessment and final award of the grant. 
The DMU in the Western Cape was responsible for managing the agency’s relationship with 
the Western Cape Department of Health around the provision of assessment services and 
facilities, providing medical form management, overseeing the quality assurance process, 
training assessors and the implementing claims procedures for service providers (SASSA, 
2011). Five district-level offices were meant to oversee the activities of the sixteen local offices 
and the satellite sites/service centres connected to them. At the time of writing, these district 
‘offices’ were not yet operational, meaning the regional office was effectively managing all 
district-level functions, putting significant pressure on the very small regional DMU team in the 
Western Cape (manager, assistant manager and two clerks). This lack of capacity limited 
monitoring and evaluation activities and therefore the amount of oversight that the DMU could 
have over local offices and medical assessors (DMU Official, 2014 June 23).   
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The actual medical assessment booking, application and approval process was carried out at 
local SASSA offices within each province. Within each local office there were one or two 
Dedicated Disability Officers (DDOs) responsible for coordinating all medical management 
processes and activities at clinics, including coordinating with local health facilities and 
doctors, picking up and dropping off assessment registers and books and performing 
administrative quality assurance checks. Local offices kept a file of all assessments conducted 
at a particular site in order to keep track of the number of assessments booked, the 
appointments honoured by patients and the claims made by assessors.  
At the end of June 2014, 150,630 people in the Western Cape received DGs, of which 24% 
(36,277) were temporary grants48. Along with the rest of the country, the Western Cape 
experienced an increase in DG beneficiaries between 2000 and 2007. However, beneficiary 
numbers grew less than the national average. Between 2001 and 2004, when DG growth was at 
its peak, the number of permanent DGs increased by only 85%, which was significantly less 
than the 143% average national increase (Delany et al., 2005). This relative stability can be 
attributed to the fact that the Western Cape did not change its disability grant policy or 
procedures between 2001 and 2004 as other provinces did and was not as severely affected by 
the HIV epidemic (see Delany et al., 2005). Likewise, the downward trend in national disability 
beneficiary numbers has not been reflected in the Western Cape to the same extent as in other 
provinces. As can be seen in Figure 2, DG numbers have remained relatively stable since the 
DMM was introduced.  
 
                                                
48 I conducted fieldwork during the fourth quarter of the 2013/2014 financial year (1 December – 31 March) and 
slightly beyond the first quarter of 2014/2015 (1 April – 30 June). As far as possible, the administrative data 
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Figure 1 Total number of DGs per province 2006-2014 (SOCPEN data compiled by SASSA) 
Data provided to me by SASSA, which was compiled from the Social Pension (SOCPEN) 
database, shows there were 22,237 DG applicants in Western Cape in the 2013/2014 financial 
year, a 17% reduction from the previous year.  
 
Figure 2 Total applications received per province 
However, this data significantly underestimates the actual number of applications submitted in 
each province and the number of assessments conducted by doctors. This is because the 
SOCPEN system only counts first time applications and therefore would not register people 
applying for a temporary DG for a second, third or fourth time, which is very common. 
Provincial-level data provides a more accurate picture of the number of people applying for 
DGs because monthly statistical reports are produced from local office data rather than mined 
from the SOCPEN system. Table 3 below provides data on the number of assessments 
conducted in the Western Cape across all districts for the 2012/13 and 2013/24 financial year 
and demonstrates the discrepancy between the number of applicants as recorded in the 
SOCPEN database and the number of assessments conducted in the province. This shows that 
although first time DG applications decreased between 2012/2013 and 2013/2014, the number 
of people actually receiving medical assessments increased. 
Table 3 Comparison of medical assessments and applications received in the Western Cape 
Financial 
year 
Total medical assessments 
(provincial data) 
Total applications (SOCPEN) 
2012/13 106,674 26,734 
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Total applications received per 
province 2012/2013




3.3.1 Interorganisational relationships around DG assessments in the Western Cape  
The relationship between the Department of Health (DoH) and SASSA around the provision of 
assessment services varied across provinces. In the Western Cape regional SASSA office, the 
facilities and medical personnel used to conduct assessments were provided by the Western 
Cape DoH. This arrangement has been in place since March 2004, when the provincial 
Department of Social Services and Policy Alleviation (now Department of Social 
Development) began to provide funding to the DoH to supply medical assessors to tackle 
medical assessment backlogs in specific areas (SASSA/DoH, 2014). After SASSA was 
established in 2006 and took over DSD functions, the new regional SASSA office made similar 
arrangements with the DoH. From 2008 onwards, an annual service level agreements (SLAs) 
have been signed between SASSA and the six health districts in the Western Cape, that covers 
service expectations, targets, quality assurance and monitoring and evaluation.  
Disability assessments were conducted by doctors in all three levels of the healthcare system: at 
PHC facilities, at the secondary level in district and regional hospitals, and at tertiary hospitals. 
The majority of DG assessments in the province take place at the PHC level and are conducted 
by physicians contracted specifically by the DoH to conduct the disability assessments (in some 
cases SASSA contracted doctors directly, but this was rare). These supposedly impartial third-
party agents, whom I will call ‘SASSA assessors’ do not the treat patients they assess. SASSA 
has made a shift towards using third-party assessors for DG assessments, which is common 
practice internationally, because it is presumed that doctors with established relationships with 
patients may struggle to be objective or have incentives to privilege patients’ interests over 
those of state or corporate bodies, both for financial reasons and because of feelings of 
obligation towards patients.  
Treating doctors were, however, able to assess their own patients in hospital inpatient and 
outpatient settings. Their assessments were considered sufficient and patients did not need to be 
assessed further by SASSA assessors. In the past, all medical officers were able to fill out DG 
assessments for patients, but since the introduction of the DMM, SASSA has reduced its 
reliance on the assessments of treating doctors. This is because of potential bias in decision-
making, the pressure it placed on the doctor-patient relationship and because of the additional 
work it created for overburdened doctors in the public sector (see Chapter 2). At the time of 
conducting fieldwork, the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape were the only provinces that had 
not completely eliminated the role of treating physicians in the assessment process.  
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In other provinces, SASSA contracted medical assessment services to medical consortia (e.g. 
Gauteng region), independent doctors (e.g. Limpopo and Kwa-Zulu natal regions), delegated all 
services to the DoH (Eastern Cape) or used a hybrid model (e.g. Northwest Province). 
According to Dr John Marite, former General Manager of the national Disability Management 
Department, this variation in the models used across the provinces was a result of the variation 
in the DoH’s capacity and willingness to provide doctors or facilities across the provinces 
(Marite, interview, 2014 June 27). The Western Cape’s model was possible because of the high 
numbers of doctors in the province relative to other provinces (DMU Official, interview, 2014 
June 23; Health Systems Trust, 2014).  In provinces where DoH facilities are not used for the 
assessments, claimants could only be assessed by SASSA assessors in dedicated rooms in 
SASSA offices.  
SLAs with the Western Cape DoH health districts were focused on regulating service standards 
for assessments conducted in PHC facilities by SASSA assessors and were less prescriptive 
about assessments conducted by treating doctors. According to the 2014/2015 SLA signed with 
Metro Health Services in Cape Town, the DoH was responsible for providing medical 
assessors, an appropriate assessment room and a designated health official to coordinate 
assessments at the clinic level. Doctors contracted to carry out assessments had to be registered 
with the Health Professionals Council of South Africa, be trained in the use of the NSAT tool 
and SASSA guidelines and could not conduct more than forty assessments per day. In turn, the 
DoH provided a schedule for each medical facility, prescribing the maximum number of 
assessments that SASSA officials could schedule at a PHC facility on a given day.  
In accordance with the SLA, SASSA paid the Department of Health for each assessment 
conducted at the PHC level and at specific district hospitals that claimed for assessments 
conducted by treating doctors (not all district hospitals made claims). Tertiary hospitals did not 
make claims. In the 2014/2015 year, SASSA paid R123 for each assessment conducted for 
application or review purposes and reimbursed doctors for trips made to assessment sites 
further than 80km away (SASSA/DoH, 2014).  
There is higher demand for DGs in high poverty areas and doctors ran assessment clinics in 
these clinics several times a week as opposed to once a week in other areas. The data in Table 4 
is compiled from data presented in the 2014/2015 Service Level Agreement between Metro 
District Health Services and SASSA Western Cape in the 2013/2014 financial year. Table 2 
shows the number of assessments that were conducted in clinics and hospitals served by local 
SASSA offices in the Cape Town Metropole (one of the six health districts) for all three 
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disability-related grants.  
Table 4 Number of assessments conducted in 2014/2015 in the Cape Town Metropole 
Local SASSA Office DG CDG GIA Total  
Wynberg 6,107 148 99 6,354 
Athlone 4,106 230 83 4,419 
Bellville 9,562 264 179 10,005 
Khayelitsha 11,180 55 141 11,376 
Cape Town 4,243 66 61 4,370 
Eerste River 11,261 106 238 11,605 
Gugulethu 12,000 34 133 12,167 
Mitchell’s Plain 9,232 80 109 9,421 
Total 67,691 983 1 043 69,717 
According to a DMU representative, there were, on average, 132 doctors contracted to conduct 
assessment services at community health centres and clinics in the Western Cape (DMU 
official, email correspondence, 2015 February 12). SASSA kept a record of their signature and 
details and the quality assurance officer, who conducted audits on assessment forms was able to 
track their work and approval rates (although in practice, the capacity to do this was limited - 
see Section 3.3.3). SASSA did not keep track of the number of doctors who conduct 
assessments in hospitals because all doctors working in a hospital could, in theory, recommend 
DGs. This made it more difficult to train or oversee the work of doctors in hospitals.  
In the case of SASSA assessors, the Department of Health typically sub-contracted the 
provision of medical personnel to locum agencies that recruited doctors to work as disability 
assessors in PHC clinics. In more rural areas, the DoH would directly contract general 
practitioners in private practice or, where there was a scarcity of doctors, SASSA would 
employ assessors to travel to these areas. Agencies were responsible for assigning doctors to 
certain clinics on particular days. SASSA was not involved in the relationship between locum 
agencies and the DoH or between doctors and the locum agencies they were contracted to.  
Although doctors contracted via locum agencies did have some contact with SASSA through an 
annual training session, their work was not directly managed by either the Department of 
Health or SASSA. This meant that their daily work was especially difficult for the DoH or 
SASSA to oversee and it was therefore difficult for the DoH to ensure the quality of 
assessments promised in the SLA. To whom doctors in treating settings were accountable in 
conducting assessments was also unclear. I heard several reports from doctors that some of 
their colleagues rushed through assessments very quickly, but still claimed the hours for a full 
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day’s work, in one case resulting in disciplinary action by the DoH. In order to have greater 
quality control, some DoH sub-district offices in in the Cape Town Metropole, such as the 
Mitchell’s Plain sub-district, had started to contract assessors directly. These doctors were also 
paid a sessional, hourly rate.  
Relative to other ‘sessional’ or locum work or full salaried work, assessors are relatively poorly 
paid. Although the Department of Health was paid per assessment, they paid agencies an hourly 
sessional rate rather than for each assessment conducted. Agencies took a cut of this hourly rate 
and doctors working for agencies were eventually paid around R200 per hour (according to 
doctors). This amount was significantly lower than rates set by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration for medical officers working in treating settings (as of April 2014 
the rate was R287 to R381 per hour, depending on experience). In cases where doctors were 
contracted directly to SASSA in rural areas, doctors had direct relationships with local SASSA 
offices and coordinated directly with the offices and clinics regarding logistics and were paid 
the full assessment rate as well as transport costs (R123 per assessment).  
3.3.2 An overview of the booking to application process 
This section presents an overview of the disability grant process as it existed in 2014 and is 
based on the Social Grants Disability Management Model Process Guidelines (SASSA, 2011), 
interviews with SASSA DMU staff and my own fieldwork.  
With the exception of people treated in hospital settings, people wanting to apply for DGs were 
required to visit their local SASSA office to book a medical assessment at a PHC facility in 
their area. Before being given an appointment with a SASSA medical assessor, clients were 
pre-screened by SASSA officials. Using a client’s identity document, SASSA officials checked 
the individual’s status on the local office booking system and the national SOCPEN database. 
A medical assessment was considered valid for three months and booking would only be made 
on the local office booking system if the applicant had not been assessed in the previous three 
months or had documented proof that their medical status has changed since their last 
application. This gatekeeping procedure was introduced to deter people whose applications 
were refused from immediately re-applying, which Dr Marite described as an “abuse of access” 
and had happened regularly in the past. The implementation of this system has significantly 
reduced application numbers and presented a significant cost saving for SASSA (Marite, 
interview, 2014 June 27; SASSA, 2013). 
Although the initial design of Disability Management Model included a National Medical 
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Assessment Booking system, this was never implemented. This meant that although a claimant 
could not apply more than every three months, a claimant could technically book multiple 
assessments at different SASSA offices. The claimant would however need to have a medical 
file at a clinic served by that office. Although a DMU official (interview, 2014, June 23) 
indicated that there is potential for people to “clinic around” (i.e. shop around for different 
doctors), it would require significant effort to cultivate comprehensive and up-to-date medical 
files at multiple healthcare facilities that served different SASSA offices. This potential abuse 
was therefore of only minor concern. During fieldwork, I noticed that people often received 
treatment at various different facilities. However, rather than creating opportunities to abuse the 
system, the lack of a centralised medical records system more often created a barrier to access. 
This was because people’s medical records were often dispersed over multiple facilities, 
making it difficult for doctors to piece together patients’ medical records and reduced the 
availability of medical information doctors needed to make a decision. This meant that patients 
sometimes had to return to previous places of treatment to request these records, which 
presented a problem to people with little money for transport and low levels of education.  
In other provinces, where patients were not assessed at DoH facilities, claimants had to have a 
referral form filled out by their treating doctor before they could be booked for an assessment 
with a SASSA doctor. This referral system acted as both a gatekeeping mechanism and a way 
to ensure that adequate medical information was available to the SASSA assessor. At the time 
of writing, this referral system was not in place in the Western Cape as all assessments took 
place at DoH facilities49. The lack of medical gatekeeping at the pre-screening phase meant that 
a large number of ineligible people were given appointments with DG assessors. During one of 
the SASSA training sessions I observed, doctors requested that SASSA implement a referral 
process at all facilities. This request was based on their experiences of assessing large numbers 
of people who they felt clearly did not qualify for the grant. They also blamed the large amount 
of abuse and physical threats they received from clients on the lack of adequate screening (see 
chapters 5 and 7). The Western Cape regional office, however, expressed serious reservations 
about implementing a referral system. This was because it would add an additional step to the 
application process and could be perceived as limiting access to social assistance and might 
therefore invite litigation from claimants (Observations of SASSA training, February 2014).  
                                                
49 An exception has however been made at three clinics where there is particularly high demand for the grant in the 
area and a referral system has been introduced to control applicant numbers. 
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After pre-screening the patient, a SASSA official would book an appointment for a claimant at 
a clinic serving that SASSA office, preferably the patient’s regular clinic. Some clinics, where 
demand for the grant was lower, only received visits from an assessor on a fortnightly or 
monthly basis, whereas in areas of higher demand (generally high-poverty urban areas) a doctor 
was present in the clinic a few days a week, or even daily.  
After an assessment booking was made, clients were issued an appointment slip with a date to 
see a medical assessor at a particular clinic. DDOs at local offices compiled pre-numbered 
Medical Assessment Booking Lists, which were forwarded to the relevant clinic so that patient 
files could be drawn and readied for the medical assessor. As there were not disability assessors 
in all clinics, people in many rural areas and some urban areas could not be assessed at their 
regular clinic. Where the assessment site was different to the patient’s treating clinic, files 
should have been sent to the assessment site, but this did not always happen, especially at 
clinics outside of the Cape Town Metro. During almost all of my clinic visits, there was at least 
one person whose file had not reached the assessment site. A doctor working in a farmland area 
indicated that this happened in up to half of all cases. As assessments could not be completed 
without a medical file, patients would have to return at a later date.  
As there are variations in how the assessment process works in healthcare clinics and hospitals, 
I will outline these processes separately, beginning with PHC clinics. Applicants typically 
arrived at the clinic early in the morning and presented their appointment slips at the clinic 
reception so their file and then waited for the doctor to arrive. On arrival, doctors were handed 
the patient files and a set of large books containing a two-page serialised form called the 
National Standardised Assessment Tool (NSAT),which were either dropped off daily by DDO 
from a SASSA local office or kept locked up at the clinic. All forms (used, unused, spoilt, 
expired and incomplete) had to be accounted for weekly, or at least monthly. This tight control 
was aimed at preventing forms from being tampered with or stolen, reducing the potential that 
fraudulent assessments might enter the system.  
Doctors called patients into the room based on the order of their files. During the assessment 
doctors were responsible for verifying the identity of the person being assessed, stamping their 
appointment slip to confirm that the patient was assessed, performing the assessment and 
making a recommendation about the patient’s eligibility for a grant. Once the assessment was 
complete, the doctor would then instruct the client to take their appointment slip back to 
SASSA to apply for the grant on the given date, which was typically two weeks after the 
assessment. After the client left, the doctor would make their recommendation by selecting 
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from one of the following options on the form: “Does not qualify”; “Temporary”, along with a 
period of time from six to twelve months; and “Permanent”, either with or without review50. 
Doctors could recommend “Social Relief of Distress” (SRD) instead of a DG if the patient was 
likely to be disabled for a period of less than six months51. Social workers could also 
recommend the SRD based on financial hardship or social circumstance, but doctors were 
technically only allowed to recommend an SRD on medical grounds for people. If a disabled 
applicant was in need of permanent care, doctors could also recommend the “Grant-in-Aid”, an 
additional grant paid to DG recipients to assist them with the costs of this care.  
Once the doctor had completed all the assessments booked for the day, the books were returned 
to the designated health official. Completed forms were collected by a SASSA official who 
performed an administrative quality check on each form and returned them to the relevant local 
office. To prevent fraud, local offices kept samples of the signatures of assessing doctors 
working in their area, which were used to confirm the authenticity of completed assessment 
forms. Back at the SASSA office, the status of the client was assessed against the SOCPEN 
system and a second check was performed to ensure that the client had not applied within the 
previous three months.  
Two weeks after their assessment, the claimant would visit their local SASSA office to apply 
for their grant. By this time, the assessment forms should have undergone administrative and 
possibly technical (medical) quality assurance and should have been processed by the local 
SASSA office. During this time, an application was completed, the means test conducted and 
the doctor’s recommendation considered. Based on the information entered by the various 
officials during this process, a letter was automatically generated for and handed to the client, 
which indicated whether a grant had been approved or refused. In the case of rejected 
applications, the official handing the letter to the client was meant to explain to claimants that 
they had ninety days to request that SASSA reconsider its decision and another ninety days to 
lodge an appeal with the Minister of Social Development. Unfortunately, the reconsideration 
and appeals process was poorly explained by SASSA officials and on a number of occasions I 
witnessed patients arriving at clinics, often without an appointment, to see the doctor because 
                                                
50 Patients whose grants are reviewed are called in after a year for an assessment, but do not need to re-apply for a 
grant in the same way as temporary recipient receiving it for one year. All other permanent beneficiaries are 
reviewed every five years.  
51 Social Relief of Distress grants are issued monthly for a maximum period of three months and can be given in 
the form of food parcels, vouchers or cash to people considered in dire need. The value of this award is 
discretionary and subject to budget availability.   
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they did not understand the rejection letter or know what appeal processes to follow. Given that 
clients could re-apply for the grant after ninety days, the reconsideration and appeals process 
was seldom used and patients simply re-applied after ninety days instead. See Quote 3.1. 
Appendix C.   
The assessment process is markedly different at the hospital level and varied based on 
administrative arrangements made within each hospital. Assessments are either conducted in 
the wards shortly before discharge or, more commonly, at outpatient clinics attached to 
hospitals where previous inpatients are followed-up on and where patients referred from lower-
level clinics or hospitals are seen for specialised diagnosis and care. Hospitals were typically 
issued with a number of disability assessment books containing the NSAT forms, which were 
shared between departments in the hospital. When a patient requested a grant or the doctor felt 
one should be recommended, doctors would obtain the book from whoever was responsible for 
it at the clinic or ward. The exception was Whitney hospital, which was considered too large 
for such a system to be feasible (it would be difficult to share books) and the old provincial 
form rather than the book system was used instead. At Whitney hospital, they would refer 
patients to the social work department who would issue the patient with a form (the provincial 
form used prior to the NSAT) and were responsible for receiving it after completion.  
Forms were collected from all hospitals by a SASSA official and each claimant’s form sent to 
the SASSA local office closest to where the claimant lived, where would undergo the same 
application process as those assessed at the PHC level (i.e. complete application form and 
means test). The social work departments at both De Waal and Whitney were responsible for 
coordinating with SASSA around the collection of assessment forms and following up on 
cases. Social workers at Welgemoed hospital had, however, relinquished their role in the DG 
system because they felt that their position as administrative gatekeepers had had become 
overwhelming. This was largely due to the number of inquiries they received from patients and 
their families regarding DGs and frustrations they had experienced in dealing with the SASSA 
administration, which they saw as unreliable and unresponsive and a nurse was made 
responsible for the book instead. Social workers at De Waal and Whitney hospitals expressed 
similar frustrations about SASSA administrators and the frequency with which forms were lost 
and applications delayed in the system.  
3.3.3 Managing doctors’ work 
When doctors carry out disability assessments, the decisions they make form part of a bigger 
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bureaucratic process and it is therefore important that their decisions are coordinated with 
SASSA’s goals. Doctors are required to make recommendations on DG eligibility within the 
parameters of Section 9 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 and the 2008 Regulations to this 
Act. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no clear definition of the term disability in either the 
2004 Act or its regulations, which leaves room for a wide variety of interpretations by doctors. 
As disability is a broad and complex concept and doctors rarely have specific training in 
disability assessment, SASSA provides a set of medical assessment guidelines and training to 
doctors in an attempt to shape their understanding of what disability ‘is’ and to communicate 
SASSA’s norms and standards for assessment practice. Rules and guidelines create a type of 
technocratic knowledge that is rational, impersonal, quantitative and universal (Scott, 1998) 
and, in the case of medicine, are intended limit doctors’ subjectivity and standardise their 
practice. Guidelines can be read as “a set of instructions telling medical personnel to do a 
certain thing in a certain situation” (Berg, 1997: 2) and like all standards and classification 
systems, are aimed at making decision-making more “visible” (Bowker & Starr, 1999; Scott, 
1998), in this case, to SASSA.  
The set of guidelines in use at the time of this study, Guidelines for the Medical Assessment of 
Disability for Social Assistance Purposes (SASSA, n.d), provides a summary of the legal 
framework underpinning the DG system, explains the function of medical assessors and 
provides conceptual definitions of impairment, disability and employability. It also provides 
some vague direction to doctors on establishing claimant’s employability. Both these guidelines 
and the material presented during training strongly emphasised the difference between 
employability and the availability of employment. Given high levels of unemployment and 
poverty amongst applicants and a history of the grant being offered on a humanitarian rather 
than medical basis, the guidelines explicitly stated that the high unemployment rate should not 
be considered by doctors during assessments.   
Disability grant is not [the] Basic Income Grant (Employability not Availability of 
Employment.) (SASSA, 2011). 
The guidelines expressly discouraged doctors from awarding DGs on a temporary basis and 
were advised to only recommend temporary grants when the disability was severe and under 
highly specific conditions:  
Unfortunately, there is a tendency for temporary grants to create dependency and poor 
motivation for recovery. Due to this component of secondary gains these grants must be given 
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out cautiously (SASSA, n.d.: 25).  
In establishing employability, guidelines advised doctors to consider the nature and severity of 
the medical impairment; the age, intellectual capacity, educational attainment, skills and labour 
market knowledge of the particular person; the nature of the work the applicant could perform; 
and ergonomics and how reasonably an individual could be accommodated by an employer 
(SASSA, n.d). However, these factors could only be considered in cases of moderate 
impairment the application of the definition of disability should remain central within the 
clinical reasoning of the medical assessor (DMU official, personal correspondence, 2014 May 
6). As the guidelines explicitly note: “certainly most of our population live in very poor social 
circumstances that cause a lot of suffering, but this alone does not constitute grounds for a 
disability grant.” (SASSA, n.d.: 5) 
The guidelines also provided list of medical criteria and impairment tables for use in 
assessments. These guidelines were distributed to SASSA assessors during individual training 
sessions, which were conducted when doctors first began conducting assessments and at annual 
regional and national group training sessions. They were not distributed to doctors working in 
treating settings. In the Western Cape, group trainings were run by the DMU office in Cape 
Town or organised by Department of Health in other districts. There was also one national 
annual training facilitated by the SASSA head office, but it was unclear whether the annual 
national trainings would continue after national disability management was dissolved into 
general SASSA operations. The DMU staff also provided individual training sessions to 
doctors who were starting in a period between group trainings. DDOs from local branches 
might also explain the general operational procedures to new doctors.  
The training that SASSA provided to doctors focused on the legal and administrative 
framework of DG assessments rather than on the medical aspects of assessments and it was 
presumed that doctors would be able to make reasonable recommendations based on their 
medical expertise and the set of medical guidelines provided to them. The focus of the training 
was on how complete the form correctly rather than on tackling the complexities of the decision 
and ignored the larger macro-level factors that shaped the interactions they had with patients.  
SASSA has also put in place a number of quality control and oversight measures.  These 
roughly align with the three types of quality control measures that De Boer (2009: 25) 
identified as common in most disability benefit application processes internationally: 
administrative quality control, professional quality control and legal quality control. In the 
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SASSA system administrative quality checks were conducted by DDOs to ensure that 
assessment forms were properly completed and legitimate. Technical quality assurance was 
performed by a medical doctor who worked assessed forms to establish whether 
recommendations were based on sound medical reasoning and evidence. An Independent 
Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals (ITSAA) convened in cases where claimants appealed 
decisions made to establish both the technical quality and legality of eligibility decisions. As 
ITSAA fell outside of SASSA’s realm of activity, I have only focused on administrative and 
technical but not legal quality control.  
Although DDOs were not trained to technically interrogate a form, these officials were 
generally able to identify inconsistencies on the form. If, for example, a doctor indicated that a 
patient had scored low on the impairment scale, but had still recommended a grant, officials 
could request technical quality assurance or follow up on the inconsistency with the doctor 
directly when next visiting the clinic. On a number of occasions, I observed DDOs arriving at 
the clinic to ask doctors for clarification on the forms they had filled out on previous days. 
DDOs could also pick up on general trends or patterns in doctors’ assessments, such as very 
high recommendation rates, which would be referred for further investigation by the medical 
quality assurer (DMU Official, interview, 2014 June 23).  The work of DDOs therefore 
presented a fairly direct form of quality assurance. As doctors often began work as assessors 
before receiving formal training, DDOs also performed the important function of informally 
coaching doctors on how the assessment process worked and how to complete the assessment 
form.  
In order to improve the quality of medical assessments, minimise assessors’ discretion and curb 
potential fraud, SASSA employed a medical quality assurance officer to conduct both pre- and 
post-application quality assurance of medical assessments. During pre-application checking, the 
quality assurer was able to make changes to doctors’ recommendations. Post-application 
quality assurance was an auditing process conducted on a sample of assessments drawn from 
the sixteen local SASSA offices across the Western Cape.  
Pre-application quality assurance (QA) took place in the time between the date of assessment 
and the date the client returned to the SASSA office. This type of QA only took place at 
specific fraud ‘hot spots.’ At the Gugulethu office, which experienced high levels of fraud, 
100% of all assessments were quality assured. In other offices, pre-application QA was only 
conducted on forms filled out by doctors who the medical quality assurer or a DDO had 
identified as having very high allocation rates, awarding high numbers of permanent DGs or 
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filling out assessment forms poorly. Doctors’ work was monitored until by the QA until his or 
her assessment rate and quality improved sufficiently. Post-application QA was conducted after 
a grant was already in payment and was intended to track assessment trends and monitor the 
work of doctors on an on-going basis. 
The Disability Management Model was initially designed with the assumption that a district-
level DMU would be in place and that considerably more resources would be allocated to the 
model than have been in practice (Marite, interview, 2014 June 27; DMU official, interview, 
2014 June 23). SASSA had also originally planned to develop an electronic Medical 
Assessment Profile of each assessor, based on a 20% sample of assessments conducted by each 
doctor. This profile would allow the DMU to monitor the number of assessments conducted, 
the approval rate and errors made by the assessor. In order to implement this model effectively 
there would need to be an assessor allocated to each of the five SASSA districts in the Western 
Cape. At the time of writing there were only six quality assurers had been appointed nationally, 
one of whom was based in the Western Cape region. This made it impossible to assess the 
quality of 20% of the forms completed by each assessor. The target was therefore revised and 
the DMU instead worked towards ensuring that 20% of all assessments in the Western Cape 
were reviewed. This target included assessments conducted at both tertiary and secondary 
levels, both pre- and post-application. As pre-application quality assurance took precedence 
over post-allocation assurance work, a large proportion of the forms reviewed each year were 
assessed at the pre-application stage. This meant and that quality assurance activities were not 
evenly spread across the sixteen local offices.  
These factors all acted to limit the scope of SASSA’s quality assurance work. Therefore, unless 
a doctor had a very high allocation rate or was filling out forms extremely poorly, they were 
unlikely to be held accountable for their decision-making. I was unable to establish the overall 
approval rate during the time of my fieldwork, however data I could obtain for Quarter 2 of 
2013-2014 (July-September 2013) that showed that 75.3% of claimants were certified disabled 
by doctors and that 74.67% of applications received by SASSA operations were approved. 
These approval rates are considerably more generous than in many other countries. For 
instance, in the United States the initial approval rate (before reconsideration and appeals) was 
33.6% in 2013 (Social Security Agency, 2013).   
During pre-application quality assurance, the QA was responsible for reviewing the decision of 
the medical assessor. In the absence of an electronic system, the quality assurer sampled 
assessments by physically drawing files from the sixteen local offices at the provincial records 
 
 92 
management centre, which were stored separately from the files for other grant-types. The 
quality assurance review was a desktop review of the NSAT form and the claimant’s file was 
not available to the QA officer. He therefore relied heavily on the information provided by the 
doctor in the form. The QA officer noted that doctors tended to fill out forms extremely badly, 
providing little clinical justification for their decision-making. This often made quality 
assurance work difficult. As a medical diagnosis was considered insufficient for declaring 
someone disabled, the assessor needed to present evidence that an applicant was functionally 
impaired despite receiving optimal treatment. It was therefore important that doctors reported 
on the type and dosage of medications or other treatments or rehabilitative interventions. 
Although doctors complained to me that there was insufficient space to provide detailed notes 
on their decisions, an interview with the QA officer and my own observations indicated that 
doctors seldom used the space that was available. While some doctors filled out forms carefully 
and took pride in this, many were very poorly filled out, indicating that doctors rushed through 
completing them. Unfortunately, if insufficient evidence or medical reasoning was provided for 
a grant recommendation, the QA officer would be forced to reject the doctor’s recommendation 
or reduce the length of time that the claimant could receive the grant for.  
The QA officer used an electronic quality assurance database, which was used to pick up 
patterns and trends in assessments. The DMU did not target a particular recommendation rate, 
acknowledging that this rate was often context-dependent. For instance, cancer clinics and 
hospices were likely to have higher recommendation rates than PHC facilities. However, if a 
doctor had an obviously and unacceptably high recommendation rate, was providing 
insufficient evidence or regularly making recommendations inconsistent with their clinical 
findings, the quality assurer would write reports on these findings. The DMU would then 
approach the doctor concerned to discuss these issues. SASSA could also refuse to accept or 
pay for poorly conducted assessments (outlined in SLA) and the doctor would be required to re-
do the assessment. The QA officer was also responsible for producing quarterly reports on 
medical assessment trends for SASSA.  
Both the DMU and the Department of Health took what a SASSA official called a 
‘developmental’ rather than punitive approach to addressing quality issues with doctors. 
Assessors were seen as a scarce resource and the DMU and DoH preferred to provide feedback 
on performance and additional training than terminating the employment of the doctor. 
However, fraudulent behaviour such as over-claiming hours was not tolerated. Three of the 
assessors I worked with during the study were called in to discuss the quality of the 
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assessments they provided. After intervening, SASSA closely monitored the work of these 
doctors by examining all of their forms until their work improved sufficiently. A DMU 
representative reported that after ‘engaging’ with doctors there was generally a rapid 
improvement in the quality of their work. There have, however, been a small number of cases 
where the DMU informed the DoH that they would like certain doctors to cease assessment 
work at particular sites.  
The initial design of the DMM imagined a greater role for quality assurers, which included 
training and information sessions, liaising with medical officers, trouble-shooting and advising 
regional DMUs and participating in the reconsideration process. However, 2014/2015, the 
contract of the quality assurer in the Western Cape did not include any of these activities and 
his interaction with doctors was limited.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the bureaucratic structure of SASSA’s disability grant system. It has 
shown that although the DMM has significantly reduced fraud, reduced backlogs, has stabilised 
DG numbers and has done much in the way of creating a standardised approach to disability 
assessment nationally, budget constraints have limited its full implementation. This means that 
the system has limited capacity to reduce doctors’ discretion in practice and doctors retain 
significant gatekeeping power. In the Western Cape, the outsourcing of doctors through locum 
agencies and the lack of genuine accountability of treating doctors within the system can make 
it difficult for the understaffed DMU to manage doctors’ work. The lack of a gatekeeping 
system in the Western Cape around who is able to apply for disability grant means that large 
numbers of people with little to no impairment are assessed by doctors. This creates pressure on 
doctors who must deal with large patient loads. Doctors who conduct assessments are either not 
paid for their work or are paid little for this work and often work in difficult conditions. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss how doctors use their discretion to make their work easier in these 
conditions.   
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CHAPTER 4:  Medical doctors as disability ‘experts’  
4.1 Introduction  
I was sitting with Dr Bury in one of the consulting rooms in the outpatient section of a small 
regional hospital in the farmland areas in West Coast region of the Western Cape, which was 
used weekly for disability grant assessments; when Mr Jones, a man in his forties with a 
heavily-scarred face walked into the room.  
Mr Jones’s main complaint was that he had a problem with his wrist. He explained that he had 
been assaulted and that his wrist and collarbone, which had been broken as a result, were still 
bothering him. Doctor Bury examined his wrist and hands, testing and comparing the mobility 
of his injured and uninjured wrist by asking him to clench both of them and move them up and 
down. Mr Jones struggled with this and the doctor had to show him what to do a number of 
times. The mobility of his wrist was normal and it appeared to Dr Bury that he was either 
pretending he could not do this or was unable to concentrate on performing the activity (he 
seemed unfocused and had a history of drug abuse). Dr Bury then examined his shoulder and 
Mr Jones complained that there was a ‘knob’ there and that it made a cracking noise when the 
doctor moved it. Dr Bury told him that it is possible to live without a collar bone, saying that 
“some people are even born without them; it’s got nothing to do with sickness.”  
Mr Jones, however, was insistent that his collarbone was a problem and said again that it 
cracked and has a knob on it. Dr Bury dismissed this, simply saying “it’s alright”. Trying 
another angle, Mr Jones complained, “my wrist is really what is worrying me, in the joint”.  Dr 
Bury patiently went back to the notes and asked, “when did you injure it?” and saw in the file 
that he had an operation on his wrist in 2008 (six years prior). Mr Jones proceeded to sit there 
and play with his wrist, making various complaints like “I can only use this one hand” and 
saying something about not being able to go back to work. He then added, “Can’t they do 
something to get rid of this knob?” “No, it’s fine” said Dr Bury, and Mr Jones responded “It 
cracks. I also can’t hold it up too long.” At this point Dr Bury began to ignore him, focusing on 
filling out forms related to the consultation.   
Dr Bury described Mr Jones’s case as a text-book case of malingering and something he 
encountered quite regularly. “Really”, he told me “there is nothing, nothing [wrong with 
him]...just ask him to get onto the bed and watch him from behind how he gets onto the 
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bed...easy - there is no problem getting onto the bed and off because he doesn't know [that he is 
being watched.]”52   Mr Jones’s appearance and drug use history also added to Dr Bury’s 
mistrust and suspicion about his motives for the consultation. 
Mr Jones’s case was not an unusual one. During my time in the field I frequently observed 
cases where doctors felt that a claimant was malingering. Although it is extremely difficult to 
determine whether in fact someone is malingering, healthcare workers believed that they 
encountered large numbers of people who were evidently not disabled on the basis of objective 
medical criteria. Experience with claimants like Mr Jones, who were assessed as exaggerating 
or feigning symptoms, made doctors alert to and suspicious of patients’ motivations in 
reporting their symptoms and lived experiences of disability during DG assessments. 
Doctors assess injury impairments frequently in their work. However, the need to detect ‘fraud’ 
changes the premise and nature of doctors’ work in DG assessments; in contrast to their usual 
diagnostic and therapeutic work, where the patient can be assumed to be honest, because they 
want the correct diagnosis and treatment. Whilst in other parts of medical practice patients are 
sick until proven healthy, in disability assessments the patient is healthy until proven sick 
(Stone, 1979). Rather than diagnosing and treating patients, doctors engage in a process of 
gathering evidence and putting it together to show why a patient is or is not eligible for a DG.  
The political and economic privileges and exemptions that come with being categorised as 
disabled mean that disability is commonly understood to exist in both genuine and artificial 
forms and the suspicion that people will malinger - feign or exaggerate impairment for 
secondary gain (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) - is integral to how disability is both 
defined and understood (Stone, 1984: 28). Given the assumption that people are likely to 
misrepresent themselves in order to meet the categorical tests of welfare programmes or for 
other secondary gains, the concept of disability has long tied to the need to detect deception 
(Stone, 1984: 51). Welfare bureaucracies like SASSA therefore guard the boundaries of the 
disability category to prevent ‘shirkers’ and disability benefit ‘scroungers’ from using fraud, 
fakery and malingering for exploiting the system.  
Historically, biomedical criteria have been the most commonly used mechanism for restricting 
access to disability benefits and a medical report of a doctor is a requirement of most social 
protection programmes for people with disabilities around the world (Bolderson et al., 2002). 
                                                
52 This was only his assumption and he did not ask the patient to do this.  
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Disability has historically been considered a pathological deviation from a biomedically 
accepted ‘normal’ condition, therefore falling under the purview of doctors. Given their 
medical expertise and professional status, doctors have been trusted to judge the authenticity of 
illness and impairment and the legitimacy of related social benefit claims. This has been the 
case since the mid-19th century when doctors were first legally positioned as gatekeepers to 
social protection programmes when Germany introduced sickness and disability insurance 
legislation and workmen’s compensation schemes in the 1880s (Robinson, 2004; Stone, 1984; 
Priestley, 2010).  
In South Africa, medical doctors have been involved in validating occupational injury claims 
since the introduction of the Miners Phthisis Allowances Act 34 of 1911 and the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act of 1914. The report of a medical doctor has been required for disability 
grant claims since they were introduced by the Blind Persons Act of 1936 and the Invalidity 
Pension Scheme of 1937. Doctors have also played an important historical role in conscription 
efforts and war injury claims. For example, doctors played a prominent role in the 1914-1918 
war effort in Europe, developing special tests to detect malingering and thwart conscripts’ 
effort to avoid the draft or to leave active duty through claims of medical injury (Wessely, 
2003). 
Although medical understandings of disability have since evolved and disability is considered a 
function of social and contextual as well as biomedical factors, doctors still play a key role in 
assessing physical impairments that can cause disability.  Doctors are regularly requested to 
provide impartial medical opinions to third-parties for legal proceedings in: occupational health 
matters; private health, life, accident and disability insurance; public social insurance claims; 
and for establishing eligibility for disability-related social assistance programmes such as the 
DG53. Although not necessarily the main decision-makers on eligibility, doctors play a key 
legitimising role in these processes.  
This chapter discusses the application of – and limits to – biomedical knowledge and expertise 
in the assessment of disability. As I have already argued, disability is neither a purely medical 
phenomenon nor a social construct, which makes disability difficult for doctors to assess. In 
Chapter 6 and 7, I will discuss how social norms, values and doctor-claimant interactions 
influence medical decision-making, but this chapter will focus on the more technical aspects of 
                                                
53 South African doctors also conduct medical assessments for the Road Accident Fund and Unemployment 
Insurance Fund and for claims made under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act. They 
also frequently consult privately to insurance companies as claims assessors. 
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assessment and what the limits of these are in determining disability. I also reflect on the 
differences between the work doctors do in distinguishing between ‘normality’ and ‘disability’ 
and other types of decision-making in medicine, and what this means for doctor-patient 
relationships in both treating and non-treating settings. Lastly, I will discuss why, despite its 
limitations, medical expertise remains key in legitimising disability claims in South Africa.   
4.2 How doctors make decisions on medical eligibility 
Medical doctors are experts in the anatomy (structure), physiology (function) and pathologies 
(abnormalities) of the human body and undergo extensive and rigorous training to use medico-
scientific principals and methods to diagnose and treat medical conditions and physical injuries. 
This expertise on the body allows them to identify the presence of impairments that may be 
disabling, making their input valuable in disability assessments. Although doctors identify 
impairment in the course of their regular work, there are a number of key differences between 
the work doctors do in DG assessments and the work that doctors do in diagnosing and caring 
for patients.  
Patients generally visit doctors because they are in pain, and have experienced or otherwise 
believe that medicine may be able to provide a solution. They expect doctors to diagnose the 
malady and prescribe treatment, which will result in a cure (in the case of acute illness or 
injury) or at least assist in managing their condition (in the case of chronic disease). Doctors’ 
ability to cure patients makes their expertise highly valued and in this way medicine is ‘succour 
as well as science’ (Collins & Pinch, 2005). When a patient is diagnosed, they are ascribed a 
label (a diagnosis) which defines and accounts for what is ‘wrong’ with the body, effectively 
‘organising’ the illness and treatment possibilities (Brown, 1995; Freidson, 1970). The process 
of diagnosis validates what does and does not count as disease (Bowker & Starr, 1999) and 
through their diagnostic authority doctors have undeniable control over deciding what it is to be 
sick and who should be classified as such.  
Freidson (1970) argued that “by virtue of being the authority of what illness ‘really’ is, 
medicine creates the social possibilities for acting sick” (206), thereby defining illness as an 
official social role. This diagnostic, labelling power gives doctors significant social and 
professional status and authority, both within the healthcare system and in society more 
broadly. In order to diagnose patients, doctors gather information on patients’ presenting 
complaints; take medical, family and social histories (summary of lifestyle practices and habits 
such as smoking or drug use history); conduct physical examinations; and review laboratory 
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reports and the results of other technical tests. This can be a rapid and straightforward process 
driven by ‘gut feel’ or managed through the process of differential diagnosis - the process of 
testing and eliminating a series of different diagnoses. Family and social background and 
history are key to narrowing diagnostic possibilities by identifying potential genetic or 
behavioural risk that may predispose patients to a certain illness and are part of doctors’ sense-
making process (Davenport, 2011). Understanding the multi-causality of disease is part of 
doctors’ expertise and a patient’s account of their history and symptoms can help to direct their 
diagnostic process and frame their technical decision to apply a certain biomedical category to 
an individual (Davenport, 2011). Gathering this information from the patient or others typically 
involves a dialogue with the patient (or their relatives or friends in cases where the patient is 
unable to communicate) to obtain information on their medical history, symptoms and 
complaints, making diagnosis a relational process (Brown et al., 2011).  
Once a diagnosis and the cause of the condition has been established, the doctor can then 
develop a prognosis, which is a prediction on the duration and outcome of the disease based on 
clinical and systemic factors and the pathogenesis of the disease. Based on the diagnosis and 
prognosis the physician then typically recommends a course of treatment for the patient and 
may make recommendations that restrict patients from carrying out physical or work activities, 
releasing patients from certain social duties until they recover and allowing them to assume 
what Parsons (1951) called the ‘sick role.’  
Parsons understood illness as an acceptable form of social deviance, which is legitimated by 
medical proof that an individual is sick and the agreement that individuals will submit 
themselves to the medical expertise of doctors, based on the expectation that doctors have their 
best interests at heart. Doctors on the other hand expect that patients will participate willingly 
in the treatment process and do their best to recover their health. Assuming the ‘sick role’ or 
‘handicapped role’ (Gordon, 1966) also allows individuals to claim certain exemptions from 
society such as paid sick leave, be excused from compulsory military service, gain access to 
particular services and earn the right to make claims on private and public disability insurance 
or social assistance programmes (Jutel & Conrad, 2011; Nettleton, 2006). Although Parson’s 
structural functionalism has been largely discredited and is complicated by chronic illness 
(where there is no assumption of recovery), the sick role and the work of doctors as gatekeepers 
to this role has remained a major grounding theme in the field of medical sociology, and 
remains important in thinking about doctors’ work in legitimising disability claims. Although in 
practice people certified disabled gain access to the ‘sick role,’ it is also important to note that 
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illness and disability are not the same. Someone who is ill may not feel disabled (e.g. someone 
with hypertension) because despite their pathology or impairment they may be able to 
participate fully in economic and social life. Likewise, someone who is disabled may not feel ill 
(e.g. a hearing-impaired person) (Cassell, 2002: 39). 
Disability assessments have a different purpose and are structured quite differently from other 
doctor-patient interactions. Instead of seeking diagnosis and treatment, patients are looking for 
affirmation that they are unable to work because of an impairment and that they therefore 
deserve to be compensated either by their insurer or the state. It is the doctor’s role to establish 
whether this claim is legitimate and there is a valid connection between the symptoms or 
complaints, functional limitations and restrictions reported by the individual, and the presence 
of an actual disease or dysfunction (Alyward, 2003). Whereas a patient’s description of their 
symptoms and history are an important part of the diagnosis, disability assessors cannot not 
entirely trust claimants’ accounts of their experiences, making objective evidence more 
important. In the DG system, disability recommendations must be based on pre-existing 
diagnoses and claimants making DG claims have generally already been prescribed treatment 
or have undergone rehabilitation. Therefore, rather than determining the cause of dysfunction 
(as is the case with diagnosis) doctors look for medical evidence to confirm a patient’s claim 
that they cannot work. Doctors must also establish the extent to which a claimant is physically 
impaired and how this affects individual functioning and employability. They either establish 
impairment using the set of impairment tables provided by SASSA (or whichever bureaucracy 
they are working for), or make their own estimation based on their examination of the patient or 
their own experience. Perhaps most importantly, doctors work (or at least are expected to work) 
within the parameters of social assistance legislation and administrative guidelines to make 
recommendations on eligibility.  
In DG assessments doctors determined the extent and expected duration of impairment based 
on the patient’s symptoms, diagnosis, severity of the condition, complications, response to 
treatment or rehabilitation, and prognosis and use of assistive devices (see the NSAT tool in 
Appendix E for more information on what doctors were expected to report). There were a 
number of sources doctors they could use to obtain evidence for assessments: observation; the 
patient’s medical file – which (hopefully) provided information on their diagnostic and 
treatment history; physical examination; and the claimants’ subjective account of their 
condition and related impairments.  
Doctors used observation to detect whether patient claims of disability were genuine, and were 
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constantly alert to how patients behaved, moved, communicated and narrated their medical 
histories. They would watch patients walk into the room, observing their gait, general body 
language, facial expressions and behaviour, whether they could pick things up off the floor, or 
if they looked or sounded breathless. This allowed doctors to check patients’ reported 
symptoms against their actual behaviour and this is a technique also employed by occupational 
therapists (OTs) who conduct work assessments (See quotes 4.1 and 4.2 Appendix C).   
I saw recently a patient also, she couldn't walk and she was walking like this 
[demonstrates someone walking hunched over] inside the room but I know her because 
I was working at Matiesfontein and when she's out [the room] I gave her a chance, say 
5 seconds, so I looked at her down the passage - she was walking normally. (Dr Bury, 
interview, 2014 July 22) 
Doctors used the collection of medical notes, referral letters and test reports and the 
prescription chart to piece together claimants’ medical histories and validate or refute their 
claims. Especially important in the patients’ files were biomarkers – objective, quantifiable and 
comparable indicators of a patient’s medical condition – (e.g. CD4 count, viral load, cholesterol 
level, blood pressure, or insulin level) which indicate the presence and severity of a disease, as 
well as treatment response. These biomarkers could not, however, measure the level of 
impairment experienced by the claimant.  For someone to qualify for a DG there needs to be 
both evidence of a medical condition and impairment caused by the condition. Mrs Jansen 
provides an example of one such case. She was a woman in her fifties with rheumatoid arthritis, 
an immunological disorder, the presence of which is established through a positive rheumatoid 
factor blood test. Although she had tested positive for this factor, this alone was not sufficient 
for her to qualify. Although a degenerative condition, rheumatoid arthritis is not immediately 
disabling and some people on treatment have no symptoms. Dr Bury, who assessed her, 
therefore examined all of her joints, looking for swelling and tested her mobility. Based on his 
examination, he determined impaired functioning measurable in terms of significantly reduced 
wrist and knee flexion (50%) and visible signs that her joints were affected by the disease and 
therefore recommended a grant. 
The list of medications prescribed to patients could also provide a good indication of the 
severity of the claimant’s presenting complaint and whether a person was on optimal treatment. 
Patients may not refuse treatment and those who were non-compliant were not eligible for the 
grant. Assessors were expected to report any history of non-compliance to SASSA. Doctors 
would typically ask patients questions about the type and dosage of medications they were 
taking to establish whether they were in fact taking it correctly (or at all). Non-compliance to 
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medication could also be easily picked up by checking the dates that claimants had visited the 
clinic to fetch their prescribed medication, which was typically recorded on the prescription 
chart in the file. When patients reported having frequent epileptic seizures, doctors would 
conduct serum tests to establish compliance. See quotes 4.3 to 4.5 in Appendix C. 
As claimants must have an established diagnosis to be eligible for a grant, SASSA assessors are 
not obliged to conduct physical examinations and a review of the patient’s medical history 
based on their existing file is considered sufficient for a DG assessment. My observations of 
SASSA assessors showed that few conducted more than a quick and focused examination of a 
patient’s primary complaint (e.g. examining the mobility of a joint) and their decision-making 
was based primarily on the medical history recorded in the patient’s file and usually – but not 
always – a conversation with the patient. Inappropriate or inconsistent symptoms, complaints or 
pain inconsistent with clinical findings and verbal or physical over-reactions on examination 
(e.g. wincing or crying out) were all red flags that alerted doctors to the possibility of 
malingering.  
Doctors also had to think about the likelihood of the condition improving (prognosis). In the 
case of manageable chronic disease doctors would not recommend permanent grants. However, 
there were clear cases where based on medical knowledge doctors knew improvement was 
unlikely; for example, in cases of intellectual impairment, cerebral palsy and paraplegia. In 
these cases, doctors would quickly and willingly recommend permanent grants, as is shown in 
the case of the 50-year old man with glaucoma below, whom Dr De Villiers would deteriorate 
and likely never work again:  
The patient complains that he has a problem with his eye and brought a referral letter 
from another doctor with him. The letter says that he has end-stage glaucoma in both 
eyes and that in this case a permanent disability grant would be recommended. The 
doctor asked him when he last worked and it was this year. The doctor says that he has 
3 metre vision in his right eye and 2 metre vision in his left and that he has been treated 
since 2014, so there is little chance of improvement. (Field notes, 2014 July 18) 
The extent to which doctors used these different sets of information depended on its 
availability, the doctor’s individual approach and individual patients. Although both SASSA 
assessors and treating doctors needed to fill out an assessment form and take the same factors 
into consideration, the information available to them varied. SASSA assessors act as third-party 
assessors and typically had no prior knowledge of a claimant’s particular case or prior 
relationship with the claimant (except in the case of repeated applications). These assessors 
very rarely diagnose or treat patients and where claimants are in need of further medical 
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services they typically referred them back to their treating doctors. On the other hand, ‘treating 
doctors’ received DG requests from patients or initiated the application process during the 
course of their daily work as physicians at hospital-level institutions in the public healthcare 
system. Most treating doctors were assessing current or previous patients and therefore had at 
least some idea of the claimants’ history54.  
In hospital settings there was also more opportunity for interdisciplinary input, especially in 
inpatient settings where physiotherapists, OTs and social workers were typically attached to 
wards. At De Waal hospital, psychiatrists made the final decision regarding DG 
recommendations, but DG assessments were first discussed in multi-disciplinary treatment 
teams composed of psychiatrists, social workers and nurses55. It was also often easier in 
outpatient settings to make referrals to social workers and occupational therapists when they 
were uncertain about whether a patient was eligible. See Quote 4.1  
Another major difference between assessments carried out by SASSA assessors and treating 
doctors was their relationship with patients. Although in the public healthcare system in South 
Africa, the relationships that form between doctors and the patients they care for are often 
limited and far from ideal (see Chapter 7), treating doctors were more likely to feel a sense of 
responsibility towards their own patients. In the case of SASSA assessments, there was a lack 
of collaboration between the doctor and claimant around ‘getting well’, which on the one hand 
allowed doctors to be more objective, but on the other hand made it difficult for assessors to 
trust claimants.  
To help doctors estimate impairment based on diagnosis, SASSA provides a table of condition-
specific directives in its guidelines for determining the percentage of impairment present based 
on diagnosis. For example, poor vision in both eyes (worse than 6/36 in both eyes) that is not 
correctable, should receive an impairment rating of 50%. Based on the tables, doctors then 
categorised the overall severity of impairment as ‘none’ (0%), ‘mild’ (<25%), ‘moderate’ (25 – 
40%) or ‘severe’ (>40%). The SASSA tables are basic and provide broad impairment ranges 
and no instruction on how to combine information from the impairment tables or information 
on what tests should be used to establish impairment. As few treating doctors had access to the 
guidelines, few were familiar with these tables.  
                                                
54 Many doctors work at multiple facilities or rotate between facilities, meaning there is not always continuity of 
care.   
55 Although OTs did not form part of this team, they could be consulted as part of the decision-making process 
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Even if doctors did use the tables (few did), they still needed to determine how an individual’s 
impairment impacted on his/her ability to work because impairment is not necessarily 
equivalent to work disability. In cases where claimants were severely impaired or had zero to 
very little impairment, the connection between impairment and disability could be fairly 
obvious and it was relatively easy for doctors to make a decision about an individual’s 
functional capacity on a purely medical basis. Mrs Jansen with rheumatoid arthritis and the man 
with glaucoma clearly fell into this category – the severity of their impairment, in their cases, 
could act as a fairly effective proxy for disability. According to SASSA guidelines, a patient 
who was classified as having a minor impairment would not qualify for a grant regardless of his 
or her social or environmental conditions and these cases could be quickly dismissed. These 
were typically patients with well-controlled and manageable chronic illnesses. The guidelines 
note that conditions such as early stage HIV, acute pulmonary tuberculosis, asthma, well-
controlled epilepsy, minor depression, diabetes, hypertension and healed fractures did not 
qualify applicants for DGs.  
Not all cases were as easy to categorise because the connection between impairment and 
disability was less clear. Cases where claimants’ impairments were moderate (25% - 40%) 
were more complicated because, in cases of moderate impairment, some claimants may be 
more capable of work or employable than others depending on their age, education, occupation, 
geography and socio-economic factors and opportunities for referral in addition to the 
impairment present. Psychiatric conditions, epilepsy and other chronic health conditions, which 
are often called “invisible disabilities”, were particularly difficult for doctors to assess because 
the functional and participation limitations they cause are not easily observed. Although in 
most cases these conditions can be controlled, people’s capacity to function effectively in the 
workplace and the stigma attached to epilepsy and psychiatric disorders in particular, made 
establishing claimant’s capacity to find and carry out work fairly challenging.  
Dr Soet described people who fell into the grey area between disabled and able-bodied as “in-
betweeners”. Sometimes these grey areas were created by a lack of medical evidence in the file, 
uncertainty about a patient’s longer-term prognosis, but mostly what made these cases difficult 
came down to the crucial and more difficult question to answer on the NSAT form, “Does the 
impairment affect the client’s ability to enter the open labour market?”  
It is fairly standard practice in disability assessment internationally and within other disability 
compensation programmes in South Africa to consider the education and previous work 
experience of claimants as a baseline for determining whether claimants would be able to find 
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work or resume their previous activities. SASSA acknowledged the importance of considering 
non-medical factors in its guidelines, but how this information should be incorporated and 
weighted in decision-making was unclear and not explained in either the guidelines or training 
provided to doctors (SASSA, n.d.). One doctor reported being told by the National Disability 
Manager during a training session that there was no legal requirement for doctors to consider 
education during assessments, indicating that this could be ignored. “In fact we are not even 
supposed to take education into account, which is wrong. But on the other hand others are not 
trained on how to do that.” (Dr Jacobs, interview, 2013 October 24) There was also no section 
on the NSAT form to capture social, environmental or economic factors that influence 
disablement.56 As I will discuss in the next section, although doctors regularly deal with social 
issues in their work, they typically have limited expertise in how to deal with them or 
incorporate them into their decision-making. The lack of detail on non-medical elements of the 
assessment process in the assessment guidelines and conflicting information about whether they 
should even consider it left doctors feeling considerable uncertainty in their decision-making.  
4.2.1 Uncertainty in disability assessment and the limitations of the medical model  
Although disability assessments are a structured process and guidelines for assessment do exist, 
these are vague and not always available to doctors. It is fairly difficult to determine a person’s 
ability to work based on their physical capacity as barriers to employment are often external 
and contextual. Moreover, illness, impairment and disability present themselves in the lives of 
individuals in highly specific, contextual and often ambiguous ways (Swartz & Schneider, 
2006; Gooding & Marriot, 2009). Disability is rarely absolute and is more of a spectrum or 
range where people have differing degrees of functional capacity and independence (Jette, 
2002). Furthermore, DGs are premised on the idea of “economic disability” (de Villiers, 2002: 
324), meaning that disability is a function of both medical disability and the relative availability 
of economic opportunities for persons with disabilities at any given time. This is a decision 
which medical doctors, who have limited formal expertise on labour market and vocational 
issues, are not necessarily properly equipped to make. Studies in Europe and North America 
have demonstrated that doctors can interpret the same patient information in very different 
ways, making different decisions about the same patients’ work ability, employability and 
eligibility for benefits (Zinn & Furutani, 1996; O’Fallon & Hillson, 2006; Dell-Kuster, 2014; 
                                                
56 Age and the highest level of education are the exceptions. However, the job of capturing this information was 
generally left to SASSA DDOs.  
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Schellart et al., 2011; Slebus; 2009).   
Patients may also have different subjective experiences of disability. People are unreliable 
observers of their own bodies and self-perceptions of disability may not always align with 
objective observations of health or disability status (Monks, 2000: 19). Different people with 
the same impairment may experience different levels of disability based on psychological 
factors and sensitivity to pain.  
“The problem is there is also this element of fatigue, which is very subjective. So I have 
patients who have an ejection fraction of 4557 who feel great, who do fine because that's 
the kind of person they are. But then you have patients who have an ejection fraction of 
45 and feel completely incapacitated. It's very difficult to know if they are. So the 
fatigue factor is very difficult. So even though with ejection fraction of even 25% you 
can function fairly okay - up and down the stairs you'd get tired, but would you be able 
to do an 8-5 every single day, would you be able to catch the bus to the job like that? It 
becomes very difficult you know.” (Dr Harvey, Interview, 2014 April 29)  
Robinson (2004) argues that fatigue, weakness and pain are really what prevent people from 
working. However, because these subjective factors cannot be easily seen or measured, they are 
given little weight in disability assessments and doctors typically prioritise ‘objective’ 
biomedical evidence over patient narratives (Dodier, 1998). Patients who lack visible 
explanations of their pain are often trivialised or dismissed by doctors (Conrad & Barker, 2010: 
S72; Fassin, 2008). The possibility of malingering in DG assessments also means that doctors 
are cautious of relying too heavily on self-reported information from patients. Furthermore, 
taking subjective factors into account requires engaging with a patient’s individual experience 
and doctors do not necessarily have the time, training or inclination to do this – especially when 
SASSA assessors have very little time to see a patient and complete all their paperwork. 
As a profession, medicine has moved away from a purely biomedical model toward a bio-
psycho-social model of health (Engel, 1977), which involves bringing together biomedical, 
psychological and social aspects of health tin a holistic and integrated approach to patient care. 
In the early 2000s, the curricula of most Bachelor of Medicine Bachelor of Surgery (MBChB) 
degrees in South Africa were reoriented towards primary and person-centred healthcare and 
teaching students within the frame of the bio-psycho-social model. However, many of the 
doctors conducting disability assessments in this study had qualified prior to this change in 
teaching approach and even young doctors taught with new curricula, had limited exposure to 
                                                
57 Ejection fraction is a measure of the heart’s ability to pump blood with each contraction. An ejection fraction of 
below 50% is generally considered an indication of chronic or congestive heart failure.  
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disability and rehabilitation issues. This is because coverage of these topics in the curriculum 
remains extremely limited and is presented in the pre-clinical years.58  
Professional experience and socialisation also shape how doctors think, interact with patients 
and make decisions on how medical knowledge is communicated and reproduced. Collins and 
Pinch (2005) argue that it is not ‘book learning’ that ‘makes a doctor’. ‘Becoming a doctor’ 
involves tacit knowledge and interactional expertise that develops as doctors gain experience, 
and learn the spoken discourse of the profession through socialisation. The way in which 
doctors are socialised into medical practice during their clinical training can also undermine 
more holistic, biopsychosocial and patient-centred approaches taught in the formal curriculum. 
This hidden curriculum is communicated through the informal lessons about medical culture 
and ethics that medical students are unintentionally taught outside the classroom in clinical and 
other medical settings59 (Hafferty & Hafler, 2011: 7; Hafferty & O’Donnell, 2014; Hafferty & 
Franks, 1994; Martimianakis, 2015).  
Vivian et al.  (2011) studied the hidden curriculum in the training of Cape Town medical 
students, finding a disjuncture between what students were taught about human rights and 
professional ethics and what the observed in clinical practice. This ‘street knowledge’ about 
how medicine really works and what it means to be a medical professional is shaped by 
organisational context, mentors and role models, the relationships they observe between 
members of the healthcare team, as well as what is not taught (Hafferty & O’Donnell, 2014). 
This can lead to both good and bad outcomes, but in poorly resourced settings such as are 
common in South Africa this is most likely to lead doctors to medically objectify patients and 
erode empathy and ethical practice.  
Medical expertise is essential in establishing the presence of disease or demonstrating the 
presence and extent of medical impairment (e.g. palpating a joint to establish deformities and 
tenderness in the case of osteoarthritis) and objectively measuring loss of physical function 
across the various body systems through established tests (e.g. range of motion of a joint or 
visual acuity.) However, medical expertise is not sufficient to establish disability and the 
biomedical model of disability has been criticised both in the South African system and more 
                                                
58 For example, at the University of Cape Town, medical students only engage with disability issues in one 
introductory course aimed at building professional skills that sensitises medical students to disability issues (UCT 
Handbook, 2015). This course was piloted in 2009 in response to a perceived lack of sensitivity to disability issues 
amongst medical students and professionals and is not related to disability assessment specifically (Amouson & 
Taukobong, 2010).  
59 This can include meetings, conferences, interactions with professors and peers. 
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generally, for its inability to account for individual experiences and social and structural factors 
that can be disabling. It has also proved inadequate in accounting for how chronic diseases, 
mental health issues and musculoskeletal complaints, which now generate the majority of work 
disability claims, affect individual work ability (Krone & Brage, 2008). Although the 
guidelines acknowledge that non-medical factors should be considered in borderline cases, it 
was clear that social and economic factors or sympathy for the patient should not define the 
assessment. Doctors were told during training sessions I attended that SASSA used a medical 
model of disability. Some overcame this uncertainty by not considering non-medical 
information at all, while others, as I will show in Section 5.4.2, developed their own 
approaches, weighing medical, personal and environmental factors differently in making their 
assessments of patient eligibility.  
How an impairment (or set of impairments) affects an individual, needs to be considered in 
terms of his or her activity limitations (especially work-specific activities) and participation 
restrictions, which may be highly individualised and contextual (WHO, 2002). However, most 
doctors are not adequately trained to use the tests and measurements that can be used to assess 
activity or participation restrictions (Govender & Miji, 2009: 229; Rondinelli & Katz, 2000). 
Unlike occupational therapists, physiotherapists or speech and language therapists, doctors 
without specialised training in rehabilitation or occupational medicine rarely focus on how 
impairment affects the individual outside of the consulting room and have limited knowledge 
on what type of work can be carried out and is available to an individual with a certain set of 
impairments (Zinn & Furutani 1996; Schneider, interview, 2013 June 14; Occupational 
therapist, interview, 2014 July 15). They are therefore more likely to assess disability in terms 
of the presence of a medical condition than in terms of actual functional limitations. 
Although doctors receive minimal training on impairment and disability assessment in their 
general training, there are specialised branches of medicine that focus on physical rehabilitation 
(e.g. physiatry) and occupational health, where doctors are trained to assess impairment, 
functional capacity and disability and in Europe doctors can specialise in social insurance 
medicine and become certified Social Insurance Physicians (De Boer, 2007; Berg, 2000). There 
is no training for physiatry or social insurance medicine in South Africa, but doctors can 
specialise in occupational medicine60 and acquire these skills through short trainings on specific 
                                                
60 Occupational health specialists receive comprehensive grounding in fitness, impairment and functional 
assessment tests and standards as well as the requirement for particular types of jobs in in terms of their physical 




disability assessment tools such as the International Classification of Functioning (ICF) and 
American Medical Association guidelines61, which are used by the Road Accident Fund and 
some private companies. However, outside of the requirement that SASSA assessors attend a 
short SASSA training session, no specialised training was necessary to conduct DG 
assessments and only two of the twenty-four doctors involved in this study had received any of 
this training. Treating doctors are not required to participate in SASSA training. This means 
that the doctors who conducted assessments very often did not have the adequate knowledge, 
skills or tools to assess disability in a consistent way. As one doctor pointed out during a 
SASSA training session I observed, “None of us have specific training related to disability and 
there is a lot of subjectivity in our choices.” (Dr Brown, SASSA training, February 2014) 
As rehabilitation professionals are arguably better equipped to address the functional and 
psychosocial aspects of assessments than most of the doctors conducting DG assessments, 
occupational therapists (OTs) were frustrated by the privileging of medical expertise in the 
assessment process. OTs also felt doctors did not have the time to conduct tests to establish 
functional capacity and argued that doctors typically did know enough about a patient’s 
personal history or background to conduct accurate assessments.   
“If a doctor has a patient and he decides ‘based on your medical condition I am not 
going to give you a grant’, but then he doesn't know how that impacts on function, on a 
person's bigger life roles or if he decides to give a person the grant, it’s going to be an 
unfair distribution of SASSA funds. No one person is the same…So if they would have a 
little bit of insight on a person's life and the context and the holistic person… but I think 
they don't have the time.” (Occupational therapist, 2014 April 25). 
4.2.2 Dealing with uncertainty  
The fact that doctors may not be experts on non-medical issues or trained in social security 
medicine, does not mean that they are not capable of using their past experiences to make 
reasonable decisions. The human experience of sickness is not exclusively biological and 
although they may not have formal training in this area, doctors often have to include these 
factors in other types of decision-making. Whilst medicine prides itself on being a scientific, 
evidence-based practice, doctors must also learn the pragmatism that is required to make 
diagnostic and treatment decisions in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity. Illness rarely 
presents itself as a textbook case and although making decisions with imperfect information 
                                                                                                                                                     
(CMSA, 2012). 




involves risks, doctors could not operate if they required epistemological certainty to act. 
(Beresford, 1991: 8).   
In the absence of formal training on disability assessment and unclear and sometimes 
unavailable guidelines, doctors used their own common sense approaches, filling the gaps with 
their own understanding of disability based on their professional experience and their 
discussions with colleagues, employing a pragmatic rationality in their clinical judgement on 
disability. In cases where claimants fell into grey areas and the patient’s ability to work 
depended on contextual determinants which they did not know of have the ability to assess, 
doctors developed their own rules of thumb to determine claimants’ employability.  
They could make referrals to occupational therapists, physiotherapists or other medical 
specialists where they needed further input on assessments before making a recommendation.62 
Doctors could delay making a decision, and recommend a six-month temporary grant for 
patients who appeared to be impaired, but whose medical condition had not been properly 
documented, investigated or treated; provided they were referred for further testing and 
treatment. Many doctors who were uncertain about decisions therefore recommended 
temporary grants in the hope that patients would in fact seek out further care. Particularly 
complicated cases could be referred for comprehensive work assessments with an OT at a 
specialised work assessment centre, where claimants would perform tasks and tests over a 
period of a full working day to establish their ability to function in the workplace. However, 
this was a time-consuming process for patients and some doctors considered it a burden to the 
system and therefore simply made a judgement call.  
When I asked doctors how they made decisions, they generally told me about their own 
informal set of assessment rules, based on their clinical experience, understanding of disability 
and conversations with colleagues. For instance, Dr Malik, who specialised in infectious 
diseases and who had never seen any guidelines, had developed his own set of criteria, infused 
with his own particular understanding of disablement and ‘deservingness’, which he explained 
as follows: 
Physically disabled, meaning a patient that is wheelchair-bound or otherwise disabled 
due to their medical condition; 
                                                
62 OTs at work assessment units at two different tertiary hospitals complained that many doctors, who wanted to 
avoid making decisions about eligibility or pressure from patients, abused the referral system by referring even 
straightforward cases to them.  
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Chronic and other incurable illness, including malignancies and chronic kidney 
disease; 
‘Demographic’ considerations. (As many of his patients were poor, he tried to 
differentiate between someone looking for easy money and someone who genuinely 
needed it because they were sick). (Field notes, 2014 May 6) 
One doctor even admitted that he didn’t give his decision-making very much thought and took 
a ‘thumb-suck approach”, which in South Africa has a meaning akin to pulling something out 
of thin air. The clinical mind is action driven and pragmatic in the face of needs to make 
decisions, and doctors come to rely on the authority of their own senses and trust in first hand 
experiences, more than abstract knowledge (Freidson, 1970). For this reason, doctors may 
evaluate the world more in terms of own experience than in terms of what authorities like 
SASSA tell them (Freidson, 1970).   
“You know a lot of medicine is about experience and feel, like so I think that experience 
helps. Like for example Prof S walking in the other day and saying ‘this patient needs a 
permanent grant, she's not going to recover.’ Now it's easy to say that when you've 
[patient] had a condition for over a year and you've [the doctor] been doing this for 
over three decades. It's very different when you are brand new on the block and we see 
patients at one point in time so that one point in time doesn't necessarily reflect how 
they are - especially in this hospital… I mean so much of medicine is about feel and 
about gut feeling. I just know and you're sometimes wrong and you're sometimes right 
and when you look back in retrospect it's easy to come to that conclusion, but when you 
were standing looking at them, how did you know that?” (Dr Harvey, interview, April 
2014) 
Dr Harvey’s feeling of ‘knowing’ is grounded in a deep experience-based practical wisdom that 
allows her to combine medical knowledge and practical skill to address the context-bound 
particularities of individual cases (cf. Montgomery, 2006). Like Dr Harvey, several other 
doctors spoke of the role of “gut feel” or making “judgment calls” based on precedent and the 
tacit knowledge that comes from experience, which Cassell (2002) called ‘experienced 
knowing’. 
Contrary to what Parsons (1951) argued, medical knowledge is particularistic rather than 
universal (Freidson, 1970). Studies of medical practice have consistently demonstrated that 
doctors very often rely on their clinical experience and tacit knowledge than on learned 
scientific knowledge (Greenhalgh, 1999; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992). Medical students are 
taught to diagnose patients using a hypothetico-deductive model of medical reasoning, using 
the process of differential diagnosis and existing research evidence to systematically work 
through and refine possible explanations for a given set of symptoms. However, as they 
develop expertise they refine their skills and knowledge through reflecting and learning from 
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their experiences rather than from technical guidelines. They learn rules of thumb, maxims and 
dictums that guide and simplify their diagnostic thinking, for example: “among competing 
hypotheses, favour the simplest one” (Occam’s razor), “when you hear hoof beats think of 
horses not zebras” and “uncommon presentations of common diseases are more common than 
common presentations of uncommon diseases” (Montgomery, 2006).   
Medical practice is commonly described as an ‘art’ as well as a science because of its applied 
nature and the need for doctors to make complex decisions in uncertain contexts. The processes 
through which doctors translate scientific knowledge into action and apply it to individual 
patients has fascinated scholars in both the sciences and social sciences for decades. Various 
theoretical explanations of clinical reasoning have emerged, mainly in cognitive and 
behavioural science, but no single theory yet fully accounts for how doctors think and make 
clinical judgements (Higgs & Loftus, 2008) 63. Scholars in the humanities and social sciences 
have recently taken up the question of clinical reasoning, arguing that it is a multi-dimensional, 
context-dependent, constructed and interpretive rather than scientific practice (Greenhlagh, 
1999; Mattingly, 1994; Montgomery, 1991, 2006; Higgs, 2008).64 The accumulation and 
application of specialised knowledge in other professions is also increasingly understood to be 
a hermeneutic process, developed through reflective practice rather than the mastery of 
technical knowledge (Eraut, 2004; Schön, 1983, 1987; Higgs, 2008).  Donald Schön describes 
the ‘topography’ of professional practice as made up both of a highland of problems that can 
easily be solved with research-based theory and technique and a ‘swampy lowland’ - a space of 
messy, confusing but usually important problems that cannot be solved with technical 
knowledge alone (1987: 3).  
Beresford (1991), Siegler (2000), Human (2011) and Montgomery (2006) describe doctors’ 
clinical judgment as a type of phronesis, an interpretive capacity and intellectual virtue that 
enables doctors to combine medical knowledge and practical skill to address the context-bound 
particularities and ethical aspects of individual cases. Oakeshott’s (1962) concept of practical 
knowledge has parallels with the concept of phronesis, as does Polanyi’s (1962, 1966) idea of 
tacit knowledge. This type of knowledge reflects a kind of know-how that can only accumulate 
                                                
63 There are numerous theories that explain clinical reasoning: cognitive processes such as scripts and schemas 
(Barrows & Feltovich, 1987; Bozhuizen & Schmidt, 1995) to the hypothetico-deductive models and Bayesian 
methods, to more heuristic, gestalt, narratological and interpretive processes (Greenlagh, 1999, Montgomery, 
2006).	   
64 This interpretive turn can be understood as a reaction to the Evidence Based Model of medicine, but is not 
unique to the study of medicine. 
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with experience and which eventually becomes almost unconsciously applied – e.g. driving a 
car. This capacity is not easily captured by science, learnt in medical school or bound by rules; 
rather, it is learnt through experience and practice and represents what is often described as the 
‘art’ of doctoring (Meershoek et al., 2007). Even ‘objective’ data from x-rays, stethoscopes and 
spirometers have to be interpreted and cannot be understood in isolation from the patient and 
their context and needs to be interpreted alongside the patient’s medical history and experience 
(Greenhlagh, 1999)65.   
This more intuitive and situational aspect of medical practice is not captured or easily governed 
by medical or administrative rules and guidelines. This does not mean that professional action 
is arbitrary, rather that its rationale is not fully explicable (Meershoek, 2007; 2012). Formal 
guidelines are based on “abstractions and generalizations of the practical situations in which 
they are intended to be applied” (Meershoek et al., 2007: 499), they assume that patients can be 
placed into homogenous categories that should be treated in the same way (Berg et al., 2000) 
and therefore do not necessarily capture the nuances of medical practices and individual 
patients. For this reason, medical doctors may resist what they perceive as the reductionist 
nature of these protocols (see Chapter 5 and 6). In order to provide the care that individual 
patients need, doctors sometimes have to side-step protocols and rely on their clinical 
judgement instead (Human, 2011; Harper, 2005). In the case of DG assessments, numerous 
doctors, especially those in treating sessions, resisted the idea of classifying patients and 
preferred to treat each client as an individual case, choosing to ignore the guidelines in favour 
of their own clinical experience and knowledge of the patient. 
4.3 Why doctors lend legitimacy to disability assessments disability    
Despite the limitations of medical knowledge and expertise in disability assessment, medical 
expertise remains highly valued in disability assessment and doctors continue to be important 
gatekeepers in most disability welfare systems, including South Africa’s - which is heavily 
reliant on doctors’ input. Policymakers and administrators want rules and standards that can be 
routinely and accurately applied. Medical knowledge presents what appears to be an 
                                                
65 Another useful and ancient concept of practical knowledge that is useful for understanding how doctors think 
and deal with uncertainty is mētis. Scott (1998) describes mētis as a set of practical skills and “acquired 
intelligence,” embedded in local experience that allows actors to respond rapidly to ambiguities and complexities 
in their environments. Although Scott refers to medical doctors as using mētis, it has not been widely used in the 




appealingly rational, scientific and objective way to establish whether medical complaints and 
impairments are genuine and to distinguish between people who should qualify or not qualify 
for benefits. 
There are other forms of professional (occupational therapy) and ‘lay’ expertise (patient 
knowledge or employer expertise) relevant to disability assessment. Medical knowledge is, 
however, the most powerful form of knowledge about the body and doctors’ input is valued 
over other forms of knowledge despite its failures struggles to measure disability because 
biomedicine has been ascribed scientific authority over matters of the body. Starr (1982) and 
Freidson (1970) have both attributed medicine’s connection to science as setting them apart 
from other health professions and central to their authority and legitimacy. Doctors have the 
officially approved monopoly over defining disease, health and treating illness (Freidson, 1970) 
and the power to decide what is ‘normal’ and what is pathological (Canguihelm, 1978) or 
deviant (Lorber, 1972).  
In addition to their biomedical knowledge, another reason why doctors play such a leading role 
in disability assessment world-wide is due to their perceived professionalism, which can be 
defined a set of values, behaviours, and relationships that underpin the trust the public has in 
doctors (Royal College of Physicians, 2005). Medical training is not only a process of 
knowledge acquisition but also a process of professional socialisation that initiates doctors into 
a ‘moral community’ (Durkheim, 1992) of professionals committed to explicitly normative 
goals and norms of acceptable behaviour. Doctors learn from other doctors how to interact with 
and treat patients and how to deal with ethical dilemmas; and through this process doctors come 
to see and interpret things in very particular ways. Being a doctor, therefore, becomes a “way of 
being in the world” (Higgs & Loftus, 2008: 214). Parsons (1951) imagined doctors in a 
normative or moral role, positioning them as altruistic, caring, trustworthy, community-
oriented, but ultimately neutral agents. Although this trust in doctors has been eroded to some 
extent, the idea that medicine is a moral enterprise and doctors should behave in objective and 
ethical ways remains central to how the profession positions itself (Freidson, 1970; Kleinman, 
1995). Society has high expectations of medical professionals; they are expected strive for 
excellence and display wisdom, strong character and integrity and a commitment to 
relieving human suffering, curing disease, true reliable knowledge and furthering the 
profession (Barlian, 2009; Freidson, 1972). Doctors are expected to hold humanistic values 
and adhere to a professional and ethical code of conduct. In South Africa this is expressed in 
the introduction to the Code of Conduct of the Health Professionals Council of South Africa 
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(HPCSA) which governs the medical profession in the country: 
“Medicine, dentistry and the medical sciences are professions based on a relationship 
of trust with patients...To be a good doctor, dentist or medical scientist requires a life-
long commitment to good professional and ethical practices and an overriding 
dedication to the good of one’s fellow humans and society. In essence the practice of 
medicine, dentistry and the medical sciences is a moral enterprise [emphasis added].” 
(HPCSA 2008: 1)  
Some of the core principals of good medical conduct are integrity, truthfulness, confidentiality, 
tolerance, justice, a respect for persons and human rights, non-maleficence and beneficence 
(HPCSA, 2002). Doctors are therefore trusted to make objective, unbiased decisions and have 
traditionally been given significant autonomy and discretion in terms of how they make 
decisions and deal with ethical dilemmas. However, as I will argue in Chapter 6, doctors may in 
fact struggle to be neutral parties in DG decisions. This is because these decisions are 
inherently normative and there are other pressures and constraints on them that shape their 
practice and because medicine alone is inadequate for assessing disability. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Doctors are asked to conduct disability assessments because of their medical expertise and 
because it is supposed that they think and operate in rational, objective and scientific ways. 
However, as this chapter has shown, medical assessments of impairments and disability are not 
straightforward and medical knowledge alone is not sufficient to conduct disability 
assessments.  
The social and medical aspects of disability cannot be easily disentangled and division between 
the clinical evaluation of the patient and social factors, including the interaction that the doctor 
has with the patient, is an artificial one. However, in conducting assessments doctors are told to 
consider these factors separately, but are also expected to bridge the gap between impairment 
and disability by incorporating psychosocial issues in cases of moderate impairment. Without 
the training and knowledge on how to do this, doctors in the current study generally created 
their own rules of thumb for making decisions. Using their clinical judgement, experience and 
conceptual understanding of disability, doctors developed a set of shortcuts or heuristics to 
simplify their decision-making. 
There are aspects to illness and disability that a purely biomedical model of illness cannot 
reveal, but current disability grant system treats the non-medical aspects of disability 
assessment as extraneous detail or what in the guidelines were referred to as “discriminating 
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factors” (SASSA, n.d.: 23). As a result, these issues, which are actually the most challenging 
part of disability assessment are ignored, and the focus has been on top-down compliance. 
Efforts to rationalise the assessment process that do not take the normative aspects and 
complexities of doctors’ reasoning into account only obscure the actual logic that doctors 
employ when making decisions (Meershoek et al., 2007). The disconnect between the 
guidelines and the actual reasoning required to make decisions result in SASSA guidelines 
being dismissed by some doctors as arbitrary and unhelpful. It also results in rigid application 
of a purely medical model of disability, which is not helpful or useful in cases of severe or 
minimal impairment.  
As I have discussed to some extent and will discuss in later chapters, these informal rules are 
influenced by a myriad of other factors, including the circumstances of their work in the 
SASSA and healthcare bureaucracies, their own personal norms and standards and related ideas 
of ‘deservingness,’ and the nature of their interactions with individual claimants. The decision 
on whether to recommend a grant is not only an administrative and medical decision but one 
that relates to human experiences and which at same time is implicitly normative. The 
inescapably qualitative nature of the disability experience means that doctors may not be able 
to act as the objective and rational arbiters of questions around disability and illness that 
welfare administrations hope them to be (Stone, 1984; Montgomery, 2006; Meershoek et al., 
2007; Mashaw, 1983). However, the fact that the disability category is ‘fuzzy,’ can be defined 
in multiple ways does not mean it should be treated as if it is not real or totally relative.  
Much as it is important to consider the ‘person,’ their context and their experience of illness 
and disability in assessments, disease and impairment are also rooted in real biological 
processes, of which doctors do have expert knowledge. The fact that disability has dimensions 
that exceed the bounds medical expertise or knowledge, does not mean that medical expertise 
and the biomedical components of illness (disease) and disability (impairment) are not 
important in decision-making (Cassells, 2002: 24). On the contrary, as Brown, (1995) noted in 
his critique of social constructionism in medical sociology, “we are, after all, talking about 
phenomena which occur in people's bodies. If we do not take seriously this reality, our search 
for socially constructed definitions will be very short-sighted.” (Brown, 1995) This opens up 




CHAPTER 5:  Doctors as street-level bureaucrats: the role and position of medical 
doctors within the social assistance system in South Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the tension between professional expertise and bureaucratic 
accountability that is specific to medical doctors serving as DG gatekeepers. I show how 
doctors navigate between their role as medical professionals and their bureaucratic role as DG 
assessors for the state and respond to the pressures, constraints, incentives and disincentives 
within their environment. 
Although medical doctors are typically considered a professional group, in their gatekeeping 
role as disability assessors, doctors operate as street-level bureaucrats in SASSA’s DMM 
model. In order to make decisions about patients’ eligibility for grants, doctors must apply the 
protocols and rules that govern DG allocation to individual patients. Baron (1992) suggests that 
in doing so, South African doctors take on the role of medical professional on the one hand and 
detective and judge for the state on the other. They are simultaneously expected to follow the 
rules and bureaucratic processes of SASSA’s DMM and use their professional judgement to 
evaluate the case at hand by engaging in ‘thought-work’ (Heyman, 1995).  
Having outlined the DG systems’ broad design in Chapter 3, here I examine the material 
organisation and everyday realities of the DG assessment process and what doctors do in 
practice. The authority, discretion, role expectations, workload of and level of support received 
by frontline workers, as well as their beliefs about their environments have distinguishable 
effects on the dynamics of worker-client interactions (Jewell & Glaser, 2006; Meyers & 
Vorsanger, 2007). Drawing on Lipsky’s (2010) work on street-level bureaucrats, I look at how 
the organisation and management of the DMM motivated and constrained the actions of 
medical professionals in the DG system as they attempted to cope with uncertainties and work 
pressures in this environment and straddle the often conflicting demands of SASSA and 
claimants and their own personal and professional interests. I show how doctors developed 
their own systems of meaning and coping strategies that simplified their decision-making and 
lightened their workload in the context of an overburdened health system, poor record-keeping 
and pressure from patients. 
As the majority of assessments were conducted by SASSA assessors at the primary healthcare 
level, this chapter focuses predominantly on this context and their work. The specific case of 
treating doctors and the particularities of carrying out assessments in hospital settings will, 
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however, be briefly considered.  
5.2 Accountability vs. discretion in disability assessments   
There is an inherent conflict between the logics of SASSA’s bureaucracy and medical 
professionalism. Whilst SASSA wants doctors to make standardised decisions, doctors are 
trained to respond to individual needs. In bureaucracies, worker compliance is achieved via 
supervision, whereas professionals are generally socialised to comply with the norms and 
standards of the profession they belong to (Scott, 1966). 
Medicine is the archetypal learned profession and is not well understood by lay people. This 
makes it difficult for the non-medical public to evaluate the work of doctors (Horobin, 1983). 
While doctors’ legitimacy and right to practice medicine depends ultimately on sanction and 
registration by the state (Doyal, 1979 in Wainwright et al.  2015), over time medicine 
developed the distinct legitimate authority to regulate its own work (Freidson, 1970). 
Historically doctors have had significant de facto discretion and independence in how they 
diagnose, treat and assess patients. However, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the 
practice of medicine is becoming increasingly bureaucratised and standardised. Protocols, 
guidelines and assessment criteria based on randomised control trials and observational studies 
are now commonly used throughout medicine in an effort to rationalise expert judgements and 
professional action, make medical-decision making more transparent, increase professional 
accountability and reduce variation in and improve quality of care (Meershoek et al., 2007; 
Timmermans & Berg, 2010; Bowker & Star, 1999; Berg et al., 2000).  
Lipsky (2010) argued that using their discretion, street-level bureaucrats develop coping 
mechanisms to simplify their work in response to environmental conditions and conflicting 
demands. As this behaviour can undermine policy intentions, organisations like SASSA seek to 
curb bureaucratic discretion in a pursuit of a Weberian neutral, rational bureaucracy and 
“bureaucratic justice” - accurate and consistent decision-making by bureaucrats (Mashaw, 
1983). This is what SASSA has attempted to do with its DMM. However, it is difficult to and 
undesirable to completely eliminate medical discretion. SASSA guidelines, rules and general 
medical standards largely eliminate the possibility for doctors to exercise “strong discretion” - 
the potential to make decisions unbound from any authority in making decisions - but do not 
eliminate the “weak discretion” that exists in the space between rules, where it might be 
necessary to make judgment calls (Dworkin, 1978).  
SASSA has struggled to constrain doctors’ discretion and monitor doctors’ work because of 
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their professional status, specialised knowledge and resistance to bureaucratic oversight. While 
curbing the discretion and increasing control of lower level interface workers can help to 
decrease bureaucratic drift and curb corruption, in the case of professionals it may constrain 
their ability to be responsive to individuals and they may value their professional obligations to 
patients over efforts by outside bodies to regulate their work. Others have shown that although 
doctors appreciate guidelines and protocol, they tend to use them pragmatically, applying them 
when they practically useful and ignoring them when they overlook individual patients’ needs 
or their own private and professional goals (Human, 2011; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). While 
doctors in this study appreciated efforts to standardise the system and make their decision-
making around DGs easier and more objective, guidelines are not sufficient to guide doctors’ 
practice and limited oversight made it easy for doctors to ignore them.  
5.3 The daily work of DG assessment   
The organisational environment that doctors worked in was an important factor in structuring 
their decision-making behaviour and how they treated claimants. Hoff argues that doctors think 
and act subjectively in response to their work environments, in ways that do not always accord 
with the norms and ideals of the medical profession but which helps them to ‘normalise’ their 
work lives and cope with uncertainty in their surroundings.” (Hoff, 2010: 54).   
The DG assessment process varied in hospitals, where treating physicians filled out DG 
assessment forms for patients during outpatient consultations. Therefore, for the purpose of 
clarity, this section focuses on the nature of assessments conducted at the clinic level and the 
specificities of hospital assessments are discussed separately in Section 5.3.1. Contrasting the 
nature and context of assessments conducted at the PHC level by SASSA assessors with 
those conducted at hospital-level by treating physicians demonstrates also demonstrates 
how organisational context framed the doctor-patient interaction and shaped assessment 
outcomes. This is because the pressures, constraints and rewards in these environments 
differed.  
Within the healthcare system, SASSA assessors were considered ‘outside doctors’ because they 
operated independently of the clinic structure. They were technically ‘managed’ by the DoH 
via staffing agencies but these agencies seemed to do little to regulate doctors’ work. SASSA 
assessors typically worked at a number of different clinics during the week. This ‘freelance’ 
arrangement allowed doctors to work shorter, more flexible hours than in other more 
demanding areas of medicine. Many of the doctors considered doing assessments to be ‘easy’ 
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or ‘laid-back’ work because it is almost exclusively paperwork based. Disability assessments 
work therefore appealed to retired doctors, those caring for children who needed flexible part-
time work and doctors with private practices who were looking for some additional income. 
Conducting assessments was also a form of transitional or temporary work for doctors waiting 
for a permanent post to become available. As it was also low paid, doctors therefore had little 
motivation or incentive to carry out this work particularly well.  
I observed that as a result of poor communication between SASSA, agencies and the clinic, 
clinic staff were not always sure who the SASSA doctor was or when they were scheduled to 
visit the clinic. It was also more difficult to keep the doctor accountable and I noticed that 
several of the doctors arrived extremely late, keeping patients waiting for hours. This frustrated 
both claimants and clinic staff. On the other hand, assessors at some clinics complained that 
because they were not treating patients their needs in terms of space and examination facilities 
were given low priority. Doctors were often placed in public use areas and beds were not 
always available as required in the Service Level Agreement with the DoH. In one particularly 
memorable case, the doctor was sharing a room with nurses who regularly came into the room 
to make tea and fetch things from their handbags during assessments, sometimes even making 
casual conversation with the patient or doctor. This was disruptive, undermined the privacy of 
the consultation and demotivated doctors. As locum doctors were not contracted directly to the 
Department of Health, they were in a weak position to complain to facility managers about the 
resources made available to them. As SASSA had no involvement with the employment of 
these doctors or the facilities they work in, doctors had to rely on their locum managers to 
represent their interests, which some complained was ineffective (Observations SASSA 
Training, 2014 February 19-20). This meant left assessors feeling frustrated and isolated from 
official structures – possibly inclining them to take official rules less seriously.  
The healthcare system in South Africa is generally highly bureaucratised by paperwork and 
standardised practises, but the bureaucratisation of the physician’s role was particularly salient 
in the case of SASSA assessor, whose interactions were very much structured by SASSA’s 
managerial processes and the standardised assessment tool. Patients became SASSA’s ‘clients’ 
and doctors were expected to offer good customer service rather than form the type of 
relationship with patients more typical in a treating setting. Working as a SASSA assessor is 
repetitive, sometimes mundane work. Doctors worked through the list of patients, filling out the 
same form over and over again, day after day. In doing so, they developed routines of practice 
and standardised ways of communicating with patients and their actions become a form of 
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“people processing” (Prottass, 1979). This routinisation did not, however, result in 
standardisation in decision-making and despite the guidelines and the standardised forms that 
doctors used to report their findings and conclusions, there was significant variation in how 
doctors engaged with the patients they assessed and the processes they developed to deal with 
patients.  
The SLAs between SASSA and DoH districts stipulated that no more than forty claimants 
should be booked per clinic per day. This left twelve minutes per patient, including paper work 
and presuming no time between patients. Although not all doctors saw this many patients a day, 
doctors in high-demand areas reported cases where, because of poor process management, up to 
sixty patients had arrived to be assessed. This put significant pressure on these doctors in terms 
of the time they had available per assessment. Both for themselves and the patients waiting in 
line – many of them from the early hours of the morning – doctors needed to work quickly and 
would watch the time, consciously speeding up when they started to fall behind. Many doctors 
rushed through the assessment forms, crossing out any sections that they felt were not directly 
relevant to the patient, filling in the bare amount of information in each section. This tendency 
made quality assurance difficult as this was conducted purely on the basis of the form. This 
could negatively affect patients because the quality assurance officer could alter a doctors’ 
recommendation if insufficient information was provided on the form to support their 
recommendation.  
As the inspection of a medical file was considered a legally acceptable form of assessment, 
physical examination was not compulsory and due to time pressures, infrequently used as a 
method of assessment. Sometimes beds were not even available in the assessment room for this 
purpose. Only four out of the eleven SASSA assessors I observed conducted physical 
examinations. Although doctors were meant to report on the weight, height and blood pressure 
of the patient, very few took these measurements and either did not fill in this information on 
the form or used measurements already in the file.  
Although guided by the assessment forms, doctors were able to structure their interaction with 
the patient as they wished and generally developed their own standard ‘scripts’ and assessment 
approaches, based on what they thought was important to consider in decision-making. These 
often diverged from SASSA’s guidelines (see Chapter 6 for further discussion on doctors’ 
framings of DG eligibility). Some never questioned patients about their educational or 
employment histories and focused exclusively on functionality or medical diagnosis. Others 
focused more on employability and asked patients about their level of educational attainment, 
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when they had last worked, what type of work they had done and why patients felt they could 
not work and combined these responses with their medical findings to establish an applicant’s 
employability. 
Doctors also found various ways to categorise patients and simplify their decision-making. 
With limited times to think through decisions, doctors developed practical and routine ways of 
classifying and treating patients, based on their own rules and stereotypes, the development and 
application of which is discussed in detail in the next chapter. One quick way of establishing 
claimants’ eligibility was determining their past DG application history and the success of these 
applications. This history provided an indication of whether the patient was likely to be a 
serious case or not and helped different doctors keep their decision-making consistent. In 
addition to asking claimants directly, most also kept track of the date and outcome of each 
assessment and the reason for recommending or refusing to recommend a grant, by making a 
note in the claimant’s folder. Assessors could therefore scan the folder to see whether they or 
another doctor had made notes about any previous assessments. This was particularly useful for 
identifying cases where a person’s condition was not improving and perhaps a permanent grant 
should be considered. It is also helped in identifying cases where patients were repeatedly 
applying for the grant, often despite not qualifying, as was the case in the assessment below. 
The doctor saw from previous notes that the patient had visited the clinic for DG applications 
more often than for any treatment and called her a “chancer” because (as he saw it) she had 
admitted that she could work but did not seem interested in working. 
He asks the patient, “Why can’t you work anymore?” She is quite agitated and speaks 
very rapidly saying that she was only getting paid R80 as day as domestic worker. He 
asks her, “If you could get work would you?” She says “yes” and then she proceeds to 
complain about how the government stopped her CSG because her child was now over 
18. The doctor asks her what is wrong with her – she says she has a headache, is tired 
and that she has asthma. The doctor examines her chest and says that the asthma 
doesn’t look too bad. As he looks through her file he asks, “When last did you see the 
doctor?” and then answers the question himself, “The last time you saw the doctor was 
August last year – you can’t be that sick.” I see in the folder that she has applied twice 
before and that both time she was DNQ [does not qualify]. The doctor is very sceptical 
about her and quickly gets rid of her. (Field notes, 2014 22 July). 
This reliance on past notes could bias doctors’ decision-making and disadvantage patients who 
had been refused the grant in the past. Dr Du Toit mentioned that he had seen long negative 
notes written in claimants’ files, which were likely to influence any doctor conducting 
assessments in future.  
During training doctors were strongly discouraged from telling patients whether they would 
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recommend the grant and the NSAT form was designed to prevent patients from seeing the 
doctor’s recommendation on the assessment form. This was intended to reduce the likelihood 
of negative reactions from patients and because doctors’ recommendations could be altered by 
the quality assessor if selected for pre-application quality assurance. Doctors typically followed 
this protocol and doctors ended the assessment by telling patients to return to SASSA in two 
weeks to apply. This neutral way of ending the conversation usefully closed off opportunities 
for the patient to probe the doctor about the outcome of their assessment. However, some 
doctors did seem to derive satisfaction from being able to tell patients they felt were ‘deserving’ 
that they had recommended a grant and shared this news with claimants. Sometimes doctors 
also chose to risk having a heated interaction with a claimant in order to explain to them why 
they did not qualify, but this was less common.  
Not telling claimants about the outcome of their grant was not necessarily effective in reducing 
the pressure on doctors. According to doctors, SASSA officials at local offices often diverted 
negative reactions by rejected applicants from themselves to doctors, who they explained had 
refused to recommend a grant. Although SASSA discouraged this practice, regional and 
national office representatives acknowledged that officials sometimes failed to communicate 
that the decision was in fact made by SASSA, not by the doctor. This led rejected angry 
applicants to return to the clinics to confront doctors, often aggressively. Blaming doctors in 
this way reinforced patient misunderstandings about the role of the doctor in the system and 
undermined other efforts to reduce patient pressure on doctors. This was discussed by doctors 
at the training session:  
Dr Y: Or they say “doctor didn’t write clearly” and that is why it was rejected.   
SASSA official: It should not be like that. 
Dr Y: It puts you on the frontline. They are aggressive. 
Dr X: In Gugulethu they hit a doctor once. 
SASSA official: This also happened at the Overberg office. It should not be the doctor 
explaining. It should be the SASSA official because otherwise you open yourself up. 
Aside from time constraints and pressure from patients to recommend the grant, doctors faced 
numerous other challenges during the assessment process. Given the importance of the file in 
the assessment, assessors were heavily dependent on the quality of the notes written by treating 
doctors. Unfortunately, these were often illegible and inadequate and patient files often did not 
contain the necessary test results, reports or scans to allow the assessor to make a fully-
informed decision. This was especially likely if the patient had been seen at the hospital level in 
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past or if the patient had moved between clinics. Although a small minority of patients brought 
referral letters or personal copies of reports or x-rays with them to add to the information in 
their file, the majority of patients lacked evidence of treatment outside their main clinic. In 
cases where a claimant’s file had not arrived from another clinic, doctors would have to turn 
patients away, telling him or her to return either with their file or a letter from a treating source 
that provided an overview of their medical history (or at least their main presenting complaint).  
One doctor complained that requests for supporting evidence such as x-rays or blood-tests for 
DG assessments were given low priority, but this did not seem to be the case everywhere. A 
few doctors, who regularly conducted assessments at the same sites, appeared to have built 
good relationships with staff at the facility and were easily able to refer patients for tests within 
the clinic. In order to obtain reports from specialists or undergo more specialised tests, patients 
very often had to be seen at the hospital level. Some tests, such as a lung-function tests and 
work assessments could only be conducted at the two tertiary hospitals in Cape Town. This 
resulted in backlogs and created a barrier to access for those who could not afford the costs of 
travel or paying medico-legal fees at hospitals to get their documents. Brodkin and Majmundar 
(2010: 827) call non-participation on the basis of “bureaucratic run around” and its associated 
costs, “administrative exclusion”.  
Although doctors could recommend a temporary grant of six months whilst supporting medical 
evidence was obtained or while the claimant received further treatment, this was only meant to 
apply in cases where the claimant was clearly impaired. In practice, this incentivised assessors 
to avoid making concrete decisions on a patient’s eligibility and many would repeatedly 
recommend the grant for six-month periods, using them as what de Villiers (2006: 3) described 
as “convenient half-grants.” During training, one doctor raised her concern that this supported 
what she called the “culture of the six-month grant.” Applicants could only receive the 
permanent grant if substantial evidence of permanent disablement can be obtained, which was 
often difficult and, given the perception that SASSA was very strict in reviewing permanent 
grants, doctors were hesitant to recommend them, recommending one year temporary grants 
instead. Whilst recommending temporary grants helped doctors to alleviate the pressure on 
them as decision-makers, this resulted in some patients being on temporary grants for several 
years, which was stressful and inconvenient for applicants.  
Many of the applicants could not read or write and had very poor medical knowledge. This 
made it difficult for patients and doctors to communicate and language barriers very often 
exacerbated this. Many patients had poor knowledge of their medical histories and treatment 
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and did not know the name or dosage of the medication they had been prescribed. In some 
cases, this made it difficult for doctors to fill in gaps in a patient’s file. The language barrier 
between Xhosa-speaking patients and English or Afrikaans speaking doctors is a general issue, 
which interferes with the clinical process at all levels of the healthcare system in South Africa 
(Swartz, 1998; Swartz & Drennan, 2000).  This can lead doctors to dehumanise patients and 
practice what some South African scholars have called “veterinary medicine” (Crawford, 1999; 
Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2007). In many cases I observed, both related and unrelated to the 
DG, it was obviously difficult for patients to clearly articulate their medical histories and 
functional limitations and communicate their experiences in the way they wanted to. It also 
made it harder for doctors to ask patients questions about their conditions or explain SASSA 
processes and requirements to them. This was particularly problematic at clinics and hospitals 
where there was a mix of patients from different racial and linguistic backgrounds and at the 
PHC level where patient loads were higher and doctors were time extremely time-constrained.  
I will discuss how this affected the doctor-patient dynamic further in Chapter 7, but as it is 
important in understanding doctors’ work context, I will briefly highlight some of the 
difficulties it created for doctors and strategies they devised for overcoming this this issue. 
Although Xhosa-speaking doctors were placed in some of the busier township clinics, this was 
definitely not always the case and on three occasions, I encountered English or Afrikaans 
speaking doctors working in predominantly Xhosa-speaking areas. Although formal translation 
services are available in hospitals, this service appears almost non-existent in clinics and I did 
not observe these services in use at either hospitals or clinics. In most cases where translation 
was necessary, nurses, administrative staff, and even other patients, were drawn into the room 
to translate. At one facility, a Xhosa-speaking woman, who spoke reasonably good English had 
capitalised on claimants’ frustrations at being unable to communicate with assessors by 
providing informal translation services, accompanying patients into the room with the assessor 
to act as a translator, presumably for some sort of fee.  
Both finding and using a translator can be time consuming and frequently SASSA assessors 
(and occasionally treating doctors) chose to stumble through consultations without translators, 
focusing on the contents of file rather than interacting with the patient. Two of the PHC clinics 
in Xhosa-speaking areas attended by doctors who did not speak Xhosa, had made a nurse 
available to assist with translation and clerical work, but this was not always the case. Dr 
Vrede, for instance, worked in a Xhosa area, spoke no Xhosa and had no translator available to 
her. Although she sometimes called in other patients to assist, this was too time consuming to 
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do in every case and she admitted to sometimes fabricating patients’ ‘self-reported’ complaints, 
basing them on what she read on the file rather than making the effort to try and communicate 
with them or find someone to translate.  
In summary, the freelance, sub-contracted nature of DG assessment work meant that there was 
little management of SASSA assessors work and lines of communication were often unclear. 
Their isolation from any real management structure meant that it was difficult to hold doctors 
accountable or for them to communicate about their frustrations. Doctors worked in difficult 
conditions, seeing large numbers of patients, which incentivised them to rush through their 
work. This led them to take numerous short-cuts, which had implications for both the quality of 
both their interaction with claimants and the assessments they produced.   
5.3.1 The assessment at hospital-level 
Doctors conducting DG assessments in state hospitals completed assessments forms in addition 
to their regular and already significant workloads and unlike SASSA assessors they were not 
paid for this work. Doctors working in the public sector in South Africa do so in an 
environment of significant emotional stress, punishingly long hours, staff shortages and poor 
working conditions, getting paid significantly less than doctors working in the private sector 
(George et al., 2013). The hospitals where I worked were considerably better resourced than 
public hospitals in many other provinces. Nevertheless, the specialists I engaged with worked 
long, difficult hours. As a result, DG applications were therefore often considered burdensome 
and annoying in a healthcare system that already required doctors to spend a large amount of 
time completing forms. 
He says that in a busy clinic when a DG form appears ‘faces often drop’. This is 
because people are usually coming forward with ‘soft indications’ and the forms are 
long and time consuming and a lot of doctors feel extremely frustrated by this when they 
have a lot of patients to see (Field notes, 2014 March 14).  
 Orthopaedists were perhaps the most frustrated by DG requests because, based on interviews 
with management staff, social workers, OTs and doctors across a number of specialties, it 
seemed that orthopaedic and infectious diseases (which dealt with TB and HIV) departments, 
received the highest number of DG requests. To save time, doctors would therefore typically 
only agree to fill out an assessment form if they have already decided to recommend a grant. 
Very often the task of filling them out would then be allocated to the most junior doctor or an 
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intern working in the clinic66. Although they would often tell a patient upfront that they were 
not eligible for a grant (and refuse to fill out a form), if pressurised, doctors would fill out the 
form, indicating that the patient did not qualify. Some others would recommend a six-month 
grant just to get rid of a patient.  
In her study of the professional socialisation of trainee doctors, Mizrahi (1985) argued that to 
cope with long hours and stress in environments where they felt unappreciated and overworked, 
doctors learnt to adopt a negative, “getting rid of patients” (GROP) mentality that objectified 
patients and encouraged them to avoid interacting with patients. In short, doctors felt abused 
and neglected and passed this onto how they treated patients.  
In Cape Town public hospitals where doctors, especially registrars who are in the process of 
specialising, have large patient loads and work incredibly long doctors, people ‘looking’ for 
grants are quickly placed into the category of patient undeserving of their time. In treating 
settings, doctors were quick to pass people wanting DG assessments onto more junior doctors 
and work assessment units, where occupational therapists complained that they received large 
numbers of ‘inappropriate’ referrals from doctors trying to avoid spending time making 
decisions. However, although I observed far fewer cases in hospital outpatient settings where 
patients were not eligible for grants than I did in PHC settings, I observed that doctors were 
generally sensitive and kind to patients despite their feelings of frustration and irritation. This 
could, of course, could also be the result of my presence in the room (See Appendix A on 
reflections on the research process).  
Some doctors were hesitant to recommend temporary grants because of the commonly held 
view that those who enter the system become stuck there and return repeatedly to the hospital 
for renewals after they have recovered and are no longer receiving care. One head of 
department at one of the hospitals indicated that he had a personal policy of refusing to 
recommend social grants for this reason. He instead referred these patients down to the PHC 
level for assessment. A social worker De Waal indicated that some doctors she worked with 
also refused to recommend grants on a similar basis: 
“I’ll get somebody who will say “don’t give this person a DG because I’m the one that 
follows them up at clinic level [outpatient] and then I’ve got to tell them that they can’t 
get for another year or another 6 months. Then I sit with the problem of having to tell 
them and we’re the bad object in everything.” (Focus group, social workers, 2014 
                                                
66 Interns are not technically allowed to complete DG assessments, but sometimes the intern would fill them out 





Despite opportunities for more multidisciplinary input from other health professionals, like at 
the PHC level, doctors in hospitals were also faced the challenge of missing notes and files and 
generally poor recordkeeping, which made assessments difficult. As patients receiving 
specialist care in hospitals were presumed to be more severe and given the logistical difficulty 
of training and overseeing all doctors working in hospitals, treating doctors were given 
significantly more discretion in making recommendations and they were not involved in 
SASSA’s training efforts.  This meant that doctors in treating settings were often unfamiliar 
with SASSA’s requirements and processes. One doctor at De Waal hospital had worked with 
SASSA DMU to offer training sessions at the hospital on a number of occasions but this had 
largely fizzled out. Other doctors complained about the lack of guidelines, training and 
feedback they obtained from SASSA on their recommendations and expressed their frustration 
when they learnt that patients they were actively treating faced long delays in receiving grants. 
This lack of engagement with and trust in SASSA left them feeling little responsibility towards 
the SASSA system and were therefore more likely to favour their own judgements and patient’s 
needs over SASSA’s requirements.  
5.4 Doctors’ responses to SASSA’s regulation of their work.  
Treating doctors and SASSA assessors engaged with SASSA differently and had different 
perceptions of the organisation’s effort to regulate their work. Treating doctors, who did not 
attend SASSA trainings, were generally totally unaware of SASSA’s guidelines and quality 
assurance processes - only two of the doctors working in hospitals had ever been exposed to 
these guidelines or had engaged directly with SASSA staff. All SASSA assessors were, 
however, aware of the presence of a quality assurance officer and the fact that their 
recommendations could be overruled in the pre-application phase and were therefore more 
cautious in their recommendations. However, none of these doctors had any contact with the 
quality assurer or knew who he was67. This lack of transparency and professional engagement 
made some doctors suspicious of the quality assurance process and the right of another doctor 
to make changes to their recommendations without seeing the patient or their file.   
                                                
67 Ideally the quality assurer would interact directly with doctors and during interviews both the QA and the DMU 




“Another doctor will review your work. What other doctor? Who is he? What right has 
he got to review my work? What is he doing when he reviews my work? Is he looking at 
the writing or is he trying to understand the patient? He’s not there with the patient so 
how the hell is he going to know anything about what you really think about that patient 
and that choice - your choice to give him this or give him that?” (Interview, Dr Brown, 
2014 April 4) 
“Feedback is just appalling. Doesn't exist. So, you know occasionally one of my 
patients comes and says, ‘they refused me the grant.’ Do you think anyone ever tells 
me? Do you think I can phone anyone to find out why? It’s just completely impossible. 
You know, how can you expect to run any sort of standard, rigorous process without 
giving feedback to the people you are trusting to make the decisions you know? It’s a 
joke.” (Dr Wright, Interview, 2014 April 8) 
 
Studies of welfare bureaucrats in Sweden (Eggebø, 2013) and occupational doctors in Holland 
(Berg et al., 2000) indicate that decision-makers sometimes prefer less rather than more 
discretion and autonomy, especially when the legitimacy of individual decision-making is 
questioned.  In the case of the DG, doctors were divided in their opinions on the usefulness and 
appropriateness of the guidelines. Treating doctors criticised SASSA for not making guidelines 
and training available to them, whilst SASSA assessors often criticised the guidelines for being 
vague and unclear or not comprehensive enough. Some assessors carried a copy of the 
guidelines with them and referred to them regularly in their decision-making, whilst others felt 
they were incomplete or impractical and did not help assist them in the most difficult aspect of 
assessment – deciding how a medical diagnosis actually impacts an individual’s ability to work. 
These complaints indicate that doctors desired decision-making support and guidance that 
would limit their subjectivity and responsibility for the decisions they made.  
Dr Soet says that when they started they gave her the guidelines and you have the 
opportunity to discuss it with them. The guidelines are vague but you get the gist. The 
difficult things is that you don’t know how a condition takes its toll on a person. It is 
very subjective and it probably means a lot of people are cut out. The guidelines need to 
be more clear-cut on the over 50s. For example someone who has epilepsy and is over 
50 – it is so hard for him/her to get a job. If the epilepsy is controlled technically they 
should not get a grant and should get a job, but you know how unlikely that is. (Field 
notes, 2014 January 29)  
On the other hand, some doctors were very sceptical about the guidelines and the right of 
SASSA to regulate their work. As they had not been consulted on the guidelines doctors felt 
little ownership in the process and therefore found them easy to dismiss, as was the case with 
Dr Wright.  
“You need to have them and look at them as a quick easy reference because number 
one, we're working flat out [laughs]. I'm not joking when I say that part of my 
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consideration is “well do I have time to fill this out today?” So you're working flat out, 
you want to make decisions as quickly as possible and if you don't have a reference in 
front of you, you...it becomes more of a judgement call. That’s what doctors do all the 
time - they take shortcuts by making a judgement call based on past experience. If you 
want people to stick to guidelines you've got to have the guidelines in their faces all the 
time and you've got to have guidelines that make sense. That’s only going to happen if 
there's adequate consultation in drawing the guidelines up…So there needs to be a 
transparent process to how guidelines are drawn up, which there hasn't been - none of 
us really understand how the guidelines came to be. So we don't own them, so we don't 
really care about them. In South Africa [laughs], laws are meant to be broken. So it’s 
just another law.” (Dr Wright, Interview, 2 April 2014)  
Dr Wright’s statement: “laws are meant to be broken,” also speaks to the more general 
tendency of doctors to bend and break the rules to help patients and themselves within an 
underresourced and inflexible healthcare system. For example, orthopaedists chose to ignore 
the state’s regulations against offering total joint replacements to patients under sixty because 
they felt it unfairly disabled people who, with surgery, could lead fully-functional lives. 
Dr Brown was particularly sceptical of SASSA’s processes and although he took his work as an 
assessor seriously and thought a lot about how he should make decisions, he conducted 
assessments very much on his own terms. He had strong confidence in his own medical 
judgement and did not feel the need to justify his decisions to SASSA or follow their guidelines 
despite the fact that he was employed by them to specifically conduct these assessments. He 
argued that “SASSA lives in a safe world with little blocks”, without any real connection to the 
actual DG assessment process. He felt that his interaction with the patient and expert opinion 
was what really counted and that this should be taken at face value by SASSA. See Quote 5.1 
Appendix C.  
He provided very little evidence of his clinical decision-making on the form, writing a set of 
notes for patient’s files instead to help him keep track of patients and to provide other doctors 
with insights on his work. Before each patient arrived he would cross-out over half of the form 
with his pen, never intending to fill in any of this information because he thought it is 
irrelevant. For example, he would not list patients’ medications on the form (a requirement) 
because he did not believe it was relevant to the assessment and that this information in 
patient’s files was often unreliable and illegible. He also felt this made it impossible to establish 
whether someone was on optimum treatment. Although perhaps grounded in some genuine 
concerns about the assessment process, this behaviour was not only a dereliction of duty but 
jeopardised patients’ chances of receiving a grant because the lack of medical evidence on the 
form would likely result in the decision being overturned if subject to auditing by the medical 
 
 130 
quality assurer. This did in fact happen and (quite coincidentally) the quality assurance officer 
showed me a form where Dr Brown had recommended a permanent grant on the basis of an 
HIV diagnosis with no supporting information.  
“Isn’t that terrible? The patient is being treated with total disrespect. The system is 
being treated with total disrespect. The doctor says “I've got the power to make 
decisions” and if I weren’t quality assuring this, this doctor's recommendation would 
go through. Do you understand what I am saying? Here, scratches, here [referring to 
crossed-out sections]. There is no evidence to confirm the diagnosis because the 
medication is not stated - just that” [pointing to the word “HIV” written on the form]. 
(QA officer, interview, 2014 March 31). 
In general, doctors expressed a strong desire for more engagement with SASSA around the 
decisions which many of them found difficult to make and a system that they identified as 
problematic. They wanted to collaborate more in drawing up guidelines, meet with the medical 
quality assurer and have discussions with their peers. The Western Cape SASSA disability 
management unit appeared to understand this need, but lacked the capacity to create these 
opportunities outside of fairly cursory annual training sessions (DMU official, 2014 June 27; 
QA Officer, 2014 March 31).  
5.5 Conclusion 
In their work assessing patients for DGs, doctors become gatekeepers to state welfare benefits. 
They are subject to the pressures, constraints and rewards of both the overburdened public 
health system and SASSA’s DMM, but also used their professional discretion to challenge or 
subvert attempts to regulate and standardise their behaviour. They faced significant social 
pressure and coercion from patients to recommend the grant and introduced conflict into 
doctor-patient interactions and undermining relationships between treating doctors and their 
patients. 
SASSA’s guidelines do not sufficiently cover the challenges that they face. SASSA was also 
unable to provide them with the support they needed in making decisions. Despite better 
regulation and general improvements in the functioning of the system, pockets of discretion 
remain and doctors used this space to develop their own systems and routines for managing 
patients, simplify their decision-making and cope with the general stresses of their work. Part 
of this was selectively applying and ignoring guidelines as it made practical sense. Doctors 
were also generally suspicious of SASSA’s efforts to standardise or regulate their work, 
privileging their own professional experiences and ideas about what constitutes disability 
(which I will discuss in the next chapter) above SASSA’s bureaucratic norms and standards. 
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Although SASSA doctors have a greater awareness of SASSA’s processes and sense of 
obligation towards SASSA, doctors in treating settings who had little to no engagement with 
SASSA or its guidelines had little respect for the organisation and little incentive to uphold 
SASSA norms and standards. This demonstrates the need to engage with doctors as 
professionals rather than through top-down control, an argument I will pursue further in the 




CHAPTER 6 ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ medicine: Framings of eligibility in DG assessment  
Doctors are not mere observers of clinical encounters, but participants, directly 
affected by what they see and called to act. (Beresford, 1991: 8) 
6.1 Introduction  
Mr Mashaba sat down in front of the doctor and Dr Rahman asked him why he was here. He 
told the doctor that he has tuberculosis and had lost his job on the farm as a result. “Normal TB 
or Multi-drug resistant TB?” asked Dr Rahman. Tuberculosis (TB) is rife in the Western Cape, 
with 800 reported cases of TB per 100 000 people in 2012 (Health Systems Trust, 2014). A TB 
diagnosis is therefore considered fairly run-of-the mill in poorer communities in the province. 
As a result, the guidelines of the South African Social Security Agency explicitly advise 
doctors against awarding temporary DGs to people with “ordinary” pulmonary tuberculosis 
(SASSA, n.d.). Mashaba got out his green card – the marker of the TB patient in South Africa – 
and showed it to the doctor. The green card is used as part of Directly Observed Treatment 
Short Course to keep a record of medications and patient-compliance for the six-months or 
longer that a patient receives treatment.  
Mr Mashaba was not quite sure what type of tuberculosis he had, but Dr Rahman was able to 
work out from the card and his file that he had a straight-forward pulmonary TB diagnosis and 
that he had started his medication the month before. After looking through Mashaba’s file for a 
while, Dr Rahman commented that his CD4 count of 175 was very low and that his HIV viral 
load was very high. Tuberculosis is one of the most common opportunistic infections 
associated with HIV. Generally, HIV/AIDS patients who have opportunistic infections are 
considered to be in Stage 3 of the disease and, according to SASSA guidelines are therefore 
eligible for a grant. However, because TB is endemic in the country, the guidelines state that 
HIV-TB comorbidity does not necessarily mean that patients have advanced to this stage of the 
disease (although in this case, with such a low CD4 count this was possible). The doctor 
listened to Mashaba’s chest and then filled out of the assessment form. After Mr Mashaba left, 
Dr Rahman explained to me that he would recommend a temporary grant for six months 
because, although Mr Mashaba’s chest was clear and he was not displaying any of the 
symptoms of TB (meaning he was not being impaired by the illness) and did not appear to have 
any other HIV-related conditions, he needed to eat. He also told me that Mr Mashaba wouldn’t 
be “here” if he was not well.  
Dr Rahman demonstrated the same trust in the intentions of all the patients he saw that day. 
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This approach was quite different to those of other doctors I observed, most of whom were 
constantly on the lookout for “fakers” and “malingerers”. I was surprised that he made all these 
assumptions about patients without talking to them very much, but he explained that patients 
are not very good at expressing themselves or explaining the nature of their disablement. 
Patients often come in simply saying that they couldn’t find work, but in his view, this did not 
mean that they were not sick or disabled. “When he said he lost his job, I already knew the 
whole story.”   
Dr Rahman believed that people in the area who cannot do manual labour are not employable 
because farmers don’t want to hire unproductive people, especially when there are so many 
able-bodied unemployed competing for the same job. After a few months of being on 
treatment, a person with TB should be able to work and should technically only qualify for 
Social Relief of Distress (SRD)68, but Dr Rahman told me that this system is broken because 
the budget available for SRD is insufficient for all those who qualify.69 He usually 
recommended a six-month temporary grant instead, as he had done in Mashaba’s case. 
Although providing a six-month grant may not seem particularly generous, SASSA is very 
strict on HIV cases and doctors were generally wary of recommending grants for chronic 
disease cases for more than six to twelve months. 
Dr Bury, who also worked in a rural area, had an almost opposite approach to Dr Rahman’s. 
Where Dr Rahman framed his decision in social terms, thinking about both individual 
experience and structural reasons for this situation, Dr Bury framed his decision in completely 
bureaucratic terms. When I met him, he been conducting assessments for SASSA for 
eight years and took his job as an assessor very seriously. He expressed 
disinterest in the subjective experiences of claimants, arguing that there was “no 
grant for pain” and justified this by reiterating that his role was to conduct a 
medical assessment, not consider other factors related to disability. When he had 
doubts about a patient’s eligibility, he erred on the side of caution, refusing to 
recommend the grant because “I am a taxpayer”.  
                                                
68 Doctors are only meant to recommend the SRD on a medical basis to people who are unfit to work for a period 
of less than six months. However, doctors tended to recommend it for people who did not meet the eligibility 
criteria for the DG but were in clear need of assistance. 




Where Dr Rahman considered the specific reason for defaulting, Dr Bury was less pragmatic. 
He told me “SASSA is very, very strict on defaulters. They must use their medication. I had a 
few that I declined because of that - even AIDS patients in a very bad condition”. In his 
experience, people who presented with pneumocystis, pneumonia or carposi sarcoma were 
always defaulters and in these situations he agreed with SASSA saying, “No way. No pay 
check.”   
Dr Bury’s and Dr Rahman’s approaches illustrate the two extremes in the ways that doctors 
frame and deal with DG assessment. As I showed in Chapter 2, in the past many doctors were 
extremely generous with the grant and several doctors in the study admitted to approving DGs 
to anyone who requested them. Since the introduction of the Disability Management Model, 
this is now less common.  
Another doctor in the study described the distinction between a flexible, sympathetic doctor 
like Dr Rahman, who bent the rules in favour of the patient, and a doctor like Dr Bury, who 
strictly applied SASSA guidelines and focused exclusively on clinical factors, as the difference 
between being a ‘hard’ or a ‘soft’ doctor. This distinction is useful, not because I want to 
provide a structuralist analysis of doctors’ decision-making, but because ‘hardness’ and 
‘softness’ provide a useful description of the two different sets of behavioural options or 
strategies available to doctors when they interact with patients and make decisions. When in 
doubt about patients’ eligibility, taking a ‘hard’ approach meant erring on the side of refusal, 
whereas taking a ‘soft’ approach meant erring on the side of leniency. The majority of doctors 
sat on a continuum between soft and hard and varied between strictness and generosity, 
responding to patients based on how they framed a particular patient and their situation. In 
short, doctors pursued strategies for action based on how they understood a particular case as 
deserving, and such exceeded the bounds of medical evaluation criteria. 
 This chapter focuses on how doctors make decisions on how to categorise patients in DG 
assessments, especially in spaces between the rules, where specialist medical knowledge and 
SASSA guidelines do not offer clear answers on DG eligibility, and how this shapes DG policy 
implementation. As claimants often do not fit neatly into the disabled category, doctors rely 
on their own categorisation systems or schemas to make decisions about who should get 
disability grants and to draw boundaries between who is and is not disabled. These are 
influenced both by their medical expertise and by social constructions which they as 
individuals tacitly subscribe to.  
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In the previous two chapters I showed that doctors have varying approaches to DG assessments 
and may make decisions that diverge from SASSA’s rules and guidelines. This chapter sets out 
to explore the extent to which these decisions are the result of doctor’s personal and 
professional norms and values and notions of social, economic and health justice. As Kaufman 
argued, bureaucrats enter organisations with “opinions, values, preferences and their own 
interpretations of the world” (1960: 80-81) that influence their behaviour within them. I argue 
that these decisional outcomes reflect different ways of framing the disability ‘problem’ and 
therefore interpreting both guidelines and the cases in front of them. Framing is the active 
process of arranging medical knowledge, SASSA’s rules and standards, and professional and 
personal norms and values to answer the question of eligibility in individual cases. Whilst these 
framings of disability are, as Lipsky (2010) argued, shaped by the structure of their work and 
coping strategies they develop to deal with time constraints and other work pressures, they are 
also related to normative ideas about their role as moral and professional agents.  
While some street-level bureaucracy scholars (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Dubois, 
2010; Hasenfeld, 2000) have paid attention to influence of norms and values on street-level 
decisions, the literature on street-level bureaucrats has paid insufficient attention to how these 
are used to categorise people (Harrits & Møller, 2011). This literature also neglects the 
particular role of professional norms in street-level decision-making. Although Lipsky (2010) 
has argued that street-level bureaucrats are governed by professional and occupational 
ideology, his work and the street-level literature in general has paid little attention to groups 
like doctors who most strongly associate with a defined set of professional norms and values 
(Hupe, 2007; Evans, 2010). The concept of framing captures the pluralism of norms and ideas 
that ground street-level actions, whilst allowing us to observe and explain patterns emerging in 
street-level decisions. It is also useful in examining the relationship and potential conflicts 
between professional expertise, social norms and values, and bureaucratic rules.  
I propose that four frames pattern doctor’s decision-making behaviour: 1) the bureaucratic 
frame; 2) the clinical frame; 3) the moral frame; and 4) the social frame. I then discuss the 
effects that these frames have on how doctors make decisions and treat claimants, and how they 
intersect with or contradict the specific eligibility conditions laid down by SASSA and their 
obligations to the state. In doing so, I will also reflect on the misalignments between the daily 
realities of doctor-patient interactions and SASSA’s bureaucratic ‘script’; and what this means 
for DG policy implementation.  
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6.2 An analysis of doctors’ decision making 
During disability assessments, doctors have to make sense of and categorise a claimant’s 
individual case and make a recommendation that can be supported by clinical evidence. They 
do this by engaging with information from multiple sources and determining what information 
is relevant to developing a coherent theory of the situation at hand. This process is both 
cognitive and conceptual and one that I argue relies on the interactive and intersubjective 
process of framing. 
When a patient enters the room, a doctor has to think through two different things. Firstly, 
“what type of applicant is this?” and secondly, “should I recommend a disability grant for  this 
person?” The first question is essentially the framing question that Goffman (1974: 8) argued 
individuals unconsciously ask when faced with any situation: “what is it that is going on 
here?” The second question, although directly connected to the first, is a more strategic one: 
“how do I deal with or treat this person?” The way in which doctors understand the context in 
which the DG application is being made is crucial to informing what information they look out 
for when conducting an assessment, how they interpret this information and ultimately what 
decision they make. In other words, doctors reach different conclusions about patient eligibility 
based on how they decide to frame a situation (Berg et al., 2000, Dodier, 1998). 
The terms ‘frame’ and ‘framing’ are widely used by diverse disciplines that include social 
theory and sociology, cognitive science, communication theory, policy studies and political 
and finance (amongst others). It is therefore necessary to clarify how I am employing this 
term and what specific literature I have drawn on in applying this idea to DG assessments. 
Goffman (1974) argued that within a given context, people need to define a situation in order 
to know how to act and interact with others. Drawing on Bateson’s (1955) work on animal 
play, he called this process framing. Frames allow people to “locate, perceive, identify and 
label” social experiences and help to guide further action (Goffman, 1974: 21). Separately, 
but also drawing on Bateson’s work in his work on reflective professional practice, Schön 
(1983, 1987) argued that when professionals make decisions they engage in a process of 
“naming and framing”, latching onto particular pieces of information to make decisions. 
Through the complementary acts of naming and framing, the practitioner selects 
things  for  attention,  guided  by  an  appreciation  of  the  situation  that  gives  it 
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coherence and sets a direction for action. So problem setting is an 
ontological process – in Nelson Goodman’s (1978) memorable word – a form of 
worldmaking. Depending on our disciplinary backgrounds, organizational 
roles, past histories, interests, and political/economic perspectives, we frame 
problems in different ways (Schön, 1987: 4). 
Giddens (1984) took up Goffman’s notion of framing and used it in developing his theory 
of structuration. Whilst Goffman’s work has mainly been applied to understanding social 
interactions in face-to-face encounters, Gidden’s work has mainly influenced theories of 
institutions. He understood frames to be “clusters of rules which help to constitute and 
regulate activities, defining them as activities of a certain sort and as subject to a given 
range of sanctions.” (Giddens, 1984: 87) Like Goffman, he saw frames as interpretive 
schemas used in interactions, that both structured interactions and could also be 
transformed by reflective and knowledgeable social actors: “Framing as constitutive of, 
and constricted by, encounters ‘makes sense’ of the activities in which participants engage, 
both for themselves and others.” (Giddens, 1984: 87) 
Drawing on and extending Schön and Rein’s (1994) work on how framing affects public 
policy specifically, Van Hulst and Yanow (2014) emphasise that framing is a dynamic and 
action-oriented process of making sense and organising prior knowledge and values. 
Frames guide emerging action in intersubjective situations and actors bring their own prior 
knowledge (from experiences, education, and other sources) to situational sense-making” 
(Van Holst and Yanow, 2014: 8). In the case of doctors, they bring to their interactions 
with patients or claimants their medical knowledge, clinical experience and social and 
cultural knowledge.  
These framing effects correspond to the Bourdieusian notion of habitus. Drawing more 
directly on Bourdieu, Harrits and Møller (2011: 241) argue that street-level bureaucrats 
present an “embodied habitus”, bringing with them, “ingrained in their own bodies, 
categorical systems and a position in systems of symbolic and social relations.” For 
example, a middle-class white cardiologist brings to DG assessments her own perspectives 
and experiences of both the medical and social world, which are informed by her race, 
class-position, culture, gender, specialist training and collection of past experiences with 
patients, which she uses to navigate the assessment process and which will inform her 
practice and decision-making. 
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Dubois (2010, 2013) also extends Lipsky’s work by connecting it with Bourdieu’s sociology 
and Goffman’s micro-interactionalist sociology, considering the nature and meaning of 
bureaucratic interactions but attending also to habitus - the dispositions that structure these 
interactions. Like Maynard-Moody and Musheno, he argues that norms and the individual 
identities, histories and dispositions of bureaucrats are important in understanding street-
level work. He argues that there are no standardised clients nor impersonal bureaucrats; 
“only social agents with individual personalities who, within certain conditions and limits, 
are required to play the role of the impersonal or standardised bureaucrat or client” (Dubois, 
2010: 3). 
I take a frame to mean an interpretive schema that social agents use to make sense of their 
situation and guide their actions (in this case, decision-making), which is shaped by their 
background and dispositions as well their professional knowledge and norms. In the case of 
disability grant assessment, framing is primarily a tacit process that facilitates decision- 
making. The decision frames that doctors develop represent a hybrid arrangement of 
SASSA’s rules and regulations and doctors’ responsibilities as medical professionals, moral 
and social agents that establish the boundaries and constraints for decision-making. 
However, following Van Hulst and Yanow’s (2014) proposition, framing the disability 
problem is an active, agency-driven process. My research suggests that, whilst they were 
neither fixed nor exclusive, four main frames informed doctors’ decision-making and 
behaviour towards DG claimants in Cape Town: the bureaucratic frame, the clinical frame, 
the moral frame and the social frame, all of which represent different arrangements of rules 
and definitions of disability, employability, need, entitlement and deservingness. 
This typology of frames is influenced by Nicholas Dodier’s (1994, 1998) work on frames. 
Applying the notion of framing to decision-making in the practice of occupational medicine, 
Dodier (1998: 53) argued that, “a person adjusts to a situation not by using discrete 
resources, but through arrangements of resources (words, rules, objects) in which past 
experiences are inscribed, that is, through frames.” Dodier put forward a number of different 
frames, including the administrative, clinical, psychological and solicitude frames, as 
alternative  ways of understanding and assessing patient’s complaints and attributing health-
based ‘rights’ to patients in occupational medicine. His concept of frames has been 
employed in Human’s (2010, 2011) study of doctors’ practical use of treatment protocols in 
HIV clinics in South Africa. Eikenaar et al. (2015) has also applied this concept to explore 
the normative aspects of professional judgements made by street-level bureaucrats involved 
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in work reintegration programmes in the Netherlands. 
Other scholars of bureaucracy have studied the patterning of discretion, describing the 
different rationalities (Willems, 2001), models of justice (Mashaw, 1983), strategies 
(Jonsson, 1998) or operational styles shaped by beliefs (Brown, 1988). However, I argue 
that the concept of framing is more useful as it suggests a more active and situational process 
of sense making. The likelihood of a doctor adopting a certain frame was influenced by their 
habitus and the nature of their social interaction with an individual patient. Influences on 
doctors’ adoption of certain frames were their medical speciality and training, institutional 
environment, personal norms and values and notions of justice, social background, approach to 
patient care, previous experiences with patients requesting the grant (especially negative ones), and 
views about the healthcare and welfare system. The table below presents the broad distinctions 
between the four different frames used by doctors.  















Professional ethics Social /cultural 
norms and values 
Socio-economic 
justice / human rights 
 
Political Neutral Neutral Ideology is 
influential 
(conservative)   
Ideology is influential 
(social democratic) 




Bureaucrat Independent medical 
professional / clinician 
Citizen-agent Community / public 
health professionals 
Outcome Rigid / strict Flexible  Varied based on 
deservingness 
Generous 
Although I present four framing options, these were neither discrete nor mutually exclusive 
ways of making sense of cases. Capable of reflection, doctors are social actors able to apply 
“a wide range of different and even incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous 
arrays of resources” (Sewell, 1992: 17). When practically applied in medicine, social norms 
and values may clash or contradict each other, shift or coexist (Timmermans & Haas, 2008: 
671). Doctors moved between or combined different frames and thinking was very often 
shaped by their specific interactions with individuals, the particularities of certain cases and 
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material circumstances. Doctors might also frame their decisions in ways that help them to 
cope with the stressors and constraints of the system, for instance framing eligibility as a 
purely administrative issue to avoid feeling sorry for people, as was sometimes the case with 
the bureaucratic frame. 
The way in which doctors framed disability claims inclined them towards handling cases in 
ways which may coincide or conflict with the way in which SASSA has framed the disability 
issue and the type of decisions it expects doctors to make. The frames doctors used affected 
their attitude - and adherence to – SASSA’s rules. For instance, doctors who framed 
disability as a multi-dimensional or social phenomenon might prioritise the consideration of 
economic, social and environmental factors over strict adherence to SASSA’s guidelines and 
might stretch or bend the rules to accommodate them. On the other hand, a doctor who 
valued administrative justice, equity and impartiality would focus on strictly applying rules 
and guidelines, refusing to make individual exceptions. This is not to say that doctors simply 
do what they wish – they are of course constrained by their legal and professional 
obligations. However, where they have discretion, their framing of certain situations might 
make them more or less likely to rigidly apply the rules, or bend or stretch them to 
accommodate people that meet their own private understanding of disability but perhaps not 
SASSA’s formal definition.  
It is however important to note that doctors, especially those working as SASSA assessors 
who had to conduct assessments day after day as consistently as possible, did not necessarily 
have the time or inclination to think through the complexities of each case. Doctors were 
therefore likely to develop quick and standardised ways of identifying and treating certain 
clients. In this way frames can harden into routine ways of classifying clients, treating clients 
based on existing categories or stereotypes (e.g. the malingerer).  
6.2.1 Bureaucratic framing 
To structure doctors’ thinking and decision-making, SASSA provides a set of medical 
guidelines and training to doctors (see Chapter 4). This bureaucratic frame promotes the 
objective categorisation of patients according to set criteria and simplifies decision-
making by effectively limiting the options or possible solutions available to decision-makers.  
The bureaucratic frame is the equivalent of strategies discussed in the literature on street-
level bureaucrats, for instance what Dubois (2010) would call bureaucratic formalism, what 
Jonsson (1998) called a bureaucratic administrator strategy. It also bears strong similarities 
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to what Eikenaar et al.  (2015) called a procedural frame of reference. Using this frame, 
medical knowledge is applied in a reductive and objectifying way, placing patients into 
categories and applying a strictly biomedical approach to disability. Disability grants were 
understood as a specific intervention for a certain group, not a general poverty intervention 
and doctors saw it as their responsibility to protect the boundaries of the disability category 
by using their medical knowledge to detect malingerers, fakers and defaulters.  
As training and guidelines were only provided to doctors contracted specifically to do 
assessments, this frame was not employed by treating doctors. Doctors could easily apply 
SASSA’s bureaucratic framework in cases where patients clearly did or did not qualify on 
medical factors. Most SASSA assessors did so. However, what distinguished doctors with a 
bureaucratic ethos from others was that even when a patient’s eligibility was less clear, these 
doctors would lean towards conservative decision-making, seeking out further clinical 
evidence through objective tests or referrals rather than considering more contextual and 
subjective factors. Applying a kind of deontological ethics, they justified their decision-
making in relation to the rules, regardless of a claimant’s individual circumstance.  In short, 
they would err on the side of SASSA rather than the patient.    
While in fact the guidelines do provide some leeway for the use of professional discretion, 
doctors approaching the assessment of a patient through this frame positioned themselves as 
SASSA workers, denying that they had any discretion and claiming that they were strictly 
following procedures and interpreting guidelines in a very conservative and restrictive 
way. Doctors using a bureaucratic frame construed employability as the physical ability to 
work and did not take contextual factors such as availability of employment or an 
individual’s competiveness in the labour market with a given health condition into account. 
Doctors working as SASSA assessors, who were specifically employed to conduct 
assessments, had received SASSA training and were most likely to employ a bureaucratic 
frame.  
For example, Dr Bury took his job as an assessor seriously and understood his role as a 
gatekeeper for the state and took a quite literal interpretation of the guidelines. According to 
SASSA guidelines, doctors should consider disability in terms of a person’s ability to do any 
sort of work in the open labour market, regardless of the availability of employment70. 
                                                
70 Although guidelines indicate that a claimant’s education or age could be considered in certain cases this was 
not a requirement and how this should be considered was very unclear. 
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Applying this principle, he understood “open labour market” to mean an individual’s ability 
to do any kind of work, regardless of whether they actually had the skills or education to do 
this. This because he felt he was only there to make a medical assessment and it was not his 
role to consider other factors related to disability. See Quote 6.1 Appendix C 
Unlike some doctors, he conscientiously filled out the assessment form in detail and 
thoroughly assessed patients. He strictly applied the guidelines and SASSA’s impairment 
tables to make decisions and avoided considering any non-medical issues or subjective 
experiences, even in cases of moderate impairment when the SASSA guidelines gave him 
discretion to consider factors such as the age, education level or employment history. As 
noted earlier, he refused to recommend grants to defaulters even if they were gravely ill and 
incapacitated because these were the ‘rules’. This hard-line approach was not necessarily 
endorsed by SASSA and Dr Marite, the national manager of the DG program said that the 
medical ethics of beneficence and non-maleficence should be brought to bear in such cases, 
provided that it could be clinically justified (Dr Marite, interview, 2014 June 27).  
However, their strict application of the rules did not mean that doctors applying this frame 
were necessarily insensitive to claimants’ suffering. For some it was a professional ethical 
stance (Zacka, 2015) in that they were doing what they were both paid to and legally required 
to do.  The bureaucratic frame is grounded in the idea of equal treatment or what Mashaw has 
called ‘bureaucratic justice’ – the notion that applying the rules in the same way in every case 
is the most procedurally fair and just way to handle DG assessments. In this way, the 
guidelines become a normative framework for action.  
For doctors, applying the rules in a very literal way could also be a way to cope with what 
was otherwise a very stressful and morally taxing job. For example, ones of the reasons Dr 
Bury so rigidly applied a medical was approach was because:  
‘…as soon as you consider anything else then it’s not about disease or dysfunction 
and that’s the only thing. Look at the records and examine the patient if necessary –
that’s that. I don’t look at anything else because then you might feel sorry for the 
patient and you say “yes” to a grant when it’s not necessary’.  
 
 Invoking rules and denying discretion or professional autonomy can be used by frontline 
workers as a defence “against the possibility that they might be able to act more as clients 
would wish” (Lipsky, 2010: 149). “Bureaucracy offers a formal structure to withdraw from 
social relationships and concomitant feelings of reciprocity and social duty” (Bartels, 2013: 
470). Thus, even choosing to “go by the book is a discretionary judgment” (Maynard-
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Moody & Portillo, 2010: 19). This approach is not unique to disability assessment, for 
instance in a US study Cassell (2004) found that medical doctors may ignore patient’s stories 
out of concern that they may interfere with patient care. Hupe (2007) argues that 
professions may impose rules upon themselves to manage their work and, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 7, doctors would use the guidelines as a way to legitimise their 
decisions to patients who questioned their decisions. However, applying a hard-line 
approach also had consequences and SASSA assessors could be very unpopular with 
claimants who found assessments depersonalising and perceived them to be inflexible 
and insensitive. This drove some of the abusive treatment of doctors by patients that I 
will discuss further in Chapter 7.  
6.2.2 Clinical Framing 
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep 
them from harm and injustice (Hippocratic Oath in Siegler, 2000).  
In contrast to bureaucratic framing, doctors employing a clinical frame were less concerned 
with SASSA’s rules, guidelines and set procedures and instead made decisions based on what 
Bourdieu described as their ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1990). Doctors employing a 
clinical frame generally justified the need for DG on a clinical basis, based on a claimant’s 
medical history and individual circumstances. Clinical framing resists administrative patterns 
of determinism and depersonalisation and allows more space for thinking about patients as 
unique individuals.  
Using the US disability program as an example, Mashaw (1983) argues that these differences 
between a bureaucratic rationality and professional judgment result in different conceptions 
of justice and can result in professionals being cast as subversive to bureaucratic ends. Whilst 
doctors certainly have subverted DG policy in South Africa in the past, not all doctors have 
the same training and clinical experience or professional and intellectual approach to the 
practice of medicine, particularly in relation to the psychosocial aspects of care. Professional 
judgement therefore cannot be understood as a singular rationality. Ethnographic research has 
shown that professional beliefs and perspectives on medical decisions may vary depending 
on position in hospital structure (Nurock, 2009) and specialty area (Mol, 2002).  
Such beliefs were also developed through the doctors’ interactions with others within their 
organizational environment, whether it be interactions with SASSA officials and other 
SASSA doctors during training or with other colleagues (especially senior doctors) in 
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hospitals. Hasenfeld (2000) calls these ‘practice ideologies’; collections of beliefs shared 
within organisations about clients’ needs and appropriate responses to them.   
Doctors using a clinical frame differed responded to claims based on how they 
conceptualised their role and responsibilities as medical professionals in relation to disability 
assessments. There were doctors who took a hard-line approach, fairly similar to those 
adopting the bureaucratic frame, whilst others with a more humanistic approach engaged with 
patient’s individual lives more and considered this in their decision-making. This section will 
show how doctors’ differing ideas of what falls into the medical domain and their self-
perceived roles as doctors, shaped their decision-making.  
As I discussed in Chapter 4, doctors are asked to assess disability because of their expertise 
on the human body, the supposed objectivism of medical science and the idea that doctors 
should behave in objective and ethical ways.  Although SASSA wants doctors to employ a 
technical, bureaucratic rationality in their decision-making and follow their rules and 
guidelines to classify patients, medical professionals also have a set of norms of acceptable 
behaviour, and standards and ethics that guide their practice; one of which is putting the 
patient first.  Their strongly engrained professional values and commitment to patients’ 
wellbeing could also result in doctors feeling torn between their goals as bureaucrats and 
responsibilities to assist patients (Wainwright et al., 2015). In this study, this was particularly 
likely when a doctor was assessing his or her own patient and doctors in hospital settings 
were more likely to employ a clinical than a bureaucratic frame, reflecting a stronger 
association to medical rather than bureaucratic values. This was less likely in cases where 
doctors worked as third-party assessors. 
It is for this reason that SASSA is moving towards a model that separates the assessing 
doctor and the treating doctor. However, this dilemma remained significant for doctors 
participating in the study.  
As I argued in Chapter 4, medical decisions require more than just scientific knowledge. 
Decision making in this context is an interpretive process that relies on doctors’ clinical 
experiences and the individual patient and clinical judgment is often described as tacit, 
interpretive and action-oriented rather than a product of technical rationality (Montgomery, 
2006; Freidson, 1970). This phronetic way of thinking can conflict with administrative, “box 
ticking” rationality that SASSA promotes as doctors focus on making sound judgments rather 
than following set procedures. As a professional group, doctors typically have discretion in 
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how they carry out their work, and their expectations of autonomy can contradict notions of 
bureaucratic control (Freidson, 2001). Therefore, some doctors, especially those conducting 
assessments in treating settings and who were not paid to conduct assessments, resisted the 
idea of classifying patients according to bureaucratic criteria. They preferred to treat each 
client as an individual case, privileging their own clinical experience and knowledge of the 
patient over SASSA’s externally imposed rules and guidelines, and they disregarded these 
where they felt they did not apply. This dislike of bureaucratic rules does not mean that 
doctors do not develop routine ways of dealing with patients. In their general work managing 
medical cases, doctors develop personal working models for managing problems that they 
encounter on a regular basis, as Lock (1985) showed in her study of how doctors approached 
menopause.  
Another aspect of doctors’ clinical socialisation that impacted on their decision-making was 
their interactions with their colleagues. As Atkinson (1995) argues, we cannot look at 
doctors’ decision-making exclusively in terms of what happens in their consultation rooms 
during their interactions with patients. Rather, their decisions are also shaped by what he calls 
‘medical talk’ – the collegial interactions that take place in medical settings such as 
conversations with other doctors, medical meetings and ward rounds. In hospitals where I 
conducted fieldwork there was considerable dialogue and consultation between doctors, 
especially between more junior and more senior doctors. Doctors passed in and out of one 
another’s consulting rooms or congregated in the halls, consulting with one another and this 
influenced their decision-making. Although SASSA assessors had fewer opportunities to 
interact with colleagues, at training sessions they shared their approaches, ideas and stories 
and in fact seemed to learn more from one another than the SASSA official training them.  
Doctors’ response to claimants differed based on whether they understood disability as a 
biomedical or psychosocial issue. As I argued in Chapter 4, as medical thinking has evolved, 
doctors have been encouraged to think more holistically about patient care and in terms of a 
biopsychosocial model of medicine, especially in the context of chronic illness. Doctors, 
particular younger doctors, who understood clinical decisions to mean more than just making 
a medical diagnosis and who had a more holistic approach to patient care, were generally 
more conflicted about their role in the assessment process and most likely to disagree with 
SASSA’s guidelines.  
“I enjoyed looking at the SASSA document, it’s quite well written, it’s quite detailed 
but it’s a lot of bullshit because with a lot of these conditions you're making your 
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decisions on clinical grounds. In other words, what is that person really suffering and 
what is their ability to really cope with work really? Because it’s got nothing to do 
with whether they've got HIV or HIV and TB or osteoarthritis. What is their state of 
mind and body and can they work?” (Dr Brown, interview, 2014 April 4) 
Doctors employing a clinical frame generally justified the need for DG on a clinical basis, 
based on a claimant’s individual circumstances and medical history. They might engage with 
social factors, but only as they related to clinical issues and the health of the patient. In these 
cases, a DG was considered a way to address social determinants of health or address health 
system failures. Doctors whose primary role was to treat patients were particularly likely to 
make exceptions for individual patients where they thought the grant could improve health 
outcomes. In this way, DGs were included as part of their treatment intervention – a way to 
fund transport to the hospital to attend follow-up appointments and fetch medication, and to 
ensure adequate nutrition to recover their health and alleviate psychological stress.  
Dr Harvey, for instance, felt that “it’s never purely medical” and was frustrated that the form 
did not provide space for her to make note of social circumstances. She argued, “You can 
make the argument that not having money is going to affect their health, although they are 
not disabled as such.”  
“I think in terms of the way in which you fill in a form you can can actually make it 
sound worse than it is. I've had a couple of patients where they're borderline so 
you've sort of given them the benefit of the doubt because of their social 
circumstances and their social circumstances do unfortunately affect their healthcare 
and so for example, if you're hypertensive you really should be able to do your job 
you know, but you know if you have to go to the clinic every month it becomes really 
difficult when you have difficult social circumstances. I've never lied on a form 
because I think a patient warrants a grant but they don't qualify. I've never made up a 
fictitious thing so that they can get a medical grant, but in terms of borderline cases 
there are a few that you just weight it a little bit more heavily, but you can't lie about 
actual facts so it's very difficult. So you can't say for example on the form there is 
shortness of breath when there isn’t but you can say that they are more short of 
breath than they are.” (Dr Harvey, interview, 2014 April 15).  
 
A senior doctor who helped me arrange access to an infectious diseases clinic explained the 
approach of some of his colleagues as follows:  
“They do understand that the patients are often unemployed and that it is a process 
for them to get to us. Although the patients are not necessarily physically disabled, 
they are disabled by their disease. They will give the patient a 6 or 12 month grant 
and there is difficulty about loopholes – the reality is that they are sick and 
unemployed and need to get to the hospital and the grant plugs that hole. Some of 
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them don’t necessarily deserve the grant but you put them on a temporary grant. You 
put them on a temporary grant while they recover – although sometimes by the time 
they get the grant they are already better.” (Xhobani, email correspondence, 2014 
March 23)  
In the case of HIV and tuberculosis, some treating doctors saw the grant as a valuable tool for 
encouraging compliance. For instance, Dr Naidoo, a doctor working in infectious diseases, 
took a highly individualised and holistic approach to DG assessments she was requested to do 
in the course of her clinical practice. She felt that her goal as a doctor was to ensure that a 
healthcare problem was optimally managed. For her optimal management extended beyond 
just medicine to include food and the psychological security of not having to constantly 
worry about money. She was strongly in favour of the DG: “I am completely for them – there 
is very little that has been done to address social determinants of health before patients get to 
me. Health is a manifestation of everything wrong in society” and felt that recommending a 
grant is one small thing she could do to assist people.  She therefore tried not to stand in 
judgment of people who ask her to fill out a DG assessment for them and told me, “There are 
so many things you can’t understand as someone who is not poor – you don’t know what it 
means to have no money and don’t understand how desperate people are.” She criticized 
some of her colleagues who she felt were “punitive and short-sighted” in their hardline 
approach to assessments. Working at a secondary hospital meant that the patients she saw 
were too ill to be seen at the primary level, but had the potential to recover and she therefore 
never gave a grant for more than a year, but saw the grant as an integral part of the recovery 
process during this time.  
Dr Wright also framed his thinking about disablement in clinical terms and expressed the 
dilemmas he faced as both a clinician and disability assessor. He felt that SASSA’s 
categorisations of disease and disability were over-simplified and he focused his thinking on 
the individual symptom profile of his patients and used his clinical judgment rather than 
SASSA guidelines to make decisions. He believed that working is an essential part of being a 
healthy person. Many doctors took this same approach, valorizing work on the basis that it 
was essential for psychological well-being and thinking that receiving a DG could be 
psychologically ‘disabling’. This made them hesitant to recommend permanent grants when 
there was any (even small) potential for them to recover.71 Although not necessarily blaming 
                                                
71  OTs interviewed, were equally concerned that DGs could potentially reinforce patient notions of their 
disability and inability to participate in some sort of productive work. They were particularly concerned that 




individuals for their ‘dependence’ on the state, they saw the DG as perpetuating a type of 
dependent mindset that disadvantaged or ‘disabled people’. This is a view also held by some 
disability rights activists that have criticized the government for focusing on social grants 
rather than empowering people to work (Gatharim, 2008). Doctors felt that young people in 
particular should be strongly encouraged to enter or re-enter the workforce or participate 
sheltered employment programs,72 even if they were severely disabled, as they felt it was 
unhealthy for young people not to work.  
“It’s hard to generalise but there seems to be a certain attitude out there of ‘I've got a 
grant, I don't have to work again’ so you have got to guard against that because it’s 
very toxic I think because to not work...actually you see people going downhill and I 
don't think it’s healthy to not work.” (Taylor, interview, 2014 March 17) 
Although very reluctant to recommend permanent DGs, Dr Wright felt that grants were 
important in encouraging and supporting people with mental illness who were actively 
working towards their recovery. He saw financial despair as one of the ‘vicious cycles’ that 
people with mental illness can get stuck in, and felt that a grant was useful in helping them to 
get their lives together enough to find work. However, this became complicated when 
patients with whom he had long-standing relationships had been working very hard to 
recover, but were still unable to find work and asked to renew their grants. In these 
circumstances it was hard for him as a clinician to justify following SASSA’s regulations 
without undermining the health and wellbeing of his patient. 
“When patients are working really hard at recovery and their conditions has 
improved, you are meant to take it away even though many of them still haven't got a 
job because unemployment is so high. So I'm not the strictest at just cutting it at that 
point. I cut them when someone is not using the grant to do anything. So I'm very 
biased that way - if someone's really doing everything they can to get a job and they 
are not getting a job I find it very difficult to say too bad, back to zero [i.e. refuse to 
recommend a grant and undo all the progress they have made].” (Wright, interview, 
2014 April 2). 
Generally, doctors saw taking one’s health and recovery seriously as an important individual 
and moral responsibility and were frustrated by patients who were non-compliant or not 
motivated to recover and were thus failing to fulfill the responsibilities of the ‘sick role’ 
(Parsons, 1951). However, several doctors, who took a more individualised approach to 
                                                                                                                                                  
market if a doctor decided that they were no longer eligible.  
72 People who work in sheltered employment programs still qualify for a grant because they are unable to 
compete in the open labour market and receive less than than the means test threshold.  
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assessments, disagreed with SASSA’s objectifying simplification of the complex nature of 
patient adherence issues and felt uncomfortable ‘punishing’ claimants for non-compliance. 
They therefore did not refuse to recommend grants for non-compliant patients whom they felt 
otherwise qualified and needed the grant to recover their health and would use the grant to 
motivate compliance.  
He says that looking at the file you can see when a patient has defaulted and he says 
that in many cases doctors will not give the grant – “defaulting equals no grant.” He 
feels that this is a pity because the defaulting and the grant are really two different 
things and that usually there is some reason that the patient is defaulting that needs to 
be explored. (Field notes, 2014 March 14)  
Not all doctors took such a holistic approach to medicine. Some understood their role as 
medical professionals as strictly limited to biomedicine and the treatment of injury and 
disease. Even if they recognised that poverty and demand for the grant was a systemic rather 
than an individual failing, many felt the social, economic and environmental position of 
patients did not concern them as medical professionals.  
Fassin (2008) suggests (although perhaps too sweepingly) that because doctors see 
themselves as technicians and scientists rather than humanists, they are more interested in 
curative activities and interesting cases than in the social dimensions of care. Good et al.  
(2005), has suggested that the culture of medicine privileges time and efficiency and that 
doctors will therefore avoid ‘problem’ patients, including those with complex social issues. 
Dr Brown argued that some doctors saw dealing with disability cases as “being on a losing 
wicket”, saying that “they’re not interested because they are essentially people that are falling 
apart; there’s not much that you can do for them medically.” In Whitney, which is a large 
academic hospital, known for its highly competitive working environment, social workers 
reported that some doctors saw DG assessments as ‘beneath’ them. Jeffrey (1979) argues that 
the prestige of doctors relative to other healthcare professionals is related to their distance 
from patients (which is one of the reasons the chore of disability assessments was often 
passed to interns and junior doctors).  
With less interest in the psycho-social aspects of care and complicated personal or social 
issues, more clinically-focused doctors were more likely to focus on purely objectively 
assessing a patient’s physical state and function and refuse to engage with other issues. Other 
aspects of care were seen as the responsibility of social workers and doctors would frequently 
interrupt patients who were sharing their subjective experiences, telling them that they were 
only concerned with their medical issues. Some medical specialists in hospitals totally 
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refused to conduct assessments for their own patients, seeing it as a waste of their time and 
scarce medical resources and instructed patients to visit their local clinic where they would be 
seen by a SASSA assessor instead. Disinterest in DGs was particularly noticeable amongst 
orthopaedic surgeons and according to a number of hospital staff interviewed (including 
orthopaedists themselves), the field has a reputation (not necessarily fairly) for being ‘macho’ 
and ‘jockish’, oriented around ‘fixing’ the patient rather than becoming involved in the 
psycho-social aspects of care. In one instance, an orthopaedic surgeon at Welgemoed hospital 
boasted, “I didn’t realise that they had changed to a book system for six months – shows how 
many disability grants I give out!”  
This is not to say that by attempting to be objective doctors are necessarily insensitive to the 
social and economic context of patients, as Dr Taylor reminded me: “Doctors make 
enormous personal, social and financial sacrifices by being doctors, so it is inherent (for 
most) to want to help the patient.” Rather, these doctors acknowledged their limited capacity 
to fix claimants’ social and economic issues, and as one of his colleagues commented, “It is 
not our responsibility to fix the unemployment problem.”  
6.3.3 Moral framing  
In assessing patients for DGs, doctors are effectively making decisions on how to allocate the 
state’s resources. In many ways these are ethical decisions because they affect how resources 
are distributed in society. Implicit in these allocative decisions is the idea that some people 
‘deserve’ DGs whilst others do not. According to Hasenfeld (2000) this work of 
categorisation makes the work of street-level bureaucrats such as doctors ‘moral work’. 
These moral categorisations of who deserves social grants have been defined to a certain 
extent by the state through legislation and regulations and institutionalised within SASSA. 
However, given their high level of discretion, frontline workers may make moral judgments 
of their own that either undermine or reinforce these state categories. Although street-level 
bureaucrats are supposed to follow rules and procedures in dealing with clients, in reality 
they “like everybody else, have personal standards of whether or not someone is deserving” 
(Lipsky, 1980: 23). Social positions are negotiated and renegotiated within the bureaucratic 
setting and “desk interactions are frequently an occasion to assign - sometimes in a harsh way 
- identities and to impose behavioural rules” (Dubois, 2010: 5).   
According to Bourdieu, “agents are both classified and classifiers” (Bourdieu, 1987 in Harrits 
& Møller, 2011) and therefore doctors are themselves part of the categorical system. Street-
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level bureaucrats therefore cannot be seen as outside-observing agents and social 
categorization is reproduced in street-level work. More simply stated: street-level bureaucrats 
always act “as human beings confronting other human beings.” (Harrits & Møller, 2011: 242) 
Beliefs about fairness strongly influenced doctors’ decision-making and doctors using a 
moral frame thought about their decisions in moral terms. Although not necessarily 
exclusively, doctors often used moral framing to make decisions at times where medical 
eligibility was not completely clear, thinking about eligibility using socially and politically 
constructed notions of ‘just desert.’ As Maynard-Moody and Musheno have argued, the 
decision-making of street-level bureaucrats is “complexly moral and contingent rather 
than narrowly rule bound and fixed” (2003: 93).  
Doctors are rarely (if ever) neutral agents. They enter the assessment process with a set of 
existing subjectivities and biases that influences their decision-making. Numerous 
sociological studies have shown that medical values of ‘non-judgmental regard’ and 
beneficence are not always adhered to and that moral evaluation and the designation of 
patients into ‘good’, ‘interesting’, ‘bad’ and ‘rubbish’ patients is a regular part of medical 
settings which influences how patients are treated (Roth, 1963; Strong, 1979; Jeffrey, 1979; 
Stein, 1990). Doctors rely strongly on pattern recognition, making them highly likely to 
stereotype patients (e.g. hypochondriac, malingerer, drug addict) and use these in their 
evaluations (Groopman, 2007). Alcoholics, drug addicts and ‘dirty and smelly’ patients may 
be seen judged by hospital staff as deviant and therefore categorised by medical staff as 
deserving of less care and attention than other patients (Jeffrey, 1979). Moral assumptions 
made about patients tend to derive from judgements about their social worth as individuals, 
their responsibility for creating their own conditions of ill-health and poverty, their degree of 
amenability to change and their own desired end results, and the degree to which view they 
view themselves as object or subject in terms of agency (Hasenfeld, 2000: 332). In his book 
on the culture of medicine in the United States, Stein (1990: 98) called this an “unofficial, 
moralistic taxonomy of types of patients.” The literature on medical rationing discussed in 
Chapter 1 shows that this is particularly likely in resource constrained or emergency settings, 
as has shown to be the case in a number of South African hospitals (Le Marcis and Grard, 
2015; Gilson, 2004). Moral and social evaluations of claimants’ worth are particularly likely 
in disability compensation claims, where doctors are less likely to trust patients’ intentions 
(Hickel, 2001).  
Doctors considering DG eligibility in moral terms may be less inclined to recommend the 
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grant for those who they feel are responsible for their own poverty and illness and deemed to 
be taking advantage of the system, and more inclined towards generosity in cases where they 
see patients as worthy of support for reasons of being victims to external misfortune or bad 
luck, for example. Hasenfeld (2000: 337) calls the process of making service decisions and 
rationalizing them through moral constructions ‘moral entrepreneurship’. Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno argue that street-level bureaucrats “apply, bend, or ignore rules and procedures 
to support their moral reasoning. Identity based normative judgments determine which and 
how rules, procedures and policy are applied” (2003: 155). Ideas about deservingness in 
human service organisations are rooted in moral rules that are shaped by political interests, 
community environments, organisations and the work of street-level bureaucrats (Hasenfeld, 
2000).  
Research on South African’s attitudes towards redistribution shows that South Africans 
clearly distinguish between people who are deserving and undeserving of social assistance, 
which are based on the capacity and willingness of people to work (Seekings 2007, 2008a 
2010). The disabled and sick are typically considered a category of the deserving poor and in 
a study of attitudes towards distributive justice, Seekings (2010) showed that Capetonians felt 
that sick and disabled people, including people with AIDS deserved assistance from the state. 
The attitudes that doctors had towards certain categories of ‘undeserving’ DG claimants can 
therefore be seen as doubts about the genuineness of their disability and inability to work, 
rather than a belief that disabled people are undeserving. Doctors’ trust in patients’ reports of 
disability is based on the claimants’ perceived moral worthiness.  
Doctors political beliefs about the value and effectiveness of the South African social grant 
system and poverty alleviation policy also shaped how doctor framed eligibility. Whilst no 
doctor in the study was totally opposed to a social grant system (all doctors appeared to agree 
that some sort of grant was important to support disabled people), many were concerned that 
it was being abused by lazy work-shy people, and that the government was spending too 
much money on social grants which created a culture of entitlement and dependency, 
especially amongst the youth.  
Dr Soet said that she has heard from another doctor that many Eastern countries 
there is no social security for pensioners or the disabled and expressed the view that 
“people here are so ungrateful” saying: “South Africa is a lazy country. Those in 
Eastern countries are so productive – they work full days and are so productive and 
they don’t seem so unhappy – they are not living in squalor and have food on the 
table”. She added that people are used to being at home (referring mainly to young 
people) and that they “sit on their parents’ necks” – not that parents don’t motivate 
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them, it’s the kids they are spoilt (even though parents may be poor) – the tough love 
doesn’t happen”. She went on to say that “Children should not get fancy tekkies 
[trainers] - if you want that then you must go out and work to get it yourself.” (Field 
notes, 2014 February 12)  
Also see quote 6.2  
Dr Soet’s statement partly signals her belief in a ‘culture’ of poverty, in which ‘living in 
squalor’ is based on values and life choices. This was echoed in the words of a doctor from a 
West African who reported “In my country there is no grant, you must go work”, imputing 
that the grant system in South Africa had contributed to a culture of dependency or 
diminished self-agency and resilience.  
At a training session SASSA held for its assessors, a number of doctor contrasted the 
attitudes of South Africans towards work against those of hardworking foreigners.  
Dr Y: “Young people (South Africans) are in the hospital just queuing for grants but 
Somalis and Zimbabweans are working.” 
Dr X: “It’s up to us.”    
Dr Y: “That dependency.”    
Dr B: “It’s about social deprivation and ‘now I am entitled because society has 
deprived me’ – the grant reinforces this - you are deprived so we will give you the 
grant poor thing.”   
Dr X: “But in the context of poverty you give a grant for six months and they buy a 
TV or burial society membership and so become dependent.” 
One day in the field I had an animated conversation about the DG with a group of four young 
doctors during their lunch break. They argued that grants create disincentives to work and 
were frustrated by what they called ‘chancers’ and ‘bullshitters’ who had never worked 
before and yet felt entitled to a grant. One of the doctors expressed his irritation at people 
who thought “because they did a few days of manual labour they are now manual labourers 
and they don’t want to try and look for anything where they can sit on their bums all day”. 
When Dr. Taylor argued that someone might not have the education to obtain work, a 
colleague countered this by arguing that there was “always something someone can do”. The 
doctors all told stories of patients who refused medical interventions because they did not 
want to lose their grants. They also argued that more people received grants than were 
working73. These discussions between doctors demonstrate a set of concerns that were held 
                                                
73 Whilst according to Statistics South Africa 8.9 million people are formally employed in South Africa in 2014, 
and at the time SASSA paid grants to just over 16 million people, this is true. However, this is not a legitimate 




by many doctors about the social grant system in general: its costs, its abuse, the disjuncture 
between the rights people claimed and their willingness to accept their responsibilities as 
citizens and so-called perverse incentives.  
While this kind of talk between doctors does not necessarily reflect how they actually 
interacted with patients or actually made decisions about DGs, it does point towards a 
frustration with and lack of support for a system in which they played an integral part. These 
stories, which are framed by bigger policy debates and stories of welfare ‘scroungers’ in both 
the South African and international media, also have a strong influence at the implementation 
level in terms of how many doctors think and talk about who ‘deserves’ DGs. The idea of an 
‘undeserving’ poor “lacking the moral fibre to enjoy the benefits of economic growth” 
(Everatt, 2008: 293) has played a central role in the public discourse about poverty in 
South Africa. I frequently heard arguments from doctors that DGs create dependency, create 
incentives for patients to remaining ill, reward laziness, represent an unsustainable cost to the 
taxpayer (including doctors themselves) or clog up the healthcare system. It also reflects 
middle class values surrounding work and individual responsibility and an insensitivity to 
structural factors such as high levels of unemployment, which for the most part is 
involuntary. 
Even doctors with more positive views on DGs felt that some claimants abused the system 
and felt that the large number of non-eligible people that applied for DGs undermined the 
system by creating backlogs in the processing of applications, burdening the healthcare 
system and absorbing resources that could be better spent on creating a better DG system for 
the ‘truly’ disabled. It was therefore important to root out those who were ‘spoiling’ it for 
others. See quotes 6.3 and 6.4. 
The concern about disability ‘fakers’ and malingerers has existed for as long as states have 
offered programs that compensate work-place injuries, military veterans or provided social 
insurance or assistance to ill or disabled people (Stone, 1984). It is part of doctor’s role to be 
alert to and guard against this, but there is also an implicitly moral judgment made about the 
archetypal malingerer or faker – people who one doctor called “chancers and rubbish who 
“spin stories” to get the grant. Although doctors generally thought the sick and disabled were 
deserving of state support, based on their frequent encounters with malingering patients they 
actively guarded against illegitimate claims and ‘abuse’ of the grant system. This has also 
                                                                                                                                                  
who are not part of the working population (SASSA, 2014).  
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been shown to be the case in other South African studies (Macgregor, 2006; Segar, 1994).  
Sometimes this led doctors to be unfairly strict with patients and social workers on the wards 
at both Whitney and De Waal facilities, reported acting as patient advocates in cases where 
they felt that a doctor was unfairly refusing to recommend the grant. Although doctors seem 
to have been influenced by broader anti-welfare discourses, it is difficult to establish the 
extent to which it was these discourses shaped their decision-making, rather than their 
legitimate efforts to perform the gatekeeping work that SASSA expects of them to that.  It is 
important to note that there were also distinctions between how doctors acted in individual 
cases and explained these actions to me. In other words, it was possible for a doctor to feel 
immensely frustrated with the system but simultaneously feel tremendous empathy towards 
individual patients.  Research has shown that people may had hold complex and internally 
conflicting views regarding distributive justice and the type of welfare state they believe is 
helpful for both the country and individuals, which has been shown in the case of the United 
States (Keiser, 2010; Gilens, 1999) and South Africa (Seekings, 2007; 2008).  
As well as broader discourses, doctors’ framing choices are influenced by past experiences 
with patients. Doctors were often cynical about DGs based on what they had seen and 
experienced as doctors working in the public health sector. One doctor mentioned that 
although it was perhaps only the minority who abused social grants, they tended to see the 
minority in their everyday practice more regularly than other people and this influenced their 
perceptions of patients. They had seen people coming in drunk after grant payment day and 
had dealt with people who stopped taking their medication or refused treatment. They had 
seen people who reapplied repeatedly for grants and had experienced bullying from patients 
who wanted them to recommend the grant. They had also seen patients who had overcome 
difficult circumstances, illnesses and disabilities that were not ‘dependent’ on grants and 
tended to compare them. For example, Dr Taylor contrasted the attitude of an older woman 
with end-stage rheumatoid arthritis, motivated to do absolutely anything to improve, with that 
of a young, overweight 31-year-old woman with back pain “who someone had stupidly given 
the DG” in the past and who refused to leave until he recommended its renewal. He described 
her entering the clinic “with her jewellery and her smart handbag” and said, “she managed to 
drive herself here, walk up the stairs and find the Kentucky Fried Chicken okay, but felt she 
could not work because someone had told her she couldn’t”. He had spent thirty minutes of 
his time trying to encourage her to work and had found the experience very frustrating. “The 
only thing that was broken was her attitude. Someone had given her the temporary grant for 
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six months and now she felt she needed it for life.” He added, “sometimes the compassion of 
the doctor shoots the person in the foot.”  
Whilst general ideas and biases structured doctors’ thinking, it was often the individual 
characteristics of claimants that influenced decision-making. Based on how patients looked, 
spoke and behaved, doctors placed patients into socially constructed categories or made 
moralistic judgments about an individual patient’s character and their relative 
deservingness. This is not to say that patients fit neatly into categories and I agree with 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s argument that citizen-client worthiness is a continuum 
and that many clients present a mixture of worthy and unworthy characteristics (2003: 
111). The comparative and theoretical literature on street-level bureaucrats identifies street-
level bureaucrats as responding positively or negatively to the physical attributes, nationality, 
educational level, perceived morality, attitudes, and character types of applicants (Rice, 2012; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Horton, 2004; Dubois, 2010). In his summary of the 
literature on deservingness, Larson (2005) highlights the five main criteria that are found to 
influence perceptions of desert: 1) the perceived control the individual has over his/her social 
and economic situation; 2) degree of need; 3) feelings of shared identity; 4) attitude towards 
the helper (docility, gratefulness); and 5) the likelihood of reciprocity.  
Looking at eligibility through a moral frame, claimant characteristics such as age, 
appearance, previous work history, self-motivation, compliance to treatment and 
responsibility for their health and economic position and family support structure became 
important factors in establishing desert. Whilst I did not observe doctors discriminating 
against patients in any direct way, these patient characteristics did influence how rigidly or 
flexibly they applied the rules to individual patients. Although doctors attempted to overcome 
negative biases they had towards particular kinds of patients, they were more likely to rigidly 
apply rules if they felt a patient was undeserving. They were also more likely to be flexible 
and generous if they felt sympathetic towards a patient that they ‘felt’ was deserving.  
As young people are better able to compete for unskilled jobs, gain further education and 
training or recover their functions, doctors were least likely to recommend grants for this 
group, regardless of how doctors framed the disability problem. Unless young people had 
significant impairments, doctors were likely to classify them as lazy and see their application 
as an attempt to avoid work. This applied particularly to the large number of young 
patients living with HIV who, with anti-retroviral therapy, doctors felt should be 
physically able to participate in the labour force. Some doctors openly chastised young 
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people for applying, saying things along the lines of “you are young, you should go to work”.  
“The old people, they can’t find jobs, but the young ones…they want only money – 
especially the HIV - I don’t like to give them any because they can work. The HIV is 
not…you have HIV and high blood sugar I can understand, but HIV on its own…you 
must go work. They don’t want to go work, they are lazy. I tell them also ‘sisi, you are 
lazy, you must go work.’” (Dr Mulumba, interview, 2014 February 4)   
Doctors sometimes tried to convince claimants that they were capable of work, using 
examples of resilient patients, colleagues, family members or invoking tropes of the ‘heroic’ 
disabled person to demonstrate that it was possible to work despite illnesses or physical 
impairments. The implication was that claimants who were claiming work disability with 
relatively minor impairments were just not ‘trying’ hard enough. See quote 6.5. 
A claimant’s contribution to the economy and society was also an important factor for many 
doctors, which accounts for why young people were seen as undeserving. People who had 
never worked were seen as undeserving for one of two reasons: 1) they had never contributed 
to society through work; and 2) if they had been already been unemployed prior to becoming 
sick or disabled - often for many years - why should did they now deserve a grant? See 
quotes 6.6 to 6.8 
Such constructions were well illustrated by an event that occurred during my fieldwork in 
Whitney Hospital. I was observing one of Dr Taylor’s consultations with a disability grant 
applicant when another doctor, who I will call Dr Cronje, stormed in and came over to Dr 
Taylor’s desk. He was angry about a patient he had just seen, who had rheumatoid arthritis. 
He told us that the patient was receiving a permanent grant although she had not worked for 
the past ten years. He said that this meant “from 55 to 65 or 63, whenever women get it 
[referring incorrectly to the age of eligibility for the age grant]74, you will get the state funded 
DG for doing fuck all”. My immediate thought was how inappropriate this conversation was 
with another patient applying for the DG sitting in the room, but Dr Taylor appeared unfazed 
and simply said to me, “this is a case in point.” Although I had never met Dr Cronje before, 
he had obviously heard about my study from other doctors and he clearly wanted to voice his 
frustration. Just as he was about to exit the room he stopped and addressing me directly, said: 
“is it true that more people in South Africa receive social grants than work?” This was 
apparently a conversation that the doctors have had amongst themselves because I had heard 
another one of the doctors say almost exactly the same thing in the clinic earlier that day and 
                                                
74 In the past women women were eligible for the old age grant (pension) at 60 and men at 65, but this was 
reduced in phases after 2008 and equalised at 60 in 2010.  
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later in my research from another doctor in another hospital, but also affiliated with this 
department in Whitney. He added, “We must have one of the highest percentages of people 
receiving grants in the world.” Feeling forced to respond, I explained that the majority of 
these are child support grants and added that other welfare states offer much greater benefits. 
He interrupted me saying, “But we are not a welfare state.” He dismissed this and joked that 
he was clearly making a mistake by only having one child. 
People whose unhealthy lifestyles had contributed to their poor health were also considered 
less deserving. Patients who were overweight, heavy smokers or drinkers were particularly 
likely to be seen as lazy or irresponsible and received little sympathy from doctors for self-
inflicted illnesses. Doctors expect patients to comply with treatment and take responsibility 
for their health and doctors may feel little moral obligation to treat patients who aspire to the 
sick role, do not look after their health or do not cooperate in getting well, though the legal 
and professional obligation does remain (Nurock, 2009). Doctors were very frustrated by 
people with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, hypertension and arthritis who 
did not make the effort to lose weight, stop smoking or manage their illnesses but returned 
annually or bi-annually to apply for temporary grants. In some cases, doctors openly voiced 
these judgements to patients. For example, Dr Michaels told a patient who had been a victim 
of domestic abuse: “you make poor life choices”.  
Doctors often faced patients who became ill or were injured through drug or alcohol abuse or 
involvement in criminal activity such as gangs. Doctors could not ethically or legally refuse 
to recommend a grant to someone with a legitimate disability regardless of the source of 
impairment unless someone was known to be an active substance abuser which automatically 
disqualified them. However, in grey areas, doctors were cautious about recommending the 
grant for people who they felt might use their grant money for ‘questionable’ purposes such 
as buying alcohol, drugs or cigarettes, or who generally were not ‘good’ people.  
Whereas those patients who are not interested in treatment for a medical condition if 
it doesn't lead to a DG, that believe they deserve a DG because they are not employed 
even though they don't have a disability, that make use of tik [methamphetamine] or 
any other drugs and enter the clinic as though they own the place - they can cause a 
change in the [doctor-patient] relationship from their behavior. I have been 
confronted with a gangster patient who refused appropriate treatment, whilst 
stating, “I’ll just get the grant” and laughing as he said it, despite understanding 
that refusing treatment may result in the loss of his limb due to complications. If 
he later asked me for a DG I’m certain that I would be reluctant to submit the 
form. (Taylor, email correspondence, 2014 February 13) 
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See quotes 6.9 to 6.12  
As much as doctors guarded against the undeserving poor, doctors using a moral frame were 
willing to make exceptions for people that had minor impairments who they felt were 
somehow ‘deserving’ of assistance:  
“I have certainly heard harrowing stories here, which seemed appropriate to listen 
to, but on the whole people are just saying things like “I've got no money” or “I’m 
struggling” but they don't say it as if they are struggling, they say it like they are 
beggars who are asking for something and I'm trying to say to them, “look, disability 
is disability, the disability grant is a grant, it’s not a right and you can't come and 
bully me into it,” which is what they really are doing. I mean the same thing happens 
when this person comes with this little cup on the side of the road and I don't even 
look at them anymore, for years I haven't looked at them - I just wave my hand and 
that's it, end of discussion. That applies to everybody...and yet there are times when 
I've picked up the odd person on the side of the road just because instinctively they 
are different and there's something that they need which, okay a lift, but it’s 
something else as well and I'm willing to make exceptions but generally if anyone's 
begging they're not going to get much um sympathy from me.” (Brown, interview, 
2014 April 4) 
During the face-to-face encounter of the disability assessment process, doctors ‘bear witness’ 
not only to the disablement of a patient but to the vulnerability and suffering of another 
human being. This may create feelings of responsibility and moral obligation towards 
patients (Olthuis, 1996; Raef, 2006), which could affect how they treated them. According to 
Swartz and Schneider (2006: 243), “It is difficult to apply principles of distributive justice 
when one is faced with the reality of poverty”. South African doctors are aware of the impact 
that decisions to award or renew grants can have on the quality of life of patients living in 
poverty.  A study of anti-retroviral adherence and the DG (De Paoli et al., 2010) found that 
doctors reported high levels of discomfort at what they described as “feeling like God” when 
making decisions on whether or not to award or re-new grants. In the past doctors regularly 
recommended grants on humanitarian grounds rather than on actual impairment (De Koker et 
al., 2006; Steele et al., 2006; De Paoli et al., 2010).  As a result, the DG has been referred to 
by some as the “ag shame” grant (Interview Margaret Schneider, June 2013). “Ag shame” is 
a commonly used South African expression of sympathy, which means something akin to 
“you poor thing” or “I feel sorry for you”. 
What a number of doctors referred to as the ‘sympathy factor’ was intensified in 
interactions between doctor and patients who were visibly poor or in social distress. 
Although some doctors were able to emotionally distance themselves in their assessments or 
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were so clinically minded that they were not interested in these issues, some felt real guilt 
about rejecting patients knowing that they could offer no other real solutions other than a 
referral to an overburdened social worker. The doctor working as quality assurance officer 
for SASSA explained how his work is easier than those of other doctors because it does 
not involve seeing the suffering of applicants: 
“But it also makes it easier unfortunately, from the non-medical point of view, to be 
removed from the patients because I can understand very much that the doctors are 
very much inclined towards patients and there will always be a sympathy factor 
involved. With me too - I know that if I was involved and I was looking at 
somebody...you know you will always look at people's social backgrounds and you 
would probably tend to err on the side of the patients. As opposed to when I do it now 
on a desktop I don't have that influence - where I don't see the people, I don't see the 
social circumstances, I don't see the poverty. I'm not influenced by that.”(QA officer, 
interview, 2014 March 31) 
Doctors were more likely to feel sympathy for older people, mothers with children and 
“ordentlike mense” (decent people) who fell into the category of the ‘deserving’ poor. This 
reflects more the more general conceptions of desert held by South Africans as well as the 
overall design of the welfare state. Attitudinal surveys conducted in Cape Town showed that 
respondents considered older people more deserving than younger ones and favoured women 
and people with dependents more than men (Seekings, 2008a, 2010). The South African state 
treats elderly people as a deserving group and provides non-contributory, means-tested old 
age pension for people over sixty, which enjoys general legitimacy in South Africa (Seekings, 
2010). Underlying this support is the belief that older people are less responsible for their 
poverty because they are disadvantaged by worsening health and opportunities for 
employment as well as the disadvantages they experienced in the past under apartheid that 
prevented them from obtaining a decent education or work, which made it harder to save for 
retirement. (Seekings, 2008b) 
 SASSA is very aware of doctors’ tendency to be particularly sympathetic towards older 
applicants and during a training session held for doctors as SASSA staff member said, “You 
are a human being first – that is the 55 year-old, I am asking you to be inhumane.” The case 
of Dr Brown and Mrs Musimane below is an example of a doctor framing his decision in 
terms of deservingness rather than medical impairment or function. Dr Brown understood 
Mrs Musimane to be as a decent lady who deserved the state’s support, recommending a 
grant when technically she was not eligible. 
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The doctor turns to me and explains that, based on her file, she has minor complaints and that 
she is getting treatment for painful limbs. After thinking for a bit he says, “I could throw her 
out and make her sell chicken feet [which she had been doing to try to earn an income]. Is it 
about compassion?” and then adds, “She is a decent lady who has been trying.” The clerk 
chips in that she is 54 years old and Dr Brown says, “Good point, there is not much of a 
market for it.” He decides to recommend a 6-month temporary grant, saying that arthritis is 
about strain and you end up with a condition of ineffective hands and feet and “You can’t 
really do much with that. You can’t sell anything with hands that don’t work.” Dr Brown 
then tells her that she will be getting the grant. Mrs Musimane becomes emotional and says, 
in English, “I didn’t have a hope!” Dr Brown tells me, “Giving hope to people is important.”   
Cases like Mrs Musimane’s were common and many doctors responded in similar ways to Dr 
Brown, who by fitting her into his framework for understanding disability stretched the rules 
to accommodate her within the system. Doctors were sympathetic to patients who were trying 
to earn their own income or were trying to ‘overcome’ their circumstances in some way, 
seeing them as more deserving than those who were ‘lazy’ and ‘dependent’.  
Some doctors looked to family and household structures to determine desert. Dr Haddid, 
along with Dr Miller, considered the responsibility of kin as important in deciding whether a 
person or a household actually “needed” a grant. Dr Miller asked every patient who they 
lived with to determine whether there was someone who was another able-bodied person who 
could support them instead. Dr. Haddid felt that in old-age, sickness and disability it was the 
responsibility of the spouse to care for his or her partner and that they did not deserve to be 
compensated for this by the state and also applied this logic to applications for the Grant-in-
Aid. However, when this support did not exist they were more likely to recommend the 
grant75.  (See quotes 6.13 and 6.14)  
It is important to note that although doctors may be inclined to feel great sympathy for 
patients applying on the basis of poverty, this did not necessarily define their decision-
making and doctors would not necessarily deviate from SASSA guidelines. They might 
however try to help patients by referring them to social work services; educating, 
encouraging and motivating patients; providing employment suggestions; and in Dr Bhele’s 
specific case, collecting and handing out clothes to claimants. Several doctors also bent the 
                                                
75 He was particularly sympathetic towards older Muslim women who were divorced by their husbands but had 
never been employed and were unlikely to find work.. 
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rules of the Social Relief of Distress award to accommodate patients who did not qualify for 
a grant but were in clear financial need.   
6.3.4 Social framing  
Doctors employing a social frame typically understood disability in terms of the social or 
bio-psycho-social model of disability rather than in terms of SASSA’s highly medicalised 
model. Using this frame of disability, doctors considered both an individual’s medical profile 
and the structural economic, social and environmental factors that shape individual 
circumstance and ability to work. They considered claimants’ ability to participate in the 
labour market in terms of a claimants’ age, education and training, ability to speak English, 
previous work experience and skills. They also considered more structural factors such as the 
tightness of the labour market and opportunities for re-training and employment in relation to 
these individual factors. They might also consider the implications of ongoing medical 
treatment might have on their ability to retain a job (e.g. frequent clinic visits, dialysis, 
transport or care). (See quote 6.15 to 6.18) 
What distinguished the moral and the social frames was whether doctors understood 
deservingness in terms of individual agency (and failures of agency) or structural factors. 
While the process of moral framing involves looking at how deserving an individual claimant 
is of state support, a social frame takes a bigger picture view of deservingness, informed by 
the social structures that drive DG applications. Through this lens, doctors saw a case of a 
patient who was clearly not eligible for a grant more as a symptom of bigger social and 
economic problems than an individual case of malingering. The social frame recognises the 
contribution of South Africa’s apartheid past to current patterns of inequality in the Western 
Cape. Doctors using this frame expressed a rights-based approach to social welfare generally, 
grounded in ideals of social justice and equality.  Despite belief that some undeserving and 
lazy people try to ‘fleece’ the system, many doctors recognised that attempts to feign 
disablement were very often based on financial desperation rather than a desire to avoid 
work. This reflects the kind of redistributive justice rhetoric promoted by the South African 
constitution, which promises socio-economic rights, including social security to South 
Africans (see Chapter 2).  
Dr Du Toit presents a good example of how a social framing of disability differs from a 
bureaucratic or moral framing. His experience working in a European country with a 
generous welfare system had markedly influenced both his approach to assessing DGs and 
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his view of the DG system in general. Unlike most other doctors involved in the study, he 
expressed a strong rights-based approach to social grants and social welfare generally that 
was grounded in an ideal of social justice and equality. While he recognised that there were 
difficulties in managing the DG system, his view was that “individual rights should not be 
subsumed by the greater problems in the system.” (Field notes, 2014 March 14) Du Toit and 
others like him were less likely to think in terms of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ and 
framed their decisions in more social, structural terms. He was highly critical of the DG 
system in terms of the nature of the assessment process and the approach of his colleagues to 
health and social issues. He felt that the system failed to take social factors into account and 
that rather than objectifying patients, he believed that it was important to listen to people’s 
stories.  
He argued that other doctors were too strict in their approach and that South African doctors 
had become hardened to poverty and the severity of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis, which while manageable, still have significantly impact people’s well-being. He 
felt that in South Africa these diseases had been normalised and had become uninteresting to 
doctors. He was particularly perturbed by doctors who, rigidly applying SASSA directives 
would not take age into account in their decision-making, using the example of a doctor not 
giving a grant to a 59-year old woman with arthritis because she could technically still 
participate in the labour market. He and two other doctors in the study identified the 
migration of people from the Eastern Cape to the Western Cape in search of employment 
who could not find work, as a major social issue driving the demand for disability grants in 
the province. “You often have people coming from the Western Cape with no education and 
no English ability with HIV and lots of children and that these people would just keep on 
coming – it’s a major social problem” (Field notes, 2014 March 14).  
This more inclusive approach often resulted in decisions that diverged from SASSA’s 
guidelines and rules, as was demonstrated earlier in Dr Rahman’s case. However, these 
decisions were not necessarily driven by sympathy. Doctors using a social frame generally 
felt that their assessment criteria were appropriately grounded in the social model of 
disability and were made on the basis of people’s actual ability to participate in the labour 
market. Considering social factors does not make medical factors unimportant and doctors 
using a social frame did not simply recommend the grant to anyone who was unemployed. Dr 
Du Toit would, for instance, spend more time than most doctors asking a patient about their 
medical problems and how this affected their ability to carry out functional activities. 
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Although his threshold for impairment was fairly low, he would not recommend the grant to 
applicants unless they had some sort of medical diagnosis that he could use to justify his 
decision. Social factors were very strongly weighted in his assessments. These factors 
included that patient’s ability to speak English, age, education, previous work experience and 
degree of poverty. Although he spoke of his guilt and discomfort driving through shack 
settlement areas on his way from work, his decisions were not necessarily made on a 
humanitarian basis. Also, although he acknowledged that his decision-making broke with 
SASSA’s medical model, he argued that he had never received a work assessment back from 
an OT that had not recommended a grant and seemed to feel that his assessments were rooted 
in a similar approach. 
Dr Wright, whose decisions appeared to be informed by both a medical and a social frame, 
had not only medical views, but also personal and political views that conflicted with his 
commitments to SASSA. Aware of the high levels of poverty in the communities he served, 
he struggled not to base his individual decision-making on these economic factors.  
“The only way I can understand it is that it is informed by your own political views. 
So you've got doctors who make it their business to make sure that anyone who in an 
economy with 100% employment might get a job doesn't get a grant and then you've 
got the other extreme (I'm probably towards the other extreme). So probably I’m quite 
lenient…I don't like hearing about people starving. If you can't get a job it’s very easy 
to argue that the mental illness has something to do with it, but I'm probably…I'm 
aware that there is a bias in there because there are lots of other people who don't 
have jobs.” (Dr Wright, interview, 2014 April 8)  
He did however draw the line when patients had “everything in place to get a job” and 
wanted to renew their grants, explaining to patients that he was not prepared to lie for them.  
Dr Haddid commented that in his experience, very few DG applicants have matric 
certificates. Based on my observations of assessments and the general level of literacy 
amongst claimants I interacted with whilst obtaining informed consent, it appeared that many 
claimants had not progressed beyond primary school. This is supported by other studies of 
DG beneficiaries. A study by Govender and Miji (2009) showed that 62% of DG applicants 
surveyed had only a primary school education, with only 4% having completed matric. De 
Koker (2006) found that across twelve managerial districts in the Western Cape, and average 
of 3.8% of respondents applying for grants had a matric certificate. A shortage of unskilled 
work means that people without a matric certificate, who do not obtain any artisanal or other 
skills training after leaving school, struggle to find employment in South Africa (Dias and 
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Posel, 2007). Without the credentials or skills and lacking the social and cultural capital to 
secure regular and well-paid employment in an economy that is becoming increasingly skills-
intensive, and where most labour-intensive work has been pushed into the precarious 
informal economy; these people are only able to obtain precarious informal work (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005; 2015).   
Being sick or disabled makes competing for unskilled work extremely difficult and escaping 
from poverty even less unlikely. Given the large numbers of people available to perform 
unskilled work and ‘slack labour’ demand, employers are able to choose among large 
numbers of high productivity recruits. This means that people perceived to be less productive 
- older, sick or disabled people – are placed at the back of the job queue and are therefore 
unlikely to find work (Reskin and Roos, 2009). Even people with very mild impairments or 
manageable illnesses, or in their fifties, are placed in a non-competitive position in this 
section of the job market. Although disabled claimants with higher levels of education could 
technically work in more skilled jobs, they often struggled to find or retain work because of 
employer discrimination, inaccessible transportation and facilities and work environments 
that did not take their needs into account (Marumoagae, 2012; The South African Presidency, 
2014). (Also see quote 6.19)  
I was also struck by the large number of people in their fifties applying for disability grants. 
Many of these claimants were applying on the basis of chronic diseases such as hypertension, 
diabetes and asthma or age-related ailments such as osteoarthritis or vision problems, which 
were often mild and non-disabling. The medical quality assessor, nurses, occupational 
therapists and doctors that participated in the study supported these observations.  Mitra 
(2010) found DG beneficiaries tend to be mostly older individuals with low levels of 
education, who have detached from the labour market for a long time compared to the rest of 
the working population (Mitra, 2010).  Older people from, rural areas in particular, have often 
not progressed beyond primary school or far in secondary school. As of June 2014, over half 
of DG beneficiaries (51%) were between 46 and 59 (SASSA, 2014), which is unsurprising 
given that the incidence of disability increases with age and the lack of jobs available for this 
section of the population. Skills development and training programs largely exclude 
people over forty and older people therefore have little chance of improving their 
employability or moving to another employment sector (Interview with occupational 
therapist, Whitney Hospital). In a Western Cape study, some doctors reported that they felt 
pressurised to recommend the grant in cases where claimants were too old to work as 
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unskilled labourers, but were too young to qualify for state old age pensions (De Waal & 
Vorster, 2006).76 (See quotes 6.20 to 6.21) 
Recognising the difficulties that older people faced in finding employment, doctors often 
recommended grants for applicants in their fifties with mild health conditions that were not 
necessarily disabling and age was perhaps the strongest non-medical factor considered by 
doctors during assessments. Even doctors who strictly adhered to SASSA’s bureaucratic 
frame would recommend temporary grants for longer than they might have for a younger 
person or recommend a permanent grant rather than a temporary grant. This differed from the 
moral framing of older patients in that these decisions were rationalized more in terms of 
‘employability’ than older patients being more ‘deserving’ (although these two conceptions 
of eligibility may of course overlap).  
Many doctors considered claimants’ eligibility for the DG in relation to pension age and are 
particularly generous towards people who would soon qualify for this pension. A number of 
doctors admitted to seeking out additional conditions such as osteoarthritis in older patients 
who might not otherwise qualify. See quotes 6.22 to 6.23 
6.4 The influence of race and class on framing  
Given South Africa’s apartheid past, including the racially segregated medical system and 
persistent social and economic segregation between races in South Africa, it would be 
reasonable to assume that racial stereotypes held by doctors in this study would influence 
who they understood to be the ‘deserving’ poor. Research on physicians in the US has shown 
that some associate negative attributes such as non-compliance, low intelligence and drug and 
alcohol abuse with black and immigrant populations, which affects physicians’ engagement 
with patients and their decision-making and medical decision-making (Van Ryn & Burke, 
2000; Krupat et al., 1999; Schulman et al., 1999). This, however, did not appear to be the 
case with doctors I observed. In studies of attitudes towards redistribution policy in Cape 
Town, Seekings (2007, 2008a, 2010) found that despite South Africa’s history as a racist 
state, attitudes towards distributive justice in Cape Town do not appear to be shaped by racial 
considerations. Seekings (2008a, 2010) did however find that white respondents were more 
                                                
76 The use of grants for disabled people being used as proxy old age pensions is not a new phenomenon. 
Gevers’s (2014) historical account of the emergence of old age pensions shows that the ex-gratia Blind Grant 
for Africans, introduced in 1937 as the first monetary social grant for Africans, was sometimes awarded to 




generous in the amounts of money they suggested should be paid towards the unemployed, 
which he attributed to guilt about enduring racial economic inequality, which may have 
contributed to how some white doctors framed disability.  
Of course, given that racism is now considered socially unacceptable in South Africa and 
medical professionals are expected to be objective in their decision-making, it was highly 
unlikely that doctors would have admitted any racial bias to me in conversation (or to 
fieldworkers in Seekings’ attitudinal survey). However, based on my observations, ‘white’, 
‘African’ and ‘coloured’ doctors involved in the study made similarly negative value 
judgements about patients of all races and did not appear to be any more or less lenient with 
people from their own racial group. This did not mean that doctors’ ideas about the deserving 
and undeserving poor were not tinged with racial bias or that overtly racist doctors do not 
exist. The quality assurance officer told me of a doctor in a rural community outside 
Oudtshoorn (a farming area about 400km from Cape Town) who recommended social relief 
of distress grants (food parcels) for people with paraplegia and strokes. In George, a small 
city in the same area, the quality assurance officer had received report of a doctor who had 
recommended a six-month temporary grant for a person with visual and hearing impairments, 
who had also suffered from a stroke. He felt this could probably be attributed to racism on the 
part of these doctors, who assumed black people were lazy and undeserving, but emphasised 
that this kind of behaviour was uncommon. 
It is more likely that doctors’ understandings of disability and poverty and their 
interpretations of particular claimant characteristics were informed more by their middle-
class backgrounds than racial stereotypes. Doctors were noticeably more friendly and trusting 
towards patients that displayed middle-class attributes or behaved in ways that aligned with 
middle-class values. As Harrits and Moller (2011: 239) argues: “the category of middle class 
is related not only to possessing a certain amount of cultural and economic capital, or to a 
specific lifestyle and consumption pattern, but also to a specific taste and morality, associated 
with, for example, the ‘right’ way to carry oneself, to raise children and to engage in work” 
and these are reinforced when confronted with other categories that are different. The habitus 
of middle-class doctors may make it difficult for them to identify with poorer patients and 
understand their decisions. Chirayath (2007) has argued that doctors are more likely to 
attribute negative actions to personal characteristics (laziness) and choices of members of 
different racial or class groups than to their own group, over-attributing poverty and 
unemployment to patient choice or fault, leading people to thinking of individuals as 
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undeserving. This can lead to stereotyping and reinforce notions of the ‘culture’ of poverty 
(Chirayath 2007).  This makes them less likely to acknowledge structural factors and more 
likely to frame assessments in moral terms. As shown in Section 6.3.3 numerous doctors 
commented on the cost of grants to the taxpayer and the growing numbers of social grants, 
which reflect middle class concerns and a real limitation on the willingness to support 
redistributive policies like social grants. 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that DG decisions are strongly shaped by how individual doctors 
interpret cases, and that the subjectivity that comes with being a human actor has not been 
eliminated by greater regulation of the system. I have argued that doctors’ decision-making 
depends on how doctors frame their decisions. SASSA guidelines and processes create an 
administrative frame of action for doctors that is meant to guide their thinking about 
disability. However, there are tensions between this bureaucratic frame and alternative 
frames that doctors use for thinking about disability and employability in the South African 
context. As I have shown throughout this chapter, the frames doctors used were derived from 
broader discursive framings of health and socio-economic rights and entitlements, needs and 
social justice within the healthcare system and in South African society more broadly. The 
moral frame strongly aligns with popular conceptions of the ‘deserving’ poor; the clinical 
frame is shaped by professional values and culture, beliefs about the psychosocial aspects of 
care and the structure of healthcare system; and the social frame is rooted in the social model 
of disability and discourses of socio-economic rights. This does not mean that eligibility was 
merely a social construct or a function of culture. Even if doctors interpreted cases 
differently, their decisions were, for the most part, rationalised by the physical realities of 
patients’ bodies and their medical expertise.   
While frames help doctors cope with and manage the difficulties of making complex 
decisions in uncertain and demanding environments, this chapter has also shown that doctors 
do not only use their discretion or bend the rules to make their work easier (as Lipsky (2010) 
argued), there are times that they will bend the rules for people they think are deserving and 
there are people who they will rigidly apply the rules to because they feel compelled to. This 
is because they are citizen-agents (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003), who are affected 
by the interactions that they have with claimants. “The street-level worker’s frame of 
reference is not the agency of the state but the citizen-client encounter.” (Maynard-
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Moody & Musheno, 2000: 349) This means that individuals applying for disability benefits 
must perform the role of the ‘deserving’ poor to the person playing the role of the impartial 
bureaucrat (Dubois, 2010), which I will discuss further in the next chapter.  
Building on Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s definition, I argue that doctors are also 
professional-agents, whose ideas about their role as doctors and the medical ethics, norms 
and values they hold also influence their decisions. The literature on the sociology of 
professions and studies of medical professionals in particular (Freidson, 1980) have 
demonstrated the influence of professional values and notions of autonomy on how 
professionals operate. Despite the fact that many professionals are street-level bureaucrats, 
this literature has not been connected to studies of policy implementation. Distinguishing 
between different frames for decision-making helps to bring some of the professional and 
bureaucratic values and demands into comparative perspective, showing why, in this case, 
doctors have been so difficult to manage within the SASSA system.  
Whether because they felt solidarity with an individual whom they felt deserved a grant, saw 
it as medically important that someone receive food to eat, or because they knew how 
unlikely it was that many claimants with even minor disabilities were to find a job, I found 
that doctors regularly made decisions that diverged from SASSA’s guidelines. This did not 
happen in every case and given the increased strictness and routinisation of SASSA’s new 
system, it appears to happen less frequently than in the past. However, this variation creates 
confusion amongst beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries about eligibility criteria. Doctors’ 
subjectivities, particularly their likelihood to feel sympathy towards deserving claimants 
creates opportunities for claimants to influence doctors’ decision-making, which I will 




CHAPTER 7: Performance, pressure and coping: Encounters between doctors and 
claimants in disability grant assessments 
7.1 Introduction 
A woman in her late fifties entered Dr Mulumba’s assessment room at Zenzele community 
clinic, a very busy primary healthcare facility in one of Cape Town’s larger townships. Mrs 
Nkosana pulled out a chair in front of the doctor’s desk and with one hand on her back and 
the other hand on the table, lowered herself carefully into the chair, complaining loudly and 
dramatically about her backache. Dr Mulumba greeted her and asked her why she was 
applying for the grant. Mrs Nkosana told her that for seven years she had had “no food and 
no job” and had “been waiting for a grant” since 2008. Mrs Nkosana went on to tell Dr 
Mulumba that she had “terrible diabetes.” After discussing Nkosana’s medical history and 
treatment for a while, Mulumba began to fill out the assessment form. While she did this, 
Nkosana started to tell her about what a terrible disease the “sugar” was. She also described 
her incontinence, saying that when she went back to the Eastern Cape she had to use babies’ 
nappies because she was “leaking.” Dr Mulumba was only half listening and did not respond 
to this storytelling, focusing her attention on the form in front of her instead.  
 Recognising this, Mrs Nkosana turned and, hoping for some more sympathy from me, 
complained that her back was sore. Trying to avoid becoming involved, I simply nodded. She 
was not deterred and added that she also couldn’t see properly. Dr Mulumba intervened by 
looking up from her paperwork and telling her that she needed to glasses and that she should 
see someone about this. Mrs Nkosana was not so easily dismissed and started complaining 
that her nose was running and that it gave her a headache and made a knocking noise in her 
head, rapping on the table to demonstrate. Dr Mulumba asked her if she had always had sinus 
problems and Nkosana responded with a complex story about leaving work because of her 
back pain. Mulumba asked her, “is it your back only or also your knees?” and Nkosana 
answered that her knees were also a problem: “Yoh77, my knees are stiff! Sometimes I leave 
the table and I have no food inside and I say ‘Hey Jesus, you must look after me.’” The 
doctor asked Nkosana where her husband was. “Yoh, yoh, yoh!” exclaimed Nkosana. She 
then continued to tell the doctor about how her husband had retired and returned to the 
Eastern Cape without her: “He sweet talks you nicely – I hate him. That is why I am getting 
the diabetes.” She added that her daughter has been smoking and drinking since 2003 - “that 
                                                
77 “Yoh” is an exclamation denoting emphasis or surprise.  
 
 35 
is why life is so terrible.”  
Until now, this thesis has focused on the perspectives and decision-making of doctors and 
how they interact with the SASSA bureaucracy, without paying much attention to the 
possibility that claimants can be active participants in DG assessments who can act to 
influence these decisions and the assessment process itself. Although their social position, 
medical expertise and the bureaucratic decision-making authority places doctors in a 
dominant position in DG assessments, Mrs Nkosana’s case shows that DG claimants, who 
often had their own ideas about their rights in the system, were not necessarily subordinate or 
passive victims in their interactions with doctors. 
In this chapter, I examine the interaction between doctors and claimants, showing how 
claimants put forward their individual disability claims by performing the role of ‘deserving’ 
disabled person and how doctors respond to patients as they perform their role as doctors. 
There is a general gap in the street-level bureaucracy around the agency of clients, who have 
mainly been considered in terms of how they are acted upon rather than as contributors to 
bureaucratic processes who co-construct institutional categories (Eskelinen et al., 2009)78. 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the relational, situational and performative aspects 
of bureaucrat-citizen interactions – what happens “between” doctors and claimants (Bartels, 
2013).   
In the previous chapter, I showed how doctors’ own framings of disability can shape policy 
implementation. Here I extend this argument and contribute to attempts to build on Lipsky’s 
work by showing that it is not only workers, but also clients, who bring their agency to bear 
on street-level encounters and shape policy implementation through their creative 
engagements with bureaucratic systems (Barnes & Prior, 2009).  
When people are co-opted into the policy process as clients, patients, beneficiaries or 
claimants, their position and agency within bureaucratic encounters is not only defined by 
administrative structures, but also by their individual experiences, own sources of knowledge 
and interpretations of the situations in which they are required to act (Barnes & Prior, 2011). 
It is not only doctors who must make sense of DG policy – claimants also interpret policy 
(for instance eligibility criteria) based on information they receive from SASSA, from 
healthcare professionals, from what they see in communities (who is receiving grants) and 
                                                
78 Lipsky does acknowledge that clients can impose low-level costs to bureaucrats in their interactions, but sees 
their ability to shape the interaction as fairly limited.  
 
 36 
information that is shared by other claimants. Based on these interpretations of their rights 
and how the system works, claimants may try and negotiate with doctors or take advantage of 
ways they see to get ‘into’ the system (Kelly, 2012). When they come face-to-face with 
doctors, claimants are able to intentionally de-stabilise power relations and influence the 
assessment context by presenting themselves to doctors in particular ways, exploiting gaps in 
existing information and capitalising on the uncertainty and fuzziness of the disability 
category, as well as the moral dilemmas that doctors face when making assessments.  
Drawing on Foucauldian (1979) notions of power as decentralised, productive and dynamic, I 
demonstrate that disability grant assessments are a dialogical and contingent process - a space 
of resistance and contestation as well as disciplining and control by the state.  
Power, if we do not take a too distant a view of it, is not that which makes the 
difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not 
have it and submit to it. Power must be analysed as something which circulates; or 
rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised 
here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece 
of wealth. Power is employed and exercised in a net-like organization, and not only 
do individuals circulate between its threats; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. (Foucault, 1980: 98).  
Foucault was interested in the microphysics of power: “power that operates at the level of 
minute and previously unobserved discourses and practices” (Newman, 2005: 54). Foucault’s 
pervasive notion of power is typically criticised for leaving no space for agency or resistance 
because there is nowhere from which resistance can emerge (Newman, 2005). However, 
McKee (2009) argues that Foucault’s notions of power actually presupposes that subjects 
have agency, just that he understood resistance as part of power rather than external to it. As 
Foucault argued: “where there is power there is resistance” (Foucault, 1979: 96). “There are 
no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective 
because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised” 
(Foucault, 1980: 142). Furthermore, the Foucauldian notion of governmentality – “the 
conduct of conduct” – implies that the ‘governed’ are capable of acting and thinking and 
exercising agency (Dean, 1999 in Hansson and Hellberg, 2015).  
In this chapter, I show how claimants use medical performance, narratives of personal 
suffering, violence and social pressure in an attempt to influence doctors’ decision-making 
processes and re-assert their personhood and the relevance of their lived experience in the 
DG assessment.  These acts of resistance to the state’s narrow definition of disability 
represent an attempt to be ‘seen’ by the state, but they are not necessarily political, conscious, 
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noticed or acknowledged by doctors. As I will demonstrate, claimants’ attempts to assert 
themselves during DG assessments in fact typically had little effect on doctors’ decision-
making. Instead, these acts often undermined patients’ position in the assessment as doctors, 
hardened by large numbers of patients that they perceived as attempting to manipulate and 
bully them into recommending the grant, employed coping strategies to defend against these 
pressures and reassert their authority in interactions. Although largely ineffective, these 
attempts at resistance do point to differential understandings of rights to inclusion and 
support from the state as well as a sense of frustration at the marginalising effects of the 
current DG system.  
7.2 Power-inequalities and claimants’ understandings of disability   
Although doctors’ work is subject to administrative and legal restraints, physicians have 
considerable power relative to claimants in the DG assessment. They have obvious 
gatekeeping and expert authority. This is reinforced by the ceremonial order and 
bureaucratic format of clinical encounters, which enables and supports the expression of 
medical authority (Strong, 1979). The notion that clinical encounters produce and reproduce 
asymmetries of power and knowledge is a well-worn idea in medical sociology. Sociological 
critiques of medicalization in particular strongly emphasise the asymmetry between 
patient and doctor and often paint patients as victims (Lupton, 1997). While medical 
imperialism and the caricature of biomedicine put forward in the medicalization thesis79 are 
exaggerated and not necessarily accurate in an age where lay people have more access to 
information and doctors’ work is increasingly regulated by corporations and the state 
(Williams, 2001; Kelly and Field, 1994 in Williams, 2001), significant power differentials 
continue to exist between doctor and patient in circumstances where patients are illiterate and 
poor.  
This is often the case in DG assessments, where the fissures created by the history of 
apartheid continue to structure the South African public health system, entrenching the 
dominance and paternalistic role of doctors in their relationship with patients and relegating 
patients to a “submissive, compliant and reactive role” (Grant, 2006: 55; Saohatse 1998; 
Crawford 1999; Kane-Berman & Hickman, 2003). Doctor-patient interactions are 
                                                
79 Critics of medicalization argue that this power allows medicine to expand its authority to address social 
problems or forms of deviance from the norm. They argue that this makes medicine a form of social control 
(Waitzkin, 1999; Zola, 1972; Conrad & Schneider, 2010). 
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interpersonal and the micro-politics of these also reflect and perhaps (to some extent) support 
broader social relations (Waitzkin, 1991: 9). The interactions I observed between doctors 
and claimants were representative of the socio-cultural cleavages that exist in and define 
relations in broader South African society. These cleavages were created by class, race, 
educational and cultural differences which accentuate social distance between doctors 
and patients and encourage “performances of distance and domination” (Heyman, 1995; 
2004: 492).	  The obvious social and economic inequality between doctors contributed to 
power inequalities in the assessment. On two occasions, I observed patients asking 
doctors to borrow money from them and another doctor told me that sometimes patients 
asked her for money to buy bread. According to Dr Brown, this resulted in doctors treating 
patients as “poor unfortunates” (Dr Brown, interview, 2014 April 4). 
Language and knowledge barriers amplify these inequalities. Watson et al. 
(2006) argue that applicants should take the central position in DG assessments 
and that they should have the opportunity to express their experiences, opinions 
and subjectively relevant information. In turn, assessors should strive to 
understand why claimants are applying and what their perceptions of function 
are. This was not often not the case in DG assessments I observed and SASSA 
doctors sometimes asked claimants very little about their experiences, leaving 
them to sit quietly in the room while the doctor filled out the forms – their presence almost a 
secondary part of the doctors’ work. As well as being a function of a doctors’ particular 
approach and time constraints, this was the result of the language barriers, illiteracy and 
claimants’ poor medical knowledge, which limited their ability to give accurate medical 
histories or give accounts of their functional limitations.  
Patients who understood or spoke no or very poor English or Afrikaans struggled to 
communicate their personal or social experiences of disability effectively to doctors. As few 
doctors conducted physical examinations during assessments, these patients often simply sat 
quietly in the chair whilst the doctor looked through their files before dismissing them. As 
most doctors could speak both English and Afrikaans, this put Xhosa-speaking claimants who 
did not speak the socially dominant languages of medicine at a distinct disadvantage, even 
when ad hoc translators were used. This reinforced racial differences between black patients 
and white, ‘coloured’ or Indian doctors. This, as Crawford’s (1999) study of language in 
South African healthcare facilities also showed, disempowered patients and reinforced 
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doctors’ dominant position. In contrast, patients who could communicate with the doctor in 
their own language or at least had a good command of English or Afrikaans were 
significantly more communicative and confident with the doctor and were better able to 
actively participate in and shape the nature of the assessment. Doctors, in turn, were able to 
develop better rapport with these patients and were more receptive to their claims. Likewise, 
patients who were better educated, who shared a cultural background and had more of an 
understanding of what the doctor needed to know from them were able to develop 
significantly better rapport with doctors. In a study of face-to-face encounters between 
rehabilitation workers and long-term sick immigrants in Sweden, Jonsson (1998) found that 
clients’ language abilities and cross-cultural skills strongly affected how they were able 
to express themselves and how they are perceived and treated by street-level bureaucrats. 
Similar findings have been made in numerous other healthcare (Horton, 2004; Porter, 
1990; Beach et al., 2006) and welfare programme settings (Kriz & Skivenes, 2010). 
A lack of medical knowledge and information about SASSA’s eligibility criteria also 
hampered claimants’ ability to present their case to doctors. For instance, when doctors asked 
patients why they were applying for the grant or why they could not work many claimants 
(particularly first-time applicants) did not understand that doctors were interested in hearing 
about their medical complaints, how these impaired them and prevented them from working. 
Social workers at Whitney Hospital explained that some psychiatric patients would apply on 
the basis of old scars or injuries, rather than their psychiatric conditions because these more 
visible signs of injury were easier for them to describe than their experiences of mental 
illness. 
It is the patient’s first application and the doctor asked her why she was applying. She 
replies that she is applying because she was still looking for a job. The doctor said, 
“So it’s not that you cannot work, you just cannot find a job?” Without any attempt to 
convince the doctor of why she might qualify on the basis of her HIV diagnosis, the 
patient replies, “yes.” (Vrede, Field notes, 2014 January 1)  
The doctor asks, “What is wrong with you?” She says that she doesn’t feel well every 
day and she doesn’t have an income. She uses medication for high blood pressure and 
asthma. He lists a number of medications but she is not sure of what the names of the 
ones she uses and can only describe them in terms of being white pills and red pills. 
He takes her BP and examines her legs and then does an eye exam to check for 
hypertensive retinopathy. He tells her that her blood pressure is very high (220/120). 
He looks through her file and sees that her blood pressure has been 220/140, 220/130 
for several months. He checks with her that she is really taking her medication. After 
the assessment is complete and the patient has left, he says that this lady is quite 
unwell - although she doesn’t necessarily look like she is. He says that people don’t 
know how to express themselves – when he asked her what was wrong she simply says 
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she doesn’t have an income (Rahman, field notes, 2014 July 10). 
Also see quote 7.1 Appendix C  
 As well as communication barriers, the first case above also points to a more general 
misunderstanding of eligibility criteria. Other studies have found that patients think that 
because they are receiving medication or have a file at the clinic that they are eligible for a 
grant (Macgregor, 2006). This was echoed by doctors in this study (see quote 7.2). 
Misperceptions about eligibility criteria were also fuelled by the previous lack of 
regulation and standardisation around eligibility (see Chapter 2) and ongoing differential 
application of eligibility criteria by doctors. These misunderstandings have been difficult 
for SASSA to correct. During one of the SASSA trainings I attended, one doctor 
commented: “It’s quite pathetic and it’s quite sad that people come and they say ‘I was told I 
could get the grant’. It is naïve and you feel horrible saying, ‘well actually you don’t 
qualify.’”  
Based on the questions claimants asked doctors and myself, it seemed many did not 
understand why some people would receive grants and others would not, why they would 
receive a temporary grant from one doctor and not another, or why their eligibility would 
change from one application to another. SASSA discouraged doctors from telling patients 
whether or not they have recommended the grant and although this practice protected doctors 
from patient retaliation, it prevented doctors from explaining to patients why they were not 
eligible and did little to reduce confusion around eligibility or reduce the perception that the 
grant system is arbitrary and unfair. Dr Haddid, told me that patients would often ask him 
“have I been lucky doctor?” at the end of their assessment. The idea that DG applications are 
a game of chance, speaks to the subjective nature of the assessment process and the confusion 
this has created amongst the public. 
These misconceptions about eligibility criteria were driven not only by naivety and poor 
communications, but what appeared to be fundamentally different understanding of what it 
means to be disabled. Various studies in South Africa have demonstrated that lay 
constructions of disability and illness and DG eligibility differ from the narrow bureaucratic 
and medicalised definitions of eligibility (Reynolds and Swartz, 1993; Delany et al., 2005; 
Segar, 1994; Macgregor, 2006; Kelly, 2012). In their ethnographic work in the Eastern Cape, 
Hansen and Sait (2012: 100) encountered people who had “talk[ed] themselves into 
disability” and who understood their poverty and inability to find work as a form of 
disablement. DG claimants in these studies understood illness, impairment, poverty and 
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distress as disability, even if their embodied experience of suffering did not fit the 
biomedical definition of disability – a definition which does not take personal experiences 
and related suffering into account (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991; Kleinman, 1995). 
Claimants tend to express their experiences as individual problems and want their 
personal experiences to be taken seriously (Lipsky, 1980: 60; Prottass, 1979; Soss, 
1999). This need stands in sharp contrast to the reductive and objectifying nature of the 
disability assessment. 
Mechanic (1995) argues that patients conceive of illness differently, displaying difference 
“illness behaviour”, responding to bodily indications, interpreting symptoms and taking 
action in often very different ways. Patients tend to experience disease in terms of function 
and their daily activities, whereas doctors tend to think more about patterns of disease 
(Mechanic, 1995: 1208). Although not all doctors prescribed to a purely medical-bureaucratic 
definition of disability, this was official policy, and I have understood claimants’ attempts to 
convince doctors to stretch or abandon this definition as contestations of the definitions that 
structure their exclusion. While many claimants were simply brushed aside by doctors, there 
were claimants who attempted to assert their demands for inclusion based on how they 
understood disability.  
7.3 Forms of contestation, resistance and insubordination: re-asserting personhood and 
strategies for making claims on the state 
One of the more bizarre doctor-patient interactions I observed in the field took place between 
33-year old Mr Khaya and Dr Marais, an orthopaedist in an outpatient clinic at Welgemoed 
hospital. Mr Khaya, a new patient at the clinic, entered the room limping and wearing a knee 
brace incorrectly – it was only half tied up and upside down and he clearly had no need for it. 
He was there on the premise that he was seeking treatment for his knee, but Dr Marais very 
quickly said to me, “Can’t you tell he’s only here for a grant?” Khaya could not understand 
any English and a nurse was brought in to translate. She explained to Marais that Khaya had 
been injured during strike action in Rustenberg where he had been a miner and had ataxia 
(poor balance) as a result of a head injury. He had been medically boarded in 2011 because 
he had Stage 4 AIDS and had been paid out R104 000, but this money was now finished. He 
told the doctor that he was looking for money from SASSA because he was not working. He 
claimed that he had tuberculosis, but he was not receiving treatment for it or his HIV because 
he had moved from Philippi to Khayelitsha and did not know where the clinic was.  
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On examination, it appeared that there was nothing wrong with Mr Khaya’s knee, he did 
however have a sore on his hip and he appeared underweight and unwell. The doctor asked 
Khaya what he wanted and he responded that if his leg could be healed then he would work, 
but if it could not be healed then he would like a grant. He added that one of his legs was 
shorter than the other. Dr Marais told me that he was frustrated because he was not sure what 
the patient wanted and whether he could help him as his problems were clearly not 
orthopaedic, despite him claiming that they were. He said to the nurse [a different one by this 
point], “Tell him that no doctor can fix his legs and that he needs to see a doctor for the HIV 
because this is his main problem at the moment.” He told Mr Khaya that he could “get a 
grant” because of the HIV and the problems related to it. He did not, however, conduct any 
real assessment of his HIV status. He was also likely unlikely to qualify because he was non-
compliant. Khaya grinned widely, perking up significantly. He and the nurse spoke in Xhosa 
for some time. The nurse then shared this conversation with the doctor, saying that Khaya 
had told her about the conversation they had had about the possibility of Marais lending 
Khaya money. Dr Marais was very amused because no such discussion had taken place. The 
nurse spoke to Khaya again and he reiterated that Marais had agreed to lend him money. Dr 
Marais told the nurse that he never lent or gave patients money and, clearly annoyed, got 
some pills from his bag, explaining he that he was getting a migraine. I didn’t understand 
much of the conversation that continued between the nurse and Khaya, but heard her saying 
“uMlungu” (white man). Clearly not directly translating this conversation she told Dr Marais 
that because he was white, people thought he had money. Whilst we waited for the DG book 
to arrive, the nurse carried on chatting with Khaya. She didn’t seem to think that the Mr 
Khaya was unjustified in his expectation and joked with him: “instant loan”. When Dr Marais 
finally filled out the form he wrote that Mr Khaya had pulmonary TB, a previous head injury 
and HIV and recommended a permanent grant without review, clearly never wanting him to 
return. When Mr Khaya got up to leave the doctor told him to leave his knee brace behind 
because he didn’t need it anymore.  
In this case, almost in collaboration with the nurse, Mr Khaya was able to assert his demand 
for a grant quite directly, resisting the inherent power disparities between him, the poor black 
man who could not speak English and the wealthy, white, English speaking medical 
professional, despite the fact that he was both non-compliant and feigning illness. Although 
claimants were seldom so successful in doing this, he succeeded in wearying the doctor to the 
point that he recommended the grant simply to get rid of him. Dr Marais admitted that he 
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appeased patients in this way fairly often and I also observed him advising a junior doctor 
who was being pressurised by one of her own patients to recommend a temporary grant if the 
patient continued to insist on it.  
This case shows that DG applicants and beneficiaries are not always passive victims without 
options or strategies. De Certeau (1984) and Scott (1985, 1990, 2009) have both argued that 
the powerless are not necessarily passive or docile and that small, tactical acts of defiance in 
everyday life can be used to resist forces of power. In Asylums, Goffman (1961) argued that 
people used “secondary adjustments” to re-assert their personhood resist the categorization 
and stripping of the ‘self’ in the institution. A number of other ethnographic studies have 
shown that people employ what James Scott has described as “weapons of the weak” (1985) 
or “arts of resistance” (1990) and what De Certeau (1984) calls “tactics” or “arts of the weak” 
– small, everyday and often unnoticeable forms of resistance to systems of domination that 
show the limits of power, but which are often short-lived in their effects. Barnes & Prior 
(2011) argue that the subversion of policy directives and disruption of bureaucratic processes 
in public service settings is driven by “agencies of resistance” of both street-level bureaucrats 
and service users. While scholars of street-level bureaucracy have paid significant attention to 
the subversive actions of frontline workers, acts of resistance by citizens and clients in 
bureaucratic encounters and its effect on policy outcomes has been less studied. Resistance 
by service users includes the development of alternative strategies and practices that result in 
distinctively different outcomes than those intended or the outright refusal to participate in 
programmes to address their needs (Barnes & Prior, 2011: 7). Clients do not always accept 
being placed in administrative categories and may work to assert their agency in street-level 
interactions and they can subvert and disrupt existing systems and refuse to participate in the 
system in the way institutions and bureaucrats want them to (Dubois, 2010: 6).  
For example, in his work in French welfare offices, Dubois (2010) observed cases where 
clients would defy the bureaucratic attempts to place them into administrative categories 
through personalisation - attempting to gain control of the interaction by creating cracks in 
the bureaucratic or professional façade of bureaucrats or introducing an emotional dimension 
into interactions through narratives of misery. There are a number of other examples of this 
in European studies. Bloor and Macintosh (1990) showed how female patients living in 
therapeutic communities resisted the medical “surveillance” of healthcare workers through 
concealment and non-cooperation. Salmon and May (1995) also found that through 
somatization, patients used the biomedical model to manipulate doctors. McDonald and 
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Marston (2005) showed how unemployed people in welfare to work programmes resisted 
efforts to imbue them with the ethics of self-responsibilisation by exiting or refusing to 
participate in programme activities. Ewick and Silbey (2003) provide examples of citizens’ 
resistance to legal authority through masquerade, rule literalness, disrupting hierarchy, foot-
dragging and colonizing space. In South Africa, using de Certeau’s concept of ‘tactics’, 
Schneider et al. (2010) showed that patients negotiated access to care and preserved their 
dignity in a resource-constrained public hospital by making tactical use of social networks, 
complaint mechanisms, narratives of resistance and becoming expert, compliant patients.  
I argue that in DG assessments, claimants interrupt disability assessments in an effort to 
assert themselves and their rights by engaging in relational or oppositional struggles with 
doctors around access to the grant. Patients attempted to achieve this inclusion through 
performances of disability, presenting their genuine, somatic or feigned impairments to 
doctors and communicating stories of psychic, social and economic suffering to convince 
doctors that they ‘deserved’ a grant, or through coercion. It is, however, important to note 
that not all claimants resisted the assessment process and I am not attempting to distinguish 
between acts of compliance and resistance in terms of agency, because accepting the rule can 
also be a form of agency (Hansson and Hellberg, 2015: 31). In fact, perhaps one of the most 
effective way of negotiating access to the grant was by being compliant, well-mannered and 
demonstrating that one was a ‘decent’ and therefore ‘deserving’ person.  There is of course 
also a risk of overstating the agency of claimants and over-interpreting DG claimants’ 
behaviour and self-expressions and labelling them as resistance, or assuming that there is a 
unity in how the ‘weak’ think, which is assumed to be antagonistic to power, criticism that 
has been levelled at Scott and de Certeau (Gupta, 2001; Vinthagen & Johansson, 2014; 
Howe, 1998).   
As in the case of Mr Khaya, who used an old knee brace as a prop in his performance of 
disability, malingering or exaggerating impairments was a commonly used tactic by 
claimants. Dr Bhele summed up this scenario quite well: “If you cannot find work then you 
remember that you have an old injury.” Back pain, osteoarthritis and pain from old injuries 
were most commonly exaggerated or feigned by claimants. The quality assurer who reviews 
large numbers of completed assessment forms joked during an interview that based on the 
number of patients who complained of arthritic pain it appeared that there was a “pandemic 
of osteoarthritis.” However, according to provincial health data and given the young age of 
many people making these claims, this was clearly untrue. Claimants with epilepsy were 
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generally aware that only uncontrolled cases of epilepsy are eligible for the DG and because 
the frequency of their fits was difficult to authenticate, some exaggerated the number of 
seizures they had per month. Failure to comply with treatment in order to remain ill can also 
be understood as a strategic attempt to manipulate the system gain access to the grant. 
Psychiatric social workers at De Waal hospital, reported that claimants frequently ‘relapsed’ 
shortly before their grants expired. Occupational therapists from work assessment units at 
Marais and Welgemoed hospitals also highlighted the frequency with which DG applicants 
that had been referred to them by doctors for formal work assessment exaggerated their 
disablement or intentionally underperformed on mobility, motor or functional tests. (See 
quote 7.3)  
Many of the people applying for grants on ‘false’ premises had received temporary grants in 
the past (often for tuberculosis), but had not found work after these grants had lapsed and 
were looking to either draw out the benefits that this impairment had given them or find new 
opportunities (e.g. old fractures) to re-new these grants and avoid the devastating effects of 
losing their monthly income. These repeat applicants, who very often had a better idea of 
how the SASSA system worked and what doctors wanted to hear, would arrive at the 
assessment with a list of symptoms and complaints (Dr Jacobs, interview, 2013 October 24). 
Although defaulting on treatment may have presented a strategy for retaining a temporary 
disability grant in the past, few doctors now recommend grants for people who do not adhere 
to treatment (See quote 7.4). As discussed in Chapter 4, because deception by claimants is a 
central concern in disability benefit administration, doctors were alert to the possibility that 
patients were exaggerating their impairments. This meant that these performances were 
seldom convincing to doctors. 
As well as people who intentionally performed their disablement, there were people with 
relatively minor impairments appeared to genuinely believe they were disabled. According to 
OTs I interviewed, who often spent days with patients during work assessments, some 
patients felt more disabled by their medical impairments than functional assessments would 
suggest. “Suffering is an affliction of the person, not the body” (Cassell, 2004: xii) and 
different people with the same disease may not have the same illness.	  Individuals with low 
self-esteem and motivation as a result of their life circumstances and subjective experiences 
of illness or impairment may become convinced that they are not able to work (Mechanic, 
1995) and both doctors and occupational therapists recognised that low motivation drove 
perceptions of disablement.   
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I get a lot of women that have come in here because of abuse - like they are broken 
because of abuse and you can actually see it in their entire demeanour already, the 
way they dress, the way their hair is, the way they smell. We do get patients that look 
horrible, they look really worn out, so life has kind taken from them, just in general - 
whether it be other people that have broken them down or circumstances that have 
broken them down or maybe they are just negative people - you get pessimistic 
people. So there’s a lot of reasons why their motivation is not where it should be to 
return to work - to go out and seek work. We see a lot of people whose children are 
on drugs and that also takes a lot out of them - that takes a lot of their motivation 
away and they've lost their faith whether it be in God or in a different deity, they've 
just lost the spirit basically. They feel like they are victimised, they feel like they just 
are...they can't do anything (OT1, interview, 2014 April 23) . 
Also see quote 7.5  
Physical pain and suffering that is not connected with or disproportionate to physiological 
problems can be driven by somatisation, which is a bodily mode of experiencing personal and 
political distress (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991: 280). Both physical and emotional pain can 
be increased by fear, powerlessness, anxiety, depression, and lack of control (Francis, 2006). 
In another study of DG applications in South Africa, Macgregor (2006) found that claimants 
in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha somatised the stresses of their economic and 
social circumstances, expressing their suffering as a psychiatric condition they called 
“nerves”. Although not connected to attempts to obtain social benefits, Fullwiley (2006; 
2014) describes how Senegalese women carrying the sickle-cell trait (a benign condition with 
no symptoms) articulated their emotional, social and physical suffering as “sickle cell crisis”. 
Fullwiley theorises that this enunciation of suffering in biological form is an expression of 
biosocial suffering, an idea drawn from Rabinow’s concept of biosociality (1992) and 
Kleinman et al. ’s (1997) concept of social suffering. Scheper-Hughes (2002) argues that 
illness can be used as a “passive aggressive weapon of the weak” and that malingering and 
somatisation are “inchoate acts of protest and defiance against oppressive roles and/or 
feelings of inadequacy, frustration, or failure.” (2002: 153-169)  
As the disabled body is entitled to support from the state, disability becomes a positive 
collective category that people can draw on (consciously or unconsciously) to be ‘seen’ by 
the state (Hansen & Sait, 2012; Kelly, 2012) to assert demands on the state as suffering 
bodies and seek inclusion in the welfare system. Becoming sick presents an ‘opportunity’ to 
seek an income from the state, resulting in people reacting positively to an HIV or TB 
diagnosis, or, although not necessarily something carried out in practice, wanting to remain 
ill. (Leclerc-Madlada, 2006; Nattrass, 2006; Hardy & Richter, 2006). Dr Bhele noted that in 
cases of longterm unemployment, claimants people thought of hypertension and diabetes as a 
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“bonus”, because they believed their diagnosis would allow them to receive a grant (Dr 
Bhele, interview, 2014 April 30).  
Petryna (2002) defines the embodiment of a demand for support from the state as biological 
citizenship – a link to “a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific and legal criteria 
that both acknowledge biological injury and compensate for it” (2002: 6). This concept was 
drawn from her work in Ukraine, where, after the Chernobyl accident, people claimed 
pensions and free health care from the state on the basis of radiation exposure and related 
indexed levels of suffering. In considering the awarding of asylum to undocumented migrants 
in need of health care in France on a humanitarian basis, Fassin (2001, 2009) and Ticktin 
(2006) also draw connections between the suffering of the human body, humanitarianism and 
a new kind of biological citizenship that is stripped of its social or political elements but 
presents a set of benefits to sufferers such as medical treatment or the freedom to stay in the 
country. Nguyen (2010, 2013) describes how in West Africa people seeking access to limited 
anti-retroviral technologies would tell compelling stories of their experiences with HIV 
narrative to broker access to life-saving medications. Those who could draw on and 
commodify their suffering using narrative techniques were more successful obtaining 
treatment than those who could not. Hoffman (2006) describes how victims of machete 
attacks, living in the amputee camps after the civil war in Sierra Leone, consciously used the 
symbolism of their disabled bodies to access aid and relief funds from the international 
community.  
Embodiment was not, however, the only way that claimants expressed their suffering. DG 
claimants’ accounts of their disablement were very often expressed as narratives of their 
everyday struggles of trying to find work and living in poverty rather than as descriptions of 
medical symptoms or physical limitations. Although many patients employed pathos to 
strengthen their cases, this story-telling was not necessarily intended to manipulate or deceive 
doctors and may, as in Hansen and Sait’s (2012) study, simply represent different 
understandings of disablement. It does, nevertheless, represent a demand for social 
assistance.  
Physicians also faced social pressure from claimants. For example, Dr Bhele, an assessor in 
township clinics around Cape Town, where there was high demand for DGs, faced significant 
social pressure from patients to recommend the grant. Dr Bhele described how on Mandela 
Day, a day when South Africans are encouraged to volunteer their time to help others, 
applicants waiting outside tried to convince her to recommend grants for all of them as her 
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act of kindness for the day. They were very angry when she did not fulfil their expectations. 
She described how people in the corridors of the clinics she visited would regularly swear at 
her, complaining: “It’s not even her money!” Unlike the rest of doctors included in the study, 
Dr Bhele was able to communicate with Xhosa patients in their own language. This allowed 
patients to confidently convey their stories in great detail to Dr Bhele, which was not possible 
with other doctors I observed working in Xhosa areas who had to use translators. These 
patient narratives made Dr Bhele profoundly uncomfortable in her role and she found it very 
painful to reject people knowing their social circumstances: “But then you still put ‘no’ at the 
end – it’s not nice. We are human beings also.” She described driving through the squatter 
camps to the clinic and told me, “you feel it, you know it, but you don’t have grounds to give 
the grant. As a doctor you choose this profession to help people, not to be unkind.”  She told 
me about another Xhosa doctor who had given up doing DG assessments because she 
couldn’t handle this dilemma.  At one point, Dr Bhele had also felt so despondent about the 
DG system that she had temporarily stopped doing assessments. However, after some thought 
she had decided to resume this work because many people genuinely “deserved” and 
benefitted from the grant.  
Another doctor working in small towns felt that rural doctors experienced more social 
pressure to recommend the grant than those working in the city because of their familiarity 
with patients or the chance that they might encounter patients in public spaces. Rural doctors 
are very often the only or one of a handful of doctors in their area and must assume multiple 
roles, from district surgeon to disability assessor and private practitioner. As one doctor 
working in a rural area told me: 
“In Cape Town it doesn't matter. In a small town, you know everybody and that 
patient goes around and says “eeeh, that doctor says there's nothing wrong with me 
and he knows how bad I am” and so on. When I see him the shop I will hear him say 
“aah daai doktor se mos ek mekeer niks” 80 . It's totally different. Small town, 
everybody knows everybody’s business and that is true. You know it has an impact on 
this sort of thing - definitely has an impact.” (Interview, Dr Bury, July 2014).  
Claimants also asserted their demands and frustrations in more aggressive ways. 
Although this was less common, some patients used verbal and physical aggression to disrupt 
power relations and make doctors feel vulnerable. In interviews, as well as training 
sessions I attended, doctors frequently raised safety concerns or shared stories of patients 
that had threatened or verbally abused them either in an attempt to coerce them into 
                                                
80 Aaah that doctor says there is nothing wrong with me 
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recommending the grant or to express their anger at what they saw as unfair treatment. 
This was experienced most commonly at the PHC level by doctors who spent hours 
presenting the ‘face’ of SASSA to disability grant claimants. These SASSA assessors 
were often intensely unpopular with patients because they were perceived as strict and 
inflexible. They were not only coerced by claimants during consultations, but were 
sometimes heckled by people waiting in the corridors. 
Dr Bhele had been threatened with a knife at two of the clinics she worked at and had also 
had a patient return to the clinic to confront her aggressively after learning from SASSA that 
his application had been rejected. Dr Bhele felt that she and other doctors were often blamed 
for not “giving” the grant and that patients “made it personal”, not understanding that their 
decisions were based on SASSA’s guidelines. In another case, Dr Kruger, a SASSA assessor, 
was physically assaulted by an angry patient who had hit him with a chair during a 
consultation. He told me via email, “I have been verbally abused a few times and had patients 
scream at me and get quite aggressive, but I was never physically abused until now.” When 
he pressed charges and reported it to a senior SASSA doctor in the region where he worked, 
he was told that he was the third doctor in the region to be assaulted by a patient. This 
treatment was not limited to doctors and nurses and occupational therapists also experienced 
verbal threats and physical abuse from patients. Dr Marais shared the story of the nurse who 
managed his clinic who had encountered a patient at a local shopping mall who believed that 
she had discouraged Dr Marais from recommending a grant. The patient had chased the nurse 
through the mall, insulting and threatening her. Occupational therapists, who are effectively 
included in the gatekeeping process by doctors who refer patients for functional assessments, 
reportedly also encountered considerable coercive pressure from patients who swore, shouted 
and threw objects at them.81 
Dubois (2010) puts forward three possible reasons why welfare claimants may use or threaten 
violence in administrative settings. It can be a resort of victims of structural violence who 
don’t understand the system, are frustrated by it and aren’t able to express themselves in 
other ways. Violence can also be strategically employed to get attention or expedite 
bureaucratic processes. It can also be used by people as a way to demonstrate their 
personhood and demonstrate that they exist beyond administrative categories. In the case of 
                                                
81 An OT at a work assessment unit at a tertiary hospital indicated that they often get inappropriate referrals 
from OTs working at PHC level in what she described as “dangerous areas” because OTs were too frightened to 
report that a patient had no functional limitations.  
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the DG, it seemed to be mainly driven by frustration and anger at a system that was confusing 
and unfair or how they were treated by doctors.  
All the SASSA assessors I encountered in the field attributed these attacks poor screening 
practices and poor communication by SASSA about eligibility criteria and doctors’ role in 
the assessment process. Dr Bhele told me that people understood the DG as a form of social 
relief for any unemployed person who received regular medical treatment: “If you are 
unemployed and have a folder at the clinic then people think that they can apply and people 
think that being on medication means you are eligible for the grant.” Another doctor at the 
SASSA training I attended told the group of other doctors in attendance: “I wish the 
community was educated – we become the bad doctor and they are always on our necks.” 
Participants in my earlier study of disability grants in an impoverished urban settlement in 
Cape Town (Kelly, 2012) indicated that people who had applied for grants felt unheard and 
unfairly treated by doctors and the system more generally. They expressed frustration with 
the government and the increasing difficulty of accessing benefits and could not understand 
why they were not physically examined or why doctors told them they were capable of 
working when their daily experiences with illness and inability to find work indicated 
otherwise. One participant in that study joked, “if you die in the hospital today and they give 
you a death certificate then they will say “okay now you are fit for the disability”’ (Kelly, 
2012: 101).   
Aggression by claimants was also a reaction to doctors who were rude or moralising in their 
interactions with patients. One claimant in Dr Mulumba’s clinic, for example, shared her 
experience of being told by another doctor: “you are robbing the government, you must go 
work.” She had responded by swearing at him, which she felt was a legitimate response to 
being treated so rudely. This also represents a bigger breakdown in the doctor-patient 
relationship and trust in doctors, where doctors are seen as functionaries of the state – 
their work as arbitrary and corruptible as those of other administrators. China has seen a 
similar but much more widespread phenomenon, where the doctor-patient relationship 
and respect for and trust in doctors has deteriorated to such an extent that doctors are 
frequently violently attacked by patients and their families (Beam, 2014).  
The tools of guilt and fear only temporarily disrupt power dynamics within the disability 
assessment. Although heckling or attacking doctors may allow patients to express their anger 
and frustration and performances of disability and suffering may dupe doctors or make them 
feel sympathetic to patients, doctors ultimately retain authority in assessments. Aggression or 
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what doctors perceived as attempts at manipulation also made doctors more likely to make 
negative moral judgments about claimants, whereas being knowledgeable, friendly and 
compliant made doctors more likely to see claimants as deserving. As I will show in the next 
section, doctors deal with the difficulties of conducting assessments and limit their 
vulnerability in these circumstances (and in the practice of medicine in general) by re-
asserting their bureaucratic, symbolic and medical authority.  
7.4 Strategies used by doctors to cope with patient pressure  
Few occupations encounter as much suffering as healthcare professionals do in their daily 
work. Doctors’ work is often emotionally draining and, in the case of DG assessments, this is 
largely because doctors make decisions that can significantly affect the welfare of claimants. 
Doctors often described their work as stressful and difficult, especially when they were 
uncertain about a patient’s eligibility, they felt compassion for patients who did not qualify or 
experienced pressure from patients to recommend a grant.  
Although the Weberian bureaucratic ideal presumes that bureaucratic encounters are 
emotionally neutral and rational spaces, there is clearly an unavoidable emotional component 
to the type of face-to-face encounters that occur during DG assessments (Graham, 2002; 
Eggebø, 2013). The literature on emotion in bureaucracy and medicine indicates that 
bureaucrats and doctors are “emotional actors” (Hunter, 2015), who may feel interest and 
boredom, fear and detachment, sadness and fulfilment, anger at being manipulated or at 
people abusing the system and guilt during their interactions with clients (Tumbo, 2008; 
Eggebø, 2013; Graham, 2002; Rousseau & Foxen, 2010; Fassin, 2005; Butt, 2002; Ticktin, 
2006).  
During one of Dr Rahman’s consultations, the patient he was examining began to cry and 
reflecting on this afterwards, said: “In this job you have to deal with people’s emotions.”  
However, professional norms of self-control and being in control (Gastelaars, 2009) meant 
that Dr Rahaman, both as a SASSA bureaucrat and a medical professional, is expected to 
manage and contain his emotions and remain rational and objective in his assessments, while 
at the same time being reassuring and empathetic towards claimants82.   
Doctors are trained to manage “unprofessional” emotions by using distancing, distraction, 
                                                
82  The “emotional labour” (Hochshild, 1979) of managing displays of public emotion is associated with 
exhaustion and burnout. 
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humour, and avoidance (Smith & Kleinman, 1989). In the epilogue to his 2006 book, medical 
anthropologist and psychiatrist Arthur Kleinman discusses Picasso’s painting, Head of a 
Medical Student (1907), which depicts a medical student sitting with one eye closed and the 
other eye open. For him the opening of one eye represents the need for medical students to 
learn to open their eyes to the pain and suffering of patients. He interprets the closing of the 
other eye as the learning of clinical distance that will enable them to protect themselves from 
pain and suffering and their own professional interests (Kleinman, 2006: 264).  
As I have discussed in previous chapters, doctors develop their own approaches or routines 
for handling the stresses that accompany their work. One of the most significant sources of 
stress is their interaction with patients and they therefore develop coping strategies to 
deal with these encounters.  
Doctors developed defensive coping strategies to protect themselves psychologically and 
manage the demands of their emotional and decision-making work, to guard against “system-
abusers” (Hoag, 2010: 19) looking to manipulate or trick them and to deal with people who 
the DG system could not accommodate. One way of coping with these pressures was through 
psychological withdrawal, cultivating what Herzfeld (1992) calls “bureaucratic indifference” 
to detach and distance themselves from the needs of clients. 
Through her study of nursing practices in a hospital in the UK, Isabel Menzies Lyth (1960) 
developed a framework for understanding how healthcare workers manage the anxiety and 
stresses of patient care. She argues that nurses have developed practical strategies that act as 
social defence mechanisms against anxiety created by their work. These mechanisms include 
focusing on specific tasks rather than on patients, avoiding eye contact and the 
depersonalisation of patients through the standardisation of care.  
Walker and Gilson’s (2004) study of the impact of the introduction of free healthcare on 
nurses in South Africa, found that nurses responded to feelings of being overworked and 
disempowered by developing coping strategies to rationalise their inability to provide 
adequate care to patients. These strategies included using simple information to make 
judgements, categorising patients, exercising favouritism, being suspicious of clients, 
distancing themselves from clients and developing lower expectations of themselves and their 
work (Walker & Gilson, 2004: 1259-1260). Fassin (2008) found that healthcare workers in a 
South African hospital ‘learned’ emotional indifference and employed tactics to distance 
themselves from patients. 
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 In many cases, patient’s real problems extended well beyond doctors’ ability to assist them. 
Unable to deal with people’s poverty they may become frustrated, despondent, disinterested, 
suffering from burn-out or compassion fatigue. Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats 
stereotype and mentally discount clients to rationalise their inability to assist them. Numerous 
studies and historical accounts of the South African health system at the peak of the HIV 
epidemic, before anti-retrovirals were widely available, healthcare professionals, unable to 
heal patients or cope with the huge burden that the epidemic placed on the healthcare system, 
became nihilistic about about the epidemic and their inability to cure patients and the 
repetitive of their work grew bored of their work and were neglectful of patients and 
indifferent to their suffering (Oppenheimer & Bayer, 2007; Le Marcis, 2004, Le Marcis & 
Grard, 2015). As Le Marcis and Grard (2015) argued, “withdrawing from a caring 
relationship is for health professionals a way to carry on working” and a driver for the 
standardization and de-personalisation of care.   
Tummers et al.  (2015) classify the behavioural ways that bureaucrats cope with the stresses 
of their work and the demands from and conflicts between bureaucratic rules, client’s needs, 
professional codes and their own values during client interactions in three ways: moving 
towards, moving away or moving against clients. Outside of their interactions with claimants, 
bureaucrats might use more cognitive coping mechanisms such as emotionally detaching 
themselves from clients, becoming cynical about their work or seeking support from 
colleagues and may also become alienated from work more generally (Tummers et al., 2015). 
Coping by moving towards clients may involve bending the rules in favour of the client or 
bureaucrats, spending extra time on cases or using their own personal resources to assist 
clients. Coping strategies that move away from clients include distancing moves that use 
bureaucratic categories and processes to limit engagement and services to clients. 
In this study, I found that doctors employed numerous strategies to protect their professional 
objectivity, cope with the pressure of making DG decisions, manage the large number of 
patients that they saw on any given day and to re-assert control over assessments where 
patients’ sought to take over. Strategies for moving away from claimants included 
confrontation, getting rid of patients, avoidance and distancing. Some doctors also moved 
towards clients by bending the rules, a strategy that alleviated their own guilt.  
One quick way for doctors to put a quick end to what they perceived as patient manipulation, 
was to confront it directly by asserting their professional and bureaucratic authority to regain 
control over the interaction. Dr Brown enjoyed interacting with patients and was generally 
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genial and friendly to them, but sternly kept the assessment on his own terms, refusing to 
allow patients to emotionally manipulate him with their stories and dealing with pushy and 
argumentative patients very bluntly. He told me, “A lot of disability grant people are very 
aggressive and have an axe to grind. They are like Jehovah’s witnesses! You can’t be friendly 
and accommodating when people want to take over.” 
Dr Brown tells the patient that her listed conditions have effective medications and 
are not eligible for the DG. He asks her if there is anything else and she does not 
come forward with any additional complaints.  He says, “Disability means unfit for 
work.” She then tells him about how she is caring for her son with cerebral palsy who 
is blind and can’t walk, adding that she gets tired easily. He says, “So you can’t work 
because you are looking after him?” He says, “Your problem is not the diabetes, it is 
looking after the child. You look grey.”  She however seems convinced that she is 
indeed disabled and says “my sicknesses are also make me feel unwell.” He 
recommends exploring other options for support such as the Grant-in-Aid (GIA).  She 
does not seem interested and insists that she be given the grant saying, “Why did they 
give it to me last time for 6 months?” He says, “Well the other doctor could have 
given it, but I can’t because there are no grounds. You need the GIA.” The patient 
then asks, “How many sicknesses must you have to be disabled?” The doctor 
responds “it’s nothing like that”. She says, “Because the sugar is not going away”. 
Dr Brown becomes very annoyed at this and says, “I don’t want to argue with you.” 
“I am not arguing”, she protests. “You are. I have told you about the DG”. The clerk 
wants to chip in at this point, but Dr Brown warns him, “say any more and I will 
‘klap’ (hit) you – the subject is closed”. Dr Brown then feels bad about how harsh he 
has been to the patient and says gently, “I know you are upset and I understand, but 
we have procedures and rules.” The patient then leaves. 
In treating settings, doctors might, like Dr Marais, may simply avoid conflict with patients by 
recommending a grant to a patient to get rid of them. Bending the rules for people they felt 
were deserving of support can also be understood as a form of coping because it alleviated 
the guilt that doctors felt about individual cases and reduced the immediate pressure from 
patients. SASSA doctors, who saw dozens of DG applicants a day were not able to pursue 
this strategy and instead used numerous strategies to avoid engagement with patients. Doctors 
found claimant narratives either trying (redolent of the “heard it all” mentality of street-level 
bureaucrats described by Lipsky) or difficult to cope with and attempted to avoid them by 
either refusing to discuss social issues or ignoring patients when they started to tell these 
stories, focusing on their paperwork rather than the patient. Dr Vrede, for example most of 
her time focused on the file and paperwork in front of her, rather than looking at and having 
to engage with patients. If Dr Vrede felt that an applicant was clearly ineligible, she simply 
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wrote “unemployed” or “RVD”83 under the complaints section of the form, had the patient 
sign the form, telling them to return to SASSA after two weeks and moved quickly onto the 
next patient. As already discussed, I observed her working in a Xhosa-speaking area where 
many patients had a very poor command of English. The language barrier also seemed a 
useful tool in avoiding engagement with patients and getting them out of the room as quickly 
as possible and most of the time she did not use translators. Swartz and Drennan (2000: 193) 
also argue that in South African psychiatric settings, clinicians may in fact choose not to 
understand patients:  
The prospect for the monolingual, white clinician to understand fully the situation of patients 
for whom there is in reality very little available in terms of mental health care may simply be 
too overwhelming. Better, in this context, not to understand patients than to risk being 
overwhelmed by their needs and by the gap between their needs and what help can be 
offered.  
At least part of her approach appeared to be some sort of a coping strategy. This became clear 
when she deviated from her usual pattern of behaviour and attempted to explain to a patient 
why she did not qualify.  
A healthy-looking young woman enters, applying for grant for the first time. Dr Vrede asked 
her why she was applying and she said that it was because she was still looking for a job. The 
doctor said, “So it’s not that you cannot work, you just cannot find a job” and woman says 
said “yes”. The doctor explains that because “it’s still early in the HIV” and that if SASSA 
does not give her the grant then they will give her food packages. She explained that you can 
only receive it if you are disabled. The woman is clearly upset (close to tears) and feeling 
guilty, the doctor asks her if she wants to say something and then proceeds to explain the 
system more. After the woman leaves the doctor turns to me and says “that is why one should 
just say nothing”. She does not talk about the possibility of rejection to anyone else that day. 
(Field notes, 2014 17 January) 
Dubois (2010) describes frontline workers have having two bodies: that of the impersonal, 
standardised bureaucrat and the complicated individual with her own individual identity and 
personality who moves between two extremes - the “institution-made man vs. the humanised 
institution” (Dubois, 2010: 74). During interactions with patients, doctors can employ either 
                                                
83 RVD (retro-viral disease) is a commonly used code-word for HIV in the public healthcare system.  
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of these identities and respond to claimants in different ways, alternating bureaucratic 
formalism and strict application of the rules with friendly casualness, compassion and 
flexibility, depending on the claimant and situation at hand. Doctors were generally far more 
open and friendly to patients who were clearly eligible for the grant than those who were not. 
Dr Soet, for instance, managed her position within the assessment process by making a 
preliminary decision about the patient based on their file before they entered the room. Based 
on this decision, she treated people likely to be eligible for the grant differently from those 
who were unlikely to qualify; she was friendly to people who she thought she would qualify 
and treated others with suspicion.  
Although she told me that this made her feel uncomfortable and like a “bad doctor”, she felt 
she could not put forward a friendly front to patients who may not qualify as this could be 
misinterpreted by patients as a positive sign that they would receive the grant. “If you treat 
people normally it creates the expectation – if then you don’t get the grant two weeks later 
then they will see you as two-faced”. She felt that being too open and friendly would give 
people ineligible claimants the opportunity to tell her about their financial issues. These 
narratives left her feeling guilty at not being able to assist patients and in her view they were 
therefore best avoided: “You end up feeling worse because they tell you their story and you 
still say no. You can’t make the person that does not qualify for the grant feel good.” (See 
quote 7.6) 
SASSA assessors also used guidelines during assessments to create distance between them 
and patients (“I only focus on what is in the guidelines, not individual situations”) and 
between them and SASSA (“It is not my decision, I am only following the guidelines”). As 
discussed in Chapter 5, framing interactions in bureaucratic terms and rigidly following the 
rules was one possible defence against the stresses of decision-making and client interactions 
(bureaucratic framing), but Dr Bhele also used them in a more material way by physically 
showing them to patients to publicly separate herself from decisions she knew would make 
patients unhappy and she had enlarged and stuck the SASSA guidelines to the walls of 
the clinics she worked at regularly. She also hoped that educating patients about 
SASSA’s eligibility criteria would reduce pressure on her in the consulting room and 
would go outside to speak to waiting patients about the grant before the start of the clinic 
to inform them about SASSA’s criteria. In these presentations she highlighted that the 
DG is not a form of social relief, but a grant specifically for people with disabilities. 
Unfortunately, this did not deter ineligible claimants from waiting to see her because 
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they had nothing to lose by doing so. Dr Bhele told me, “Everyone wants to try their 
luck.”  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that relationships between doctors and claimants were often fraught 
with tensions that were the result of divergent understandings of disability and rights to social 
assistance. Many patients actively attempted to express their own understandings of disability 
and influence doctors, but were limited in their capacity to do this by doctors’ ability to 
dictate the terms of the assessment. Claimants who were most successful were those who 
exhibited appropriate behaviour that made doctors more likely to believe they ‘deserved’ a 
grant, while more overt efforts to manipulate doctors lead to a break-down in the doctor-
patient relationship. Doctors’ belief that claimants were trying to manipulate or deceive them, 
together with the pressures inherent in the medical work environment often led doctors to 
employ defensive strategies that distanced them from claimants. Doctors’ defensiveness 
limited patients’ ability to participate in the assessment process, already limited by language 
and education barriers. Being unable to tell their “side of the story” and the perceived 
unfairness of the system was extremely frustrating to claimants. This frustration led some 
patients to be highly aggressive with doctors, which created a vicious cycle that further 





CHAPTER 8: Conclusion  
This thesis has focused on the challenges of disability determination in South Africa’s DG 
system, looking specifically at the gatekeeping work of medical doctors who conduct 
disability assessments for SASSA. I have shown that as doctors interact with claimants and 
interpret and apply formal eligibility criteria to individual cases, they mediate access to the 
grant and shape policy outcomes.  
In discussing both the historical and more recent decision-making of doctors, I have 
highlighted some of the key definitional conflicts and operational tensions that exist within 
DG administration. Assessing disability for social protection programmes is generally 
difficult and, in a context like South Africa, these issues are magnified and tensions between 
the social and medical model of disability are made even clearer. The overlapping problems 
of poverty, chronic illness and disability have been hard to separate. The multiple ways that 
disability can be understood and operationalised has created confusion and tensions both at 
the higher levels of the policy making process and at the frontlines of service delivery. 
The lack of political consensus around how to define disability has left doctors to resolve 
conflicts about how to measure and define disability at the implementation level, using 
unclear guidelines and an outdated medical model that is difficult to apply in practice. My 
observations of doctors’ work as DG assessors have shown that physicians play multiple and 
sometimes conflicting roles in DG assessments. They play the role of medical professional - 
with its attendant norms, responsibilities and knowledge-forms - and the role of bureaucrat 
within the structure of SASSA’s disability management system. They are also human actors 
with their own agency and set of personal experiences, norms, moral dispositions and notions 
of social justice, who are likely to have subjective reactions to claimants (Barnes & Prior, 
2009). The socio-economic, political and policy context doctors operate within also 
influences their understandings of concepts like disability, employability, health and desert. 
Claimants also bring their own agency to bear on the assessment as they present their stories 
and bodies to doctors, along with it their own understandings and interpretations of SASSA’s 
eligibility criteria. The broader policy environment and poor DG policy design also shaped 
the implementation context. The decisions that doctors make about claimants are contingent 
on all these factors and dynamics, which shape how the doctor makes ‘sense’ of or frame a 
particular case and implements DG policy. The extent of the poverty and unemployment in 
South Africa shows how systemic structural issues can affect both policymaking and 
decision-making in a way that is perhaps less obvious in the North American and European 
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contexts. Though not in the direct way that rules and regulations or organisational context 
might, these systemic factors contribute to the implementation context and inform doctors’ 
understanding of claimants’ eligibility.  
By examining how doctors and claimants interact, both with each other and the policies and 
bureaucratic machinery of the state, I have shown that the DG assessment is a space where 
different welfare, medical and disability discourses are instantiated. The process of DG 
assessment turned the clinic and the hospitals where I carried out my research into sites of 
policy administration and social politics, where rights to social assistance were negotiated. 
Disability as a social, medical and administrative category was socially and discursively 
constructed, (re-)defined and applied in ways that sometimes contradicted official policy.  
My ethnographic account of these dynamics provides useful insight into what policy 
implementation scholars call the ‘gap’ between policy and practice (Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984). It makes an original empirical contribution to the study of conceptions of the 
‘deserving’ poor in a context of high poverty. This research shows the value of studying 
professionals as a ‘special case’ of discretionary behaviour at the street-level. It also shows 
the usefulness of ethnography in unpacking problems of policy implementation.  
Before highlighting some more general contributions of this thesis to the literature on street-
level bureaucracy, I will highlight the main findings and contributions of each chapter.   
Chapter 2 presented the history of the ANC governments’ efforts to manage the DG system 
inherited from the apartheid government. As the case of the DG shows, in the face of a major 
shock to policy like the HIV epidemic, frontline responses to a changing implementation 
context can radically change what a policy does. In this case, the DG became, in effect, an 
HIV and a general poverty alleviation grant, serving a purpose beyond the one for which is 
was designed. The history of DG policy shows that the process of policy implementation 
created the politics that then very directly informed policy decision-making and drove reform 
of the social grant system towards strictness. This demonstrates how important the actions of 
policy implementers can be in shaping both policy outcomes and policy development. The 
circular relationship between the design of DG policy and its implementation therefore 
provides an excellent case for thinking about the policy-making process as less of a 
unidirectional, top-down process and more of a feedback loop (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1993; 
Hacker, 2002).  
In Chapter 3, I explained SASSA’s efforts to ‘rationalise’ the DG system and constrain 
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doctors’ discretion through the implementation of the DMM. I detailed workings of this 
system in the Western Cape, showing that in practice, SASSA had limited capacity to 
oversee doctor’s work. Doctors retained significant gatekeeping power in assessments and it 
was difficult to hold them accountable for their decision-making, especially in treating 
settings. The system has not been able to reduce the large number of claimants applying for 
grants, which creates pressure on doctors who must deal with large patient loads.  
Chapter 4 discussed the role of South African doctors as medical experts in the DG system. 
Findings showed that medical assessments of impairments and disability are not 
straightforward and because disability is determined in relation to employability, medical 
knowledge alone is insufficient to conduct disability assessments. Doctors therefore faced a 
high degree of uncertainty in making decisions. The disconnect between the guidelines and 
the actual reasoning required to make decisions resulted in SASSA guidelines being 
dismissed by some doctors as arbitrary and unhelpful. In the absence of formal training on 
non-medical aspects of disability assessment, doctors used their own common sense, 
pragmatic approaches in their clinical judgements.  
In Chapter 5, I showed how SASSA’s DMM system, in combination with the organisation of 
the Western Cape healthcare system, structured doctors’ work. I demonstrated how the 
demands, constraints, incentives and frustrations created by these two systems shaped the 
way that doctors conducted assessments. Doctors used their discretion and autonomy to 
develop strategies to simplify their decision-making and cope with large patient loads, 
difficult working conditions, poor medical record keeping, significant communication 
barriers with patients and a lack of medical evidence on which to base their decisions.  
Unwillingly drawn into the system, treating doctors felt alienated from SASSA and felt little 
obligations to uphold its norms and standards. In general, doctors wanted to standardise their 
assessments, but wanted to achieve this through professional, peer-to-peer engagement and 
more specialist input into assessment guidelines rather than through SASSA’s monitoring 
approach.  
Chapter 6 showed that within the bounds of social security legislation and regulation, doctors 
exercise considerable discretion in making recommendations on grant eligibility. In this 
discretionary space, doctors were able to insert their own understandings of deservingness 
into the assessment process. I used the idea of framing to show how doctors make sense of 
patient cases and their particular contexts. These decision frames represent different 
arrangements of SASSA’s rules and regulations and doctors’ responsibilities as medical 
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professionals and moral agents that establish the boundaries and constraints for decision-
making, acting like a set of rules to guide emerging action. How a doctor framed a particular 
case inclined them to be stricter or more flexible in applying eligibility criteria to patients. 
Whilst frames show that bureaucratic action is structured by institutions, habitus, social 
relations, knowledge and prior experience, frames do not preclude agency and doctors have 
the capacity to pragmatically and actively move between and combine frames in different 
situations. Looking at their work as a process of framing shows that doctors were not 
necessarily ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ on patients because they felt unsympathetic towards or felt sorry 
for patients (although this was the case in some instances) and they did not make conscious 
decisions to break the rules or stick to them because they opposed or supported DG policy. 
The concept of framing allows us to see beyond these dichotomies to understand how 
multiple factors influence how doctors think about the disability problem and the person in 
front of them. It also shows how both personal and professional norms and subjectivities 
matter in street-level decision-making.  
Chapter 7 examined the interaction between doctors and patients during DG assessments. It 
showed that the DG assessment is not only a bureaucratic and medical process, but a social 
interaction shaped by the emotions and relative power and agency of the doctors and 
claimants who participate in the assessment. The ways in which claimants interpreted 
eligibility criteria, interacted with doctors and strategically positioned themselves in relation 
to the disability category influenced doctors’ decision-making. I showed that claimants could 
be active participants who creatively engaged in the assessment process, using narratives and 
physical performances of disablement and suffering to influence doctors’ decision-making. 
Claimants’ understanding and subjective experiences of disability differed from biomedical 
conceptions of disability and claiming disablement represents an attempt to have their 
financial hardship and social suffering “seen” and legitimised by the state. Others, frustrated 
by the perceived unfairness and arbitrary nature of assessments verbally harassed or used 
violence against healthcare workers as a form of protest against the system. Some claimants 
were also legitimately confused about eligibility criteria, which also shows how important the 
historical application of an administrative category by street-level bureaucrats is in creating 
expectations about who should rightfully be included in that category84. The high demand for 
the grant from people with minor health conditions is driven by the expectations created by 
                                                
84 Hacking (2006) refers to this as the process of “making up people” 
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previous applications of the DG category, which communicated an idea of what disability 
“is” that has been hard to change and which creates ongoing confusion about eligibility 
criteria. This provides an example of how street-level bureaucrats’ categorising work can 
influence and reconfigure power relations, social identities and ideas about deservingness as 
they interact with citizens (Yanow, 2003).  
In highlighting these forms of contestation, I demonstrated that DG assessments are a 
dialogical and contingent process - a space of resistance as well as disciplining and control by 
the state. The agency of claimants who resist and disrupt the DG assessment process and the 
ways in which doctors respond to this highlights power dynamics that are often overlooked 
by the street-level bureaucracy literature, which tends to presume that, as decision-makers, 
bureaucrats hold all the power in social relations at the frontline. This chapter showed that the 
ways in which citizens understood eligibility criteria and utilised the DG system as a poverty 
alleviation mechanism shaped the system from below, putting pressure on doctors and the 
system more generally. Therefore, contributing to the work of policy feedback theorists like 
Moynihan and Soss (2014), this chapter concludes that that it is not only the agency of street-
level bureaucrats, but also the agency of the people who are the supposed targets of policy 
that can shape its implementation. This means that they are also active in the process of 
‘making’ policy and that their actions are an important part of the feedback loop that informs 
further policy development (as shown in Chapter 2). This is also an important contribution to 
recent efforts to include the perspective of clients in street-level scholarship.  
The case of the DG demonstrates the importance of considering how the macro-level 
environment shapes street-level work, something only recently recognised as important by 
those applying the concept of street-level bureaucracy to their work (Rice, 2012). In this 
thesis, I have shown how claimants and doctors are embedded in a wider net of political, 
social, cultural and economic factors. This includes their individual social positions, race and 
class, but also the actual economic, political and social realities of South Africa. By paying 
attention to historical and structural issues, this thesis also makes a contribution to the policy 
implementation literature by showing how street-level action is shaped by the broader socio-
economic and policy environment and how the outcomes of street-level action feed back into 
the policy development process.  
In highlighting some of the deep ethical conflicts and moral stresses that doctors face in their 
work, this thesis contributes to work that focuses on the moral agency of street-level 
bureaucrats (Maynard-moody & Musheno, 2003). When facing individual claimants, doctors 
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often felt the urge to help them with their often severe financial and social problems and the 
grant was one way of doing that. This puts them in the position of breaking the rules or 
distancing themselves from patients in a way that makes it easier to avoid making difficult 
decisions.  
The truth is doctors, yes we're supposed to be so Hippocratic and the truth is 
important, but it comes second to helping people and so you get in these fixes. This 
is the problem: when you've got that many people going hungry - to expect people 
who are paid to look after people to then make decisions around whether they get 
food or not...it’s not a good position...it’s not going to work. (Wright, interview, 2014 
April 8) 
This supports Maynard-Moody’s citizen-agent narrative, which presents street-level 
bureaucrats as moral agents that respond to individual need and worth, making “micro-justice 
decisions” (Maynard-moody & Musheno, 2000, 2012). Adding to Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno’s work I would add that through their clinical framing of disability we can see how 
doctors are also professional agents. They are not just caught between the state and their 
humanity, but between what they feel they need to do to be a ‘good’ doctor and what they are 
asked to do as bureaucrats of the state. In trying to carry out their role as physicians, 
bureaucrats of the state and moral agents, doctors face a dilemma because the gatekeeping 
work they are asked to do is “antithetical to the requirements of the social role that he or she 
occupies” (Zacka, 2015: 8). As a result, they become caught in what Zacka (2015: 26) 
defines as an “impossible situation”:  
As in the double bind, agents who are caught in an impossible situation face two 
injunctions that operate at distinct levels: one that requires them to act in a particular 
way (“implement this new law, or else you will be punished”), and another, more 
personal, that enjoins them to act in line with long-term moral commitments they have 
developed (“act as a good police officer would”). 
Street-level bureaucracy theory largely neglects the narrative of the professional in frontline 
work. Most of the existing research on street-level bureaucrats has focused on lower-level 
frontline workers who have some discretion in their work. Although the importance of 
professional values is mentioned in passing in much of the street-level bureaucracy literature, 
there has been little effort to theorise how professional ideas about the ‘right’ way of 
implementing policy colours the way that frontline workers carry out their work. By focusing 
on medical professionals - the archetypal profession - my work contributes to efforts to 
extend street-level bureaucracy theory by demonstrating how more professionalised groups 




Although much of the work they do is bureaucratic, few, if any of the doctors in this study 
thought of themselves as bureaucrats or policy implementers. Treating doctors in particular 
would dislike being considered part of the SASSA system, very often positioning themselves 
against it or going out of their way to avoid participating in it. The work of doctors in DG 
assessment shows how important professional identity, status and a strong association with a 
set of professional values, knowledge and codes of conduct is in shaping street-level action.  
One of my main findings was that although some doctors found it easier to just directly apply 
SASSA’s guidelines, many doctors strongly valued their own professional opinions over 
SASSA’s recommendations and gave them priority in their decision-making. As I showed in 
Chapter 6, when doctors framed the disability problem in clinical rather than bureaucratic 
terms, their ideas of eligibility conflicted sometimes conflicted with formal policy, which 
drove policy divergence (Hupe and Hill, 2003, Bergen and While, 2005).  In addition, the 
discomfort that doctors felt in their role as DG assessors showed that street-level workers’ 
sense of professional purpose and feelings of obligation towards patients might not easily be 
ceded in the face of new rules and public management initiatives.  
The case of the DG also shows how efforts to rationalise expert judgement and professional 
judgement to increase accountability may not be effective. This study calls into question the 
ability of guidelines and rules to achieve goals of distributive justice when the daily practice 
of professionals like doctors requires a more pragmatic and tacit kind of thinking (Schön, 
1983). Efforts to rationalise the assessment process and police it from the top-down do not 
take the normative aspects and complexities of doctors’ reasoning into account and only 
obscure the actual logic that doctors employ when making decisions (Meershoek et al., 2007; 
Eikenaar et al., 2015). Rather than enforcing rules and processes that doctors are likely to 
find unhelpful and ignore, this study highlights the need to create opportunities for 
multidisciplinary engagement with and contribution to assessment guidelines85, greater 
opportunities for peer interaction and discussions on the challenges of disability assessment 
and greater transparency about oversight processes. In short, in order to encourage doctors to 
cooperate better with SASSA, they need to be engaged with as professionals and not just as 
bureaucrats.   
However, as the case of the DG shows, despite their professional values, doctors may still 
                                                
85 To the credit of the Western Cape SASSA office, they have made several attempts at this but they have 




make biased or moralising decisions that may not be addressed through greater engagement 
with SASSA. Perhaps this is because disability assessment work itself is not sufficiently 
professionalised and doctors’ lack of training and expertise in this area leads to 
unprofessional behaviour. However, as the literature on the work that doctors do in other 
settings, especially resource constrained settings like the SA public health system, has shown, 
unequal treatment of patients or breaking rules to benefit patients is common and unlikely to 
change until there is radical improvement in the health system.    
The disjuncture between the design of DG policy and its actual application on the ground not 
only reveals the limitations of the DG system and the medical model of disability, but also 
fault lines in social policy to address poverty and inequality and integrate disabled people 
into society. If the meaning of disability exists in relation to the “normal,” the administration 
of the DG not only raises questions about how to define disability but also of what the 
definition of “normal” is. As this study has shown, the state’s distinction between the 
deserving disabled and undeserving non-disabled does not necessarily reflect either 
community or individual understandings of suffering and rights to social security or doctors’ 
understandings of disability. This not only creates potential for doctors to stray from official 
policy and guidelines, but also brings into question the boundaries between physical and 
other types of disadvantage and marginalisation. The categorical targeting of people with 
physical impairment for social assistance may not necessarily be viable or appropriate in a 
context where large numbers of people are unemployable (and therefore impaired by) social 
and economic factors and also in need.    
The fact that the sickness and disability become desirable in this context creates a perverse 
reversal of values and norms around health. Using the disability category to gain access to an 
income and soliciting compassion from gatekeepers in the hope of being the beneficiary of a 
humanitarian act or compromising one’s health in order to qualify for a grant is an 
undesirable and uncertain way of achieving economic inclusion, especially when one’s 
performance of disability has to be re-enacted every six to twelve months. Although it has 
become more difficult to acquire a grant in this way, in the Western Cape, where no referral 
from a treating doctor is needed to book an appointment to see a SASSA assessor, many 
people still apply for the DG out of desperation. Doctors and OTs involved in this study 
repeatedly highlighted the need to educate people about eligibility criteria. However, whilst 
this is certainly necessary, it does not remove the underlying reason for people applying, nor 
does it deter people who have nothing to lose from ‘trying their luck’.  
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 The state has focused on reducing medical discretion and tightening eligibility criteria, but 
this cannot solve the bigger social and economic problems reflected by the demand for DGs 
and the inability of people receiving grants for temporary illnesses to graduate from grants 
into employment. This shows that regardless of how disability and chronic illness are 
defined or measured, the conversation on how to incorporate people whose participation in 
society is limited by their physical capabilities cannot be separated from a wider 
conversation about poverty in South Africa. With the labour market unable to absorb large 
numbers of unemployed people who are poorly educated and and without adequate protection 
to support everyone living in or at risk of falling into poverty, the DG system will continue to 
serve a purpose for which it was not originally intended. 
This thesis has engaged with a practical problem that requires real policy solutions. Although 
the best solution to these problems would be to create more stable jobs, this has proved 
difficult. Bearing this in mind, I highlight a number of policy solutions that have been 
suggested (beyond just top-down control), that may be useful in thinking about how the 
social grant system could be reformed to promote social and economic inclusion.  
One set of possible policy options focuses on the systemic pressures underlying the 
administrative problem of targeting and proposes extending benefits to other groups. The 
best-known of these proposals is the Basic Income Grant, which would be a small monthly 
cash transfer offered to all South Africans, which would relieve the poverty-driven pressure 
on the DG system. This policy was proposed in 2002, but after much public debate and 
strong resistance from the government, it was eventually abandoned. As I showed in Chapter 
2, similar attempts to introduce a Chronic Illness Grant also failed, although many (including 
doctors in this study) still feel that these would be useful in supporting people to manage their 
health conditions.  
In general, the state has been very resistant to extending the social grant system outside of 
existing categories. This may, however, be changing and the Department of Social 
Development’s most recent Strategic Plan (2015-2019), includes the development of a policy 
to expand social security to people with chronic conditions, who are excluded from existing 
DG policy as a high-level strategic objective. This would form part of a series of other 
planned policy initiatives that include: providing income support for the working-age 
population; a guaranteed employment scheme; mandatory cover for retirement, disability and 
survivor benefits; inclusion of informal sector workers in social security provisioning; 
universalization of the CSG and OAG; and increased social assistance for orphans and 
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vulnerable children (DSD, 2015). How the Treasury will respond to these plans given current 
slow rates of economic growth and other pressing demands on the budget remains in 
question.  
Another set of options involves finding ways for people with disabilities as well as the people 
with manageable illnesses or injuries who could technically work, but struggle to compete in 
a very tight labour market, to become part of the economy in some way. There are very few 
opportunities for re-skilling people, especially older people, to participate in the workforce in 
different ways. Although the Employment Equity Act of 1998 requires that employers use 
affirmative action methods to create equal opportunities for disabled persons within the 
workplace and sets quotas for disabled people within certain sectors, these are seldom 
filled86.  The Code of Good Practice: Key Aspects on the Employment of People with 
Disabilities (DoL, 2015) further states that employers should attempt to accommodate 
employees who are or become disabled by adapting their work role. However, in reality, it is 
very difficult for people with disabilities with low levels of education to find or keep 
employment in the open labour market and workers are often dismissed or, if they are lucky, 
‘medically boarded’87, when they are no longer deemed able to perform their regular work 
duties.  
Despite public declarations about the need to include people with disabilities in the economy 
from the Department of Social Development, there is a large amount of policy evaporation in 
this area. Disability rights activists have argued that the government’s spending on DGs 
comes at the expense of making more meaningful efforts to include disabled people in the 
labour force and society in general (Gooding & Marriot, 2009). More supply-side efforts are 
needed to create work for people with physical limitations The DG has historically been 
compensatory, targeted at people who cannot work, rather than having any developmental 
aspects. Whilst providing this type of support is important, it does not align with societal 
shifts in understanding disability and disabled people’s place and role in society. Linking re-
training and employment programmes to the DG would provide opportunities for people, 
especially those caught in a cycle of re-applying for temporary DGs, to find work. Involving 
other professionals who understand vocational and rehabilitation issues (e.g. occupational 
                                                
86 Neither the private sector nor government agencies have been able to meet the 2% employment quota laid 
down in employment equity policy. In 2013, only 0.9% of formally employed people were disabled 
(Commission for Employment Equity, 2014). 
87 Employees part of provident or pension funds dismissed because of incapacity may be effectively placed in 
early retirement and receive disability benefits from the fund.   
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therapists) more substantively in the DG process, would not would not only make it easier to 
make decisions on claimant’s actual employability, but provide greater opportunities for 
linking people to opportunities outside of the DG system. This will require collaboration 
between government departments to coordinate other existing programmes such as the 
Expanded Public Works Programme and the work Sector Education Training Authorities and 
Job Centres.  
Ideally, efforts to link people to the labour market and more accurately assess discretion 
would be combined with efforts to create a more comprehensive social protection system. 
Applications from large numbers of ineligible people cost the government significant 
money and a more comprehensive safety net would take the pressure off the DG category. 
This would free up resources to develop a better-targeted DG programme that provided more 
comprehensive support to people with long-term disabilities, linking them to other 
programmes, services and job opportunities. 
While this study has shown that tools and definitions alone cannot fix the underlying problem 
of disability, it has also demonstrated that the current model of assessment is seriously 
inadequate. A multidimensional assessment tool like the Harmonised Assessment Tool, 
which provides a comprehensive model for assessment and can take functionality or 
employability into account would reduce the discretion and uncertainty that doctors face in 
their assessment. Combined with other bigger policy interventions it would reduce both 
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APPENDIX A: Reflections on the research process 
Gaining access to the field is an incredibly important part of the research process, not only 
because it is necessary to obtain information, but also because the form and quality of access 
establishes what information is available to researchers. Gaining access to do ethnographic 
work and recruiting research participants is also one of the most time consuming and difficult 
aspects of conducting research (Smith, 2001). According to Feldman, Bell and Berger (2003) 
gaining access requires persistence, flexibility and luck as well as interpersonal skills. 
A SASSA Disability Management Unit (DMU) official was helpful in identifying a number 
of doctors that were directly contracted to the Western Cape regional office, who I was able 
to interview and gain an initial idea of how the system worked and obtain permission to 
observe them at work. After this, doctors were largely selected to participate in the study 
based on where they worked.    
Although I was fairly familiar with the basic healthcare system in the Western Cape, making 
choices about what sites to select was challenging and was complicated by administrative 
factors. Acquiring access to clinics, hospitals, specific hospital departments and the 
healthcare personnel that worked in these facilities, required navigating the bureaucratic 
structures of and engaging with personnel from SASSA, the Western Cape Department of 
Health and the City of Cape Town, which managed some clinics in the metro (or in some 
cases, part of a clinic). Tertiary hospitals are managed by Speciality Services in the Western 
Cape and have their own procedures for managing research requests. This meant that after 
obtaining ethical approval for the study, I had to submit separate research proposals to four 
different administrative bodies. In the case of primary and secondary level facilities, my 
requests to work at specific clinics were relayed to the relevant district or metro substructure 
managers who then decided whether or not the research could be feasibly carried out in these 
facilities and in some cases my requests were rejected. I then needed to secure access through 
the relevant sub-structural manager and then manager of the specific facility concerned. My 
ability to work in a clinic therefore depended on managers’ perception of the usefulness of 
the project, the willingness of the district or substructure manager to host a researcher, the 
capacity of the clinic to host a researcher, the presence of a disability grant doctor in the 
clinic (which was often unclear before beginning the process), doctors’ willingness to 
participate and the signed consent of individual patients.  
The process of gaining access to doctors working in hospitals was similarly convoluted. As 
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well as obtaining permission from the hospital manager, I had to approach department heads 
to gain access to clinics and doctors. Often the head of department or a specific clinic would 
decide or suggest which doctor I should work with. Whereas in the primary care settings DG 
doctors only saw patients applying for disability-related grants – DG, Care Dependency 
Grant and Grant-in-Aid - in hospital settings many patients were already receiving DGs or 
were not applying for DGs. This meant that not all interactions I observed involved an actual 
grant assessment. It was nevertheless helpful to get a sense of how doctors and patients 
interacted when the DG was not involved.  
The initial research design of this study was focused on developing case studies of the work 
of ten to twelve doctors, selected based on factors such as gender, race, contractual 
relationship to SASSA and their approach to disability grant assessment, but this proved 
impossible from a practical perspective. Permission to access the various clinics and hospitals 
in the Western Cape is not centralised and I could only obtain access to doctors’ information 
once I had proof of my right to work within the clinic or hospital department concerned, 
which typically took several weeks. While I had hoped to spend time with fewer doctors of 
longer periods of time so that they would grow more accostomed to my presenced, this 
proved logistically difficult in many cases. Doctors working for SASSA generally worked at 
multiple clinics and in most cases there was only a doctor at a specific clinic once or twice 
week, sometimes only every two weeks. However due to the permission process, I was 
unable to move between clinics with doctors who had agreed to work with me, except in one 
case where the same doctor worked at two clinics that I had already coincidentally obtained 
permission to work at. Gaining permission from individual patients and having them sign 
formal consent forms could also be disruptive and, given how busy doctors were in both 
clinics and hospitals, two days of observation seemed to be the maximum period of time 
doctors could reasonably tolerate.  
Data collection at De Waal hospital varied from the other two hospitals. I met with the head 
of the social work department and we decided on the most appropriate form of data collection 
in this specific hospital, which served patients with intellectual disability and psychiatric 
disorders. A multi-disciplinary team that involved psychiatrists, nurses and social workers 
made the majority of decisions about disability grants in this hospital, except in the outpatient 
unit, where psychiatrists made the decision independently. Given the nature of psychiatric 
consultations, observing doctor-patient interactions in this setting would not be appropriate. I 
therefore interviewed a psychiatrist who worked in the outpatient unit and conducted a focus 
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group with social workers from across different units at the hospital and another one with 
nurses. In August 2014 I presented my provisional research findings to a larger group of 
social workers at De Waal, who provided further useful input on the study.  
I also interviewed social workers at the other two hospitals and an occupational therapist at 
the work assessment unit at Whitney Hospital and two occupational therapists from the work 
assessment unit at another hospital (Marais), where I did not conduct any other form of data 
collection.  
Ethical considerations 
The aim of the study and goal of this study was not to focus on experiences of, or the 
physical nature of disability or illness, or the medical histories of patients. Rather, it was to 
explore how the opportunity for income through the disability grant was seen and negotiated 
in an environment where opportunities for formal employment are limited and unemployment 
insurance and support is minimal or non-existent. However, as the study was carried out in 
medical facilities, I was required to obtain ethical consent from the University of Cape 
Town’s Health Research Ethics Committee.    
Healthcare personnel and government officials participating in the study all provided their 
consent to participate. Some SASSA staff preferred to remain anonymous, but the remainder 
of interviews with government officials were conducted on the record. All interviews and 
focus groups with healthcare workers and all patient interactions were conducted on the 
condition of anonymity. To this end, I have used pseudonyms when referring to any patient, 
doctor or facility and have avoided using any personal identifiers or other information that 
might reveal the identity of any participant. Power-relationships in healthcare settings are 
often unequal and it was important to obtain patient’s consent to observe what is typically a 
private interaction between them and a doctor in a way that minimised any perceived 
pressure to participate. In order to avoid this, I introduced the study to the patients as they sat 
lined-up in the corridors waiting to be seen by the doctor, when they were in a large group 
rather than in the room with the doctor and myself. I would explain the study to patients and 
answer any questions they had, either about the study or other social-grant related questions. 
During this time I reinforced the fact that their disability grant applications would not be 
influenced at all by either their participation or decision not to participate in the study. I also 
provided a consent form and written description of the study and then left them with pens, 
allowing them to make the decision to sign the forms in my absence. This allowed them to 
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make the decision about whether to participate prior to entering the room.  The consent form 
and study description had to be modified when I began working in hospitals because not all 
patients were applying for disability grants. In order to avoid influencing the nature of the 
doctor-patient interaction by introducing the idea of disability grants, I explained the research 
as a study of doctor’s decision-making rather than a study focused specifically on the 
disability grant.  
Data Analysis  
Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software package was used to manage the data collected 
and to identify themes in data by first breaking it down into codes which were categorised 
and then linked together during the process of analysis. I used this approach to analyse 
interviews, field notes and hundreds of pages of parliamentary minutes and Hansards. Using 
this software was particularly useful in that it allowed easy access to small pieces of data but 
preserves them within the larger context of documents or interview notes being analysed.  
Reflections on the research process 
Mechanic (1989) writes that qualitative researchers, who use themselves as a research 
instrument, must calibrate themselves. He argues that the way we make sense of and organise 
observations is a construction of the researcher’s social biography. The subjectivity that is 
inherent in qualitative research, makes it important to engage in reflexive practice. It is also 
only through reflexive practice that more junior researchers like myself can learn to navigate 
the ethical and practical realities of fieldwork. 
As part of this reflection I have taken detailed notes, not only of my time in clinics and 
hospitals, but of all my experiences conducting interviews, informal conversations and 
meetings and experiences of gaining access that have shaped my understanding of the 
disability grant system. Note taking also helped to guide and focus the research process in a 
way that allowed me to build concepts rather than a collection of colourful quotations. I have 
also provided detailed accounts of my research methods and findings and consulted the 
literature in my area of focus to learn from the methods others have used. Qualitative 
research is less a process of capturing data than an interaction between people, through which 
very specific and contextual information will emerge. This often means that entering the field 
requires the re-evaluation and adaptation of research strategies. In this section I acknowledge 
and consider the ‘throwntogetherness’ (Fraser, 2012) of research by reflecting on my 
fieldwork experience.  
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Although I adopted a non-judgemental approach in my observations, it is impossible for me, 
as a social actor, to claim that I was totally objective in my data collection or analysis. Like 
the doctors who interpret DG cases, my own social biography and position influenced how I 
framed or ‘made sense’ of the data I collected in the field. My own social democratic political 
beliefs and views on the social security system in South Africa perhaps made me more biased 
towards doctors who took a more sympathetic approach to claimants. My attempt to 
understand the perspectives of doctors whose views differed from my own is what initially 
led me to the idea of framing.  
Although I have had many conversations with patients in the passageways and consulting 
rooms of clinics and hospitals, in this PhD research I largely positioned myself on the 
doctors’ side of the desk. This research therefore cannot provide a new account of patient 
motivations or understandings of desert, except as doctors and I have interpreted them. This 
research can, however, reflect on how doctors and patients enact their roles, how doctors 
interpret and react to patient’s actions, what this means for the doctor-patient relationship and 
how doctors ultimately reach decisions. I acknowledge that although I observed the doctor-
patient interaction, I was positioned closer to doctors than patients in this study, which may 
have introduced a certain bias to my perspective, but I hope that this was countered 
somewhat by my previous experience working with disability grant claimants (Kelly, 2012).  
As Simpson (2006) has observed, research can be a messy and there were a number of 
reasons why my research did not go to plan. Firstly, I had hoped that could be an invisible 
observer in the assessment and that doing this repeatedly over time would reduce the effect of 
my presence in the room and the effect of any observer bias. In fact, I ended up working with 
twice the number of doctors I had anticipated for only one or two days, because I soon 
realised that it was more difficult for me to disappear than I had hoped and I felt that this 
made my presence in the room burdensome to doctors. As a result, I only ended up doing 
repeated observations with four doctors.  
There were a number of reasons why my presence in the observation was more noticeable 
than I had hoped, all of which were logistical. In order to observe their consultation with the 
doctor, I needed to obtain signed consent from individual patients. Although I explained the 
study to patients outside of the room and many of them signed them, very often I needed to 
re-explain the study to them. This meant that my presence added time to the doctor’s 
consultation and I was very conscious of this, especially in PHC settings where doctors had 
dozens of patients to see. The consultation rooms were small and I often needed to move 
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around to accommodate patients and the family members that often accompanied them – 
sitting on beds, stools or standing where necessary.  
A large part of the assessment involves reviewing folders and tests and filling out forms and 
this meant that I would either have to sit directly next to the doctor to see what they were 
reading or writing or would have to explain their decision-making to me afterwards. 
Although I told doctors that I was only there to observe, often doctors would often also talk 
to me during the consultation, sharing information with me about what they were doing and 
what they were considering. Doctors would also often start talking to me about claimants as 
soon as they left the room and I quickly learnt that probing doctors about their decision-
making at this point was a very effective way of understanding how they made decisions in a 
concrete way and this often segued into deeper conversations about their experiences as 
assessors. This, however, made it made me difficult to disappear.  
It was also not unusual for there to be other people in the room, especially in hospitals where 
medical students, interns, registrars and consultants all collaborate and new people came into 
the room either to seek or give advice and my presence was then explained. This often led to 
impromptu conversations about the social grant system, which were useful. Patients would 
also sometimes address me directly during the consultation, looking to me for reinforcement 
or support especially when doctors were consciously ignoring them. 
Although medical doctors are generally supportive of and interested in research (and are 
often researchers themselves), they are also busy professionals and this limited the length of 
time I was able to sit and observe their work. Initially some doctors were sceptical about me 
observing them, but commented after the experience that they had found it less intrusive and 
more interesting (as a form of self-reflection) than they had expected. Where I could, I made 
myself useful by assisting doctors with small tasks or with their paperwork.   
Language and knowledge barriers 
All study information and consent forms for the study were made available to participants in 
English, isiXhosa and Afrikaans. I explained the study to potential participants in Afrikaans 
and English, but because my ability to speak and understand Xhosa is quite limited, other 
clinic staff had to assist me in explaining the study to Xhosa-speaking participants. These 
informal translation arrangements are very common in clinics but are far from ideal as I was 
unable to understand exactly what had been explained to patients, but the written study 
materials were useful in this regard and I was able to field any other questions  There was 
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however usually one person who spoke English and isiXhosa I spent one day observing a 
Xhosa speaking doctor assessing Xhosa-speaking patients in a clinic in a township area with 
the doctor providing a synopsis of the assessment in English after the patient which provided 
useful material for discussion, I was not able to understand what patients were saying in any 
real detail. Observing the differences in the structure, length and tone of the conversations 
held in Xhosa with those held in the patient’s non-native language were also very useful from 
a comparative perspective.  
Researchers with health expertise are perhaps able to assimilate into these settings more 
easily by taking on the role of a doctor or a nurse. Although not a major challenge, my lack of 
medical training limited my ability to interrogate the medical eligibility of patients. By 
familiarising myself with SASSA’s medical guidelines, the medical literature on disability 
assessment and gradually developing a basic medical vocabulary helped to overcome these 
challenges somewhat. My layperson status also had advantages as it broke down any anxiety 
they may have had at being assessed or judged by me.  
Research quality  
Given the qualitative nature of this study, I was concerned more with context and meaning 
than inference and generalization. I have used Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) four criteria for 
evaluating qualitative research (credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability) 
reflect on the quality of this research.  
The credibility of qualitative research generally refers to how congruent findings are with 
reality and is key to establishing the trustworthiness of findings (Merriam, 1998 in Shenton, 
2004). Key to establishing credibility is the degree to which the sample group represents the 
overall population under consideration. As discussed previously, difficulties in recruiting 
people resulted in looser forms of recruitment than I initially envisaged. 
Also important is how representative my research was of reality – whether I had captured the 
whole picture and the complexities of the disability grant system. I have tried to achieve this 
by keeping my analysis strongly grounded in the data collected, by triangulating findings 
with other sources of data, and by including people with multiple perspectives on the system. 
Using overlapping methods (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) in the form of both interviews and 
observations allowed me to reflect on the differences between what actors said they did and 
how they actually behaved. Through presentations and papers, I have shared my findings, 
with the Disability Management Unit at SASSA as well as the General Manager of SASSA 
 
 99 
Western Cape who were comfortable with my presentation of the DG system and found the 
results useful to their work.  
However, it should be noted that the small sample size and non-random sampling method 
present limitations to the study in terms of the transferability of research findings88. In 
addition, limiting the study to the Western Cape, which has quite a different system to other 
provinces, reduces opportunities to generalise findings to the rest of South Africa or make 
comparisons between different environmental contexts or the implementation of policy 
across provincial departments. However, by providing a large amount of background context 
and grounding findings in existing literature, it is hoped that the findings of this thesis can be 
transferred to other contexts.  
Dependability is closely linked to credibility but focuses more on what quantitative 
researchers would consider to be the replicability of the study. Whilst I have attempted to 
reflect extensively on my research methods, as discussed above, the research process was 
driven heavily by contextual factors (where doctors worked, their position within the 
hospital) rather than an easily repeatable process. Although through rigorous research 
practice we can approach a valid understanding of the world, ‘all knowledge is contextual 
and partial and perspectives are always possible’ (Altheide & Johnson, 2011: 581-582). 
 
  
                                                




APPENDIX B: List of research participants  
1.   Description of medical doctors involved in the study (pseudonyms) 
 Pseudonym Description Contracted to Type of facility Specialisation Data collection 
1 Dr Jacobs 
 
Coloured, 
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DOH Tertiary Neurology Interview 















































15 Dr Naidoo 
 
Indian, early 























17 Dr Malik 
 
Coloured, 











































































23 Dr English White, 50s, 
male 
DOH Hospital Infectious 
diseases 
Interview 









2.   Description of other health professionals included in interviews or focus groups 
 
 Hospital  Description Type of hospital   Department  Data collection 
Whitney Hospital Coloured, female, 
40s 
Tertiary Social work Interview  
Whitney Hospital Coloured, male, 
40s 
Tertiary Social work Interview 
Whitney Hospital Coloured, female, 
20s 
Tertiary OT - Work 
Assessment 
Interview 




Social work - 
Intellectual disability 
Social worker FG 




Social work - Forensic 
psychiatry 
Social worker FG 




Social work - General 
Psychiatry  
Social worker FG 




Nurse - Forensic 
Psychiatry 
Nurse FG 




Nurse - General 
psychiatry 
Nurse FG 




Nurse - General 
psychiatry 
Nurse FG 

















late 30s  





Welgemoed Hospital Female District hospital Social Worker Email  
 
3.   Interviews and correspondence with government officials and disability experts 
 
Participant Position 
Thomas Ongolo Programmes Manager African Decade of Persons with Disabilities 
Margie Schneider University of Cape Town – disability expert  
Irmgard Marais Western Cape SASSA DMU 
John Marite Former General Manager of Disability SASSA 
Selwyn Jehoma Former Deputy Director General Social Security DSD  
Nomfundo Sasa Western Cape SASSA DMU 
Yogan Pillay Deputy Director General Department of Health  




APPENDIX C: Additional interview quotations and field notes  
2.1  Households that are in receipt of social grants are more active in job searches and go 
onto start survivalist and small enterprises. The income security and predictability 
that the social grants provide also allow households to take risks to augment their 
overall income. Teenage pregnancy has been on the decline in South Africa for more 
than a decade. The view that South Africans struggled to free their country and 
themselves from racial discrimination and are now not interested in building their 
country but want to lie down and laze in the African sun and wait for government to 
give them free handouts without them lifting a finger is indeed a disturbing, 
unfortunate and untrue one. (Skweyiya 
2.2  What happened was that the health professional was confronted with the poverty of 
the patient. Even if the patient was not disabled from a medical point of view, some 
doctors would declare him/her disabled so that he/she could access a grant 
(Unnamed Social Development Portfolio Committee Member, 2010)  
3.1   A middle-aged woman then came up to me asking about her grant – she was assisted 
by a man who helped to translate. She was waiting for the doctor because she had 
made an application in October/November but not heard anything from SASSA (it is 
now January) and wanted to find out from the doctor what had happened. I asked her 
if she had a slip for an appointment from the doctor but she did not. I tried to explain 
via the translator that the doctor could only help her if she had a slip and that she did 
not make the decisions or do the administration for the grant – it was SASSA’s job 
and she would need to take it up with them. Not sure how much was understood but 
she did end up going anyway. There seems to be a lot of confusion around the 
appointment system – obviously people know when the DG doctor is in but don’t 
understand that it works centrally through SASSA (Field notes, 17 January 2014).  
4.1 The person will say that they are in pain but you can give them test like the ramp and 
the stairs to do...which are physical tests, but then they will have no indicators of 
pain. Their facial expression will be the same, there will be no facial expression of 
pain, their body language will tell you they are not in pain but they will SAY they are 
in pain about everything they are doing, they are still doing it underneath the normal 
times taken and they are not using the railings, there's no abnormal gait pattern - 
those type of things and then you can also see if they know that we are testing them 
they will excessively walk slower, much slower, on the stairs and then we'll record the 
time but they don't realise that we are still assessing them during tea and lunchtime. 
(Occupational therapist, interview, 2014 April 23)  
4.2  In the ward you’ve got a whole team of people and it’s quite evident whether or not 
someone is disabled because your patients are seen by physiotherapists, occupational 
therapists and speech therapists attached to the ward. It’s not too hard to make that 





4.3 “Sometimes the clever ones lie and say that they were given enough pills to last three 
months. In these cases he tells people, “You should perform the same miracle on 
bread and fish.”’ (Dr Haddid, field notes, 22 July 2014) 
4.4.   Dr Vrede usually starts by reading through the file before engaging with patients and 
she notices that there is something in the file that indicates non-compliance. She asks 
the patient whether she is attending her [treatment] club and the patient tells her that 
she is. She then asks her why she is applying and the patient replies, “I am not 
working and I am suffering.” (Dr Vrede, field notes, Feb 2014)  
4.5. You start asking yourself, "why, what is this treatment for?" and sometimes from the 
stories that they tell you, you can see that they know nothing about this treatment - it 
is probably borrowed treatment - so we have had to be vigilant in terms of how we go 
about and sometimes asking questions. You would ask them, "this tablet that you say 
is yours. I am accepting that you say it is yours. How do you take it?" and if the 
person gives you a totally wrong dosage intervals for that so that you would know 
that they don't know this treatment - they cannot be taking that high, you know.  
(Marite, interview, 2014 June 27)  
5.1  Is it good medical advice or is it bad medical advice – that’s got to be shown by your 
behaviour as a doctor, but the form doesn’t help you do any of that because none of 
that is allowed. You're not entitled to write what you think - you've got to write what 
they think…The person who sits here is the person who needs the disability and you 
the doctor have to decide. Now either you are able to do that or you are not and that 
is based on experience. I mean I had 20 years as an occupational health...workmen’s 
compensation stuff - that's a lot of experience. (Dr Brown, interview, 2014 April 4) 
6.1  It is about employability, but it's for the open labour market, not for sheltered labour, 
so many people can still...a person with a chronic back problem, he can sit down, he 
can do office work, but I do not know what is the education level of the patient and it's 
not necessary because there it is on the form [points to form] “open labour market.” 
That is important. That is the thing I discovered a long time ago. It says, “Does it 
affect the client's ability to enter the open labour market?” So in other words, I can 
say “this and this patient is okay for this type of work or that office work, clerical 
work, but not fit for physical labour...but it is OPEN labour market, so we do not 
distinguish.” (Bury, interview, 2014 July 22) 
6.2  Are you encouraging people not to work? But you also see people that people in 
South Africa are somehow lazy and not interested in work – you see young people. r 
Bhele, Field notes) 
6.3 Grants should be made available to those deserving and more of them should be 
getting them and those non-deserving ones should be taken out of the system. It’s been 
open to abuse. (Quality assurer, interview)  
6.4.  She says it’s the same with the child support grant and people that leave their child  
the grandmother and use the money from themselves. But she is very clear in saying 
that it’s not everyone – in every system there is abuse but there are people that also 
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really need it. (Dr Bhele, interview)  
6.5   Because you see that sister [referring to a nurse who is assisting her with her 
paperwork] she is also sick – she has high blood pressure. I tell the people “she is 
almost 56/57 but she is sick and she is still working, you see. So you must try to do 
something, you can’t be lazy.” [Laughs](Dr Kewasi, interview, 4 February 2014)   
6.6 And quite often those people who have never worked...they say "I've never worked" - 
how can you apply for a disability grant when you're 56 or whatever and if they have 
family to look after them then they don't really need the grant, especially if they've 
never worked [chuckles]. No, if someone has been looking after you for years - for 
many years - I don't think you deserve a disability grant because you're then not really 
disabled. (Dr De Villiers, Interview)  
6.7 Well that's my impression, but it's very difficult if they’ve never worked before and 
you also have that feeling of like, “so you’ve never worked before, you've never 
earned any money, you've never contributed anything” and then it’s difficult to know 
whether they just haven't contributed anything or they just can't find work… like do 
you know what I mean? Life is hard, you don't know. (Dr Harvey, Interview, April 30)  
6.8 A lot of patients in black communities are uneducated and come from the Eastern 
Cape, but this does not mean you can’t work”, she says. We then talk about education 
and to what degree it should be considered. She doesn’t have much sympathy for those 
who are uneducated and seems to think that people can do other kinds of work. She 
thinks differently if someone has certain skills (uses the example of a machinist that 
uses their hands) and then lost that ability to do that specific job and became “stuck.” 
(Dr Soet, fieldwork, 12 Feb) 
6.9  Drug addiction is a real difficult one...like I mean, once a drug user, always a drug 
user and once you give them money sometimes it's enough of an initiation to start 
using again and it's very difficult to predict. But you can't punish them because...And I 
mean we don't really test...do drug tests...I can but again should you give the grant to 
someone who has chronic obstructive airways disease or emphysema from smoking? 
They continue to smoke - should you still give a grant? I have another lady who is tik-
induced cardiomyopathy but she's got 5 kids, but she's never worked a day in her life - 
she's 28 and she's got not a great heart and medically she qualifies but how do I know 
for sure that she's not going to use, but it would make a real difference to her life if 
she could have a grant for her kids and for her well-being, but she's never actually 
worked before that so it's difficult...I don't know, I don't know the answer. (Dr Harvey, 
interview, 2014 April 30)  
6.10 She says there are a lot of drug problems in the Muslim areas – “people who have 
fried their brains with drugs” She is very strict about these applications and does 
not give the grant unless the psychiatrist recommended it. “It is taking from others”. 
She will consider it if they have stopped using drugs and they have ongoing 
symptoms and the psychiatrist has said that they are not functioning. 
She tells me of a patient in his early 20s with MDR living in Bonteheuwel (coloured). 
She says that with MDR you usually get 1 – 1.5 years on the grant mainly because 
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they want to isolate you from the work environment. She said that he defaulted and 
came back very sick and restarted medicaition. She personally felt that she should not 
get the grant but she could see he was very unwell.. He also looked like a 
“drughead”. She did not want to give him the grant but felt she had to but only made 
it 6 months. She says that you can’t “let your personal bias come in”.  She said that if 
she saw him getting well she would probably not continue it. (Soet, field notes, 2014 
February 12) 
6.11 He is as mad as a hatter! He obviously needs something, but not a disability grant. All 
he will do with a grant is go and buy drugs. (Dr Brown, field notes, 4 April 2014)  
6.12 G: The one question that you seem to ask most patients is "who do you live with?" What 
are you trying to establish there with that kind of question? 
D: The thing is...I once saw a patient in Groot River and the sister there, the head 
sister she knew...she's been working there for a long time and she basically knew 
everyone and this lady came in for disability grant and she was nearing 60 and sister 
Fredericks said, "But this patient, her children can look after her. We all looked after 
our mothers and fathers and so on" and that's obviously true you know. If I have a sick 
mother, I would look after her. If I have work and my wife didn't work etc. etc. and 
then she doesn't really need it. (Interview, Dr De Villiers, 2014 July 18).  
6.13 He has a problem with the grant-in-aid because he sees women coming in looking for 
the grant to compensate them for looking after their husbands. He thinks that this is 
part of one’s marriage vows and asks me whether I would apply for a grant to look 
after my husband. He says that the argument they make is that they could be working 
but instead are looking after the husband but he says that the grant can also be used 
to pay for a caregiver and the woman could go work. He says that he often tells 
women this (he has a tendency to lecture claimants). (Field notes, 2014 June 11) 
6.15  I tell him that I had noticed that he asks everyone their age, education-level, and work 
experience and I ask him how he takes this information into account. He says that he 
takes these factors into account in terms of the person’s likelihood of getting a job. 
(Field notes, June 2014 11) 
6.16  It’s very well and good to say "well actually you can get a job that isn't manual labour" 
but they're not really qualified to do anything other than that. (Dr Harvey, interview, 
2014 April 15 )  
6.17 She says the main reason for applications is high unemployment. She sometimes asks 
patients if they have worked before and many of them haven’t, even those in their 40s. 
(Dr Bhele, Interview, 2014 April 30)  
6.18  …sometimes I think social circumstances do play a role - education level, you know if 
you, if you've got skills you can have a much higher level of pathology and still work 
than if you don't have skills. I mean some people - labourers - don't require a lot of 
skills either but the job market is very tight so...so ja, I do think about those things, I 
can't say that they don't influence. (Dr Wright, interview, 2014 April 4)  
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6.18 Generally it is not a problem if it’s a labourer and the guy has gone to 
school until Std. 2 or 3 (Grade 4 or 5) and he can’t work – he will clearly 
qualify for a grant. But if you get a guy with matric or any other sort of skill 
then generally it’s a problem to give someone a permanent disability. 
Normally he will qualify easily for a TDG and we will encourage the guy to 
find some work. What I will also do in those cases is refer to an occupational 
therapist if there is any uncertainty but you’ll find with some of these guys 
they are just on the grant all the time and you will try R1000 a month if 
you’ve got matric if you can’t find you’ve got no choice but to just repeat it, 
but I have a problem giving them permanent. The guidelines are not very 
clear when it comes to that. (Dr Jacobs, interview, 2013 October 24) 
6.19 I ask the nurse about the type of people that come to apply for the grant. She said that 
often the people come because they are over 50 and say they can’t get a job because 
they are not 100% well. A lot of people re-apply after 3 months because they have no 
other options. (Field notes, 28 January 2014)  
6.20  He shows me someone else’s file and we talk about age – he says that lots of people in 
their 50s come to apply. Work is difficult to find and that work [that is available] is 
always given to a younger person with no record of illness. (Field notes, 9 June 2014) 
6.21  Patient 16: Older lady. She is applying 6 months after her TB treatment was 
completed. She says that she was trying to sell things on the streets but she is tired, 
coughing and “not right for working” - she is quite emphatic about this. Doctor 
Vrede says to her “why do you come to me now once the TB is finished?” She asked 
her where her TB was and she says that it was in her glands. She recommended the 
SRD but no grant. After the patient leaves she says that with the older people who are 
too young for the pension but are not eligible for the DG she looks for something such 
as osteoarthritis, but if there is nothing then she will just give SRD (Field notes, 2013 
October 24).  
6.22 When it comes to age then it also becomes quite subjective. I am aware of how 
difficult it is for older people to find employment (even older doctors!) and I have 
seen colleagues have a low threshold to submit DG forms for a patient close to 
pensionable age. (Dr Taylor, email correspondence, 12 February 2014)  
6.23 After the patient leaves Dr Soet tells me that this woman fell into a grey area. She 
is in that age category where it is very difficult for her to find a job. She does not 
look like she is actively drinking, but clinically she is not “sick, sick”. She says 
that she was looking for things wrong with her and that is why she had examined 
her joints – “normally in her age group they will have arthritis”. She says that 
there is a need to make her understand that she might not get the grant but she 
would give her the grant for combined TB/HIV just because of her age – she has 
not lost much weight (only 2 kilograms) and looks relatively healthy so if she has 
TB it is still very early. She adds, “When you are young you have more of an 
opportunity to find work”. (Field notes, 12 February 2014) 
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7.1  When asked by Dr Vrede why she is applying the patient says that she doesn’t 
have a qualification and admits that it is difficult to find a job. She adds that she 
is married with three children, but has no husband and lives with her sister. 
(Field notes, October 2013). 
7.2  He said that he had a boy in matric coming in recently to apply for the grant. When 
he asked him why he said that he was wanting money for his gran because his gran 
was having to look after him. When he asked him what was wrong with him he said 
“my little toe is crooked”. He said the boy’s intentions were good but that there was 
this complete misunderstanding of what a disability is. He says that people who have 
had an operation or a broken leg (even many years ago) think they must get the grant 
even if they no longer have symptoms – he says there is no understanding that the 
operation “fixed” them. He tries to explain that the reason they had the operation 
was to make them better and having an operation does not mean by definition that 
there is something wrong with you. (Field notes, 2014 June 9) 
7.3  A big thing are limps - you really need to be very vigilant, sometimes limps change 
(sometimes the limp was in that leg and now it's in this leg) or things like we have a 
test where they need to pick up bricks and they say, "no but I can't pick up this brick" 
and we've had a couple and then they can pick up their bag, which was heavier than a 
brick, or you watch them walk and they have a good pace and then you put them in a 
test where they have to walk for 6 minutes and all of a sudden it's a tortoise, so those 
things...you pick up between your standardised tasks and your simulated tasks - the 
two don't match somewhere either you're doing something wrong or the patient is 
trying to... (Occupational therapist, interview, 2014 April)  
7.4 She mentions that some people even default on their medication to get sick again – 
but according to the SASSA guidelines defaulting means no grant. She says that you 
can listen to the history of defaulting and if there is no clear reason why they have 
defaulted you can give them SRD, but not the grant. She says that this is a problem 
with epilepsy because people sometimes abuse alcohol or drugs that interfere with the 
effectiveness of their medication. She says she can see this from their file where the 
doctor has noted on a number of occasions that they have advised the patient to 
change their behaviour and they have not. She says that she also often tries to 
encourage them to stop. (Dr Bhele, field notes, 2014 April 30). 
7.5 You'll get the people - the aunties or the older ladies who would say “I won't be able 
to do that" - so they've already got this perception of “I can't" and then when they do 
do it, it's like “[sigh], it's like so difficult.” I also don't know if it's because of who 
they are, their perceptions of themselves like “I'm not good enough" and I think that it 
feeds into their motivation to eventually go and look for work because "I can't do 
anything”. I've had 21 year olds come in here and say they need a disability grant 
because they broke their arm! So it's like for me it’s like wow, it's amazing how 
people view themselves (Occupational therapist interview, 2014 April 25).  
7.6  In reponse to a woman who was complaining about having to pay for taxi fare to go 
to Woodstock of an xray she says “People only like you when you give them the 
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grant” People hold community meetings to complain about the doctors. (Field notes, 
2014 Feb 12)   
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APPENDIX E: Maps of the Western Cape Health District 
 MAP 1: Western Cape Provincial Health Districts  
 















APPENDIX F: Interview/Focus Group Guides Other Healthcare Professionals 
QUESTIONS SOCIAL WORKERS AND NURSES: 
1.   Maybe we could start off with you telling me how the DG process works at the 
hospital.  
a.   Does it work differently in the different departments of the hospital 
b.   Who is involved in the decision-making? 
c.   Who initiates the DG process?  
d.   Do staff involved always agree? What happens when they don’t?  
e.   To patients normally get temporary or permanent grants?  
 
2.   Other than the medical considerations, what else do you take into account when 
thinking about who should get a grant or not? 
 
3.   What is the biggest challenge around the disability grant?  
 
4.   Can we discuss a few cases of patients where you have advocated (try to convince the 
rest of the team) for the patient to get or not get the grant? 
 




TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION OTs 
•   What is work assessment and how does it “work”?  
•    
•   How do DG patients come to have a WA at x? 
o   What areas of hospital refer the most? 
•   What is the role of occupational therapists in the assessment process in relation to the 
disability grant? Why are OTs called on – what do they know that doctors don’t?  
 
•   Bio-psycho-social model / social model? 
•   What challenges does the DG present to your work? 
o   Inappropriate referrals – why?  
•   What makes someone disabled rather than impaired? What does disability mean in the 




•   How accurately is the current DG tool and processes able to accurately identify 
disability? 
 
•   New vs. old system  
•   A discussion on patients – what complaints do they present with? Socio-economic 
factors; attitudes; “performances” 
 
•   General views on the social security system 
 
•   Recommendations on how the system could be improved / refined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
